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Administrative Law. Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler,
21 A.3d 430 (R.I. 2011). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that a party cannot bring a substantive due process claim against
a governmental body acting in a purely advisory capacity, and
that when a purely advisory government body acts, a plaintiff has
no constitutionally protected interest in the advisory body's
actions that may give rise to a procedural due process claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
November 2005. Plaintiff land developers, including the
Narragansett Improvement Company, file an application with the
North Smithfield Planning Board to develop property in North
Smithfield.' From September 2006 to August 2007, the planning
board reviews the application. 2 The application is denied in
August 2007 for a variety of reasons. 3 This case revolves around
one: certain rock piles at the property may be Native American
burial mounds.4
2001. Plaintiffs hire the Public Archaeological Library (PAL)
to study the rock piles. PAL 'conclude[s] that the stone mounds
[are] not burial sites."'5
April 2007. PAL's conclusion is contested.6 The North
Smithfield Conservation Commission presents an individual who
is both an anthropologist and an archaeologist to the North
Smithfield Town Council.7 The anthropologist relates that he has
studied the pertinent property and noted "significant historical
artifacts and mound piles"' and "thought ... [they] contain[ed] the
1. Narragansett Improvement Co. v. Wheeler, 21 A.3d 430, 433 (R.I.
2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 435.
4. Id. at 433-34.
5. Id. at 435 n.9
6. Id. at 435.
7. Id. at 434.
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remains of American Indians." The Town Council approves a
motion requesting that the anthropologist and the conservation
commission "defin[e] and protect[] the area and present it9 to the
[pilanning [bloard for their review."' 0 Shortly thereafter the
anthropologist is hired by the town council in order to "conduct an
archaeological study of a site adjacent to the proposed
[development] site."" During this time, the planning board has
been holding informational meetings as it reviews plaintiffs'
application. 12
August 2, 2007. The planning board holds its fourth and final
informational hearing. 13  Evelyn Wheeler, chairperson of the
Rhode Island Advisory Commission on Historical Cemeteries,
testifies to the planning board that the cemeteries commission has
"identified and registered" two cemeteries [that are at least
partially on the proposed site1 4] as historical.15 She provides the
planning board with a June 2007 letter she sent to a member of
the conservation committee. 16  The letter states that the
cemeteries commission "ha[d] been informed by [a member of the
cemeteries commission], of the two (2) new cemeteries which ha[d]
been registered with the RI Historical Cemetery Database. . . ."1 7
The anthropologist testifies too. He is "95% certain that the stone
mounds on the proposed [development site] are burial mounds."18
He explains that the 2001 PAL report (which, the reader may
recall, contradicts his conclusion) is "at best cursory."l9
August 16, 2007. The planning board unanimously votes to
8. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. This enigmatic "it" is not explained in the Court's opinion. The
opinion alludes to a "final report" to be prepared by the anthropologist. The
contents of this report are not discussed, but the Court notes that it was not
completed by the time the planning board rendered its decision. See id. at
442.
10. Id. at 434.
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See generally id. at 435 (The extent to which either or both of these
two cemeteries encroach upon plaintiffs' property is unclear from the Court's
opinion).
15. Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. at 434-35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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deny plaintiffs' application for development. 20
October 24, 2007. Plaintiffs file a seven count complaint
against the cemeteries commission:
[C]ount 1 sought declaratory judgment on a violation ...
of the substantive due process clause of the Rhode Island
Constitution; count 2 sought declaratory judgment on a
violation of the procedural due process clause of the
Rhode Island Constitution; count 3 sought a declaration
that chapter 18.3 of title 23 [which statute creates the
advisory committee] is unconstitutional, both on its face
and as applied; count 4 sought a declaration that the
'registration' of the historical cemeteries by the advisory
commission is null and void; count 5 alleged slander of
title; count 6 alleged trespass [voluntarily dismissed by
the plaintiffs]; and count 7 alleged tortious interference
with expected business advantage, opportunity, and
-21
expectation.
November 15, 2007. The planning board issues a written
decision addressing the denial of plaint fs' application. 22  The
decision evinces great deference to the anthropologist's testimony
and near disregard of the PAL report.23 The latter, the decision
explains, "offer[ed] no reference to historical data, empirical
evidence or any other historical records to support [its]
conclusions."24 Furthermore, the authors of the PAL report never
appeared before the planning board; the anthropologist did.25
December 2007. Defendants move to dismiss all but the
trespass claim. 26 In June 2008 plaintiffs object to the motion to
dismiss, and file for summary judgment.27 On July 8, 2008, a
hearing is held at the trial court: Defendants argue that any
registration by the cemeteries commission is merely "symbolic."28
Plaintiffs reply that the cemeteries commission acted ultra vires
20. Id. at 435.
21. Id. at 436.
22. Id. at 435.
23. Id.
24. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 436.
27. Id.
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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when it sent a letter to the conservation committee saying that it
had registered the cemeteries as historic; that the cemeteries
commission intended for the planning board to rely upon the
asserted registration; and that the planning board did rely upon
that registration. 29  The plaintiffs suggest that the motion to
dismiss had been transformed into a motion for summary
judgment, on account of the breadth of materials presented to the
trial justice. 30 "I guess so," elucidates the trial justice. 31 At the
end of the July 8, 2008 hearing, the trial justice grants defendants'
motion to dismiss. 32 Because the cemeteries commission is purely
advisory, "no cause of action of constitutional dimension" can be
raised against it, opines the trial justice.3 3  The trial justice
clarifies that when the chair of the cemeteries commission said
that the cemeteries were registered as historic cemeteries, she did
not mean that the cemeteries were registered in a legally
operative fashion, she merely meant that they had been listed in
an internal database. 34
December 17, 2008. Final judgment is entered; only one of
the plaintiffs timely appeals. 35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island treated the entry of
dismissal for defendants as though it were one of summary
judgment, for procedural reasons related to the quantum of
evidence presented to the trial judge.3 6
Plaintiffs claim that the cemeteries commission violated
plaintiffs' procedural due process rights: the commission violated
constitutionally protected interests without affording notice or an
opportunity to be heard. Nay, responds the Supreme Court.38
When a purely advisory government body acts, a plaintiff has no
29. Id.
30. Id. at 436-37.
31. Id. at 437.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 438.
38. Id. at 439.
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constitutionally protected interest in the advisory body's actions. 39
The Court cites a 2007 case involving the Commission on Judicial
Tenure and Discipline. 40 There, the commission was relieved of
liability because it acted in an advisory role; it lacked the
authority to enforce its recommendations.41 In that case, the
authority (the Rhode Island Supreme Court) "conduct[ed its] own
evaluation of the evidence adduced by the commission and
reach[ed] an independent conclusion."42 So too here. The North
Smithfield Planning Board acts independently of the cemeteries
commission and is not bound by its recommendations. 43
Plaintiffs claim that the cemeteries commission violated
plaintiffs' substantive due process because the cemeteries
commission's actions were "arbitrary and unreasonable."44 Nay,
responds the Supreme Court. 45  "[A] party cannot bring a
substantive legal claim against a governmental body acting in a
purely advisory capacity." 46 Since the cemeteries commission's
actions were purely advisory, the plaintiff has no substantive due
process claim. 47
Plaintiffs claim that the cemeteries commission's slandered
plaintiffs' title.48 "Slander of title occurs when a party maliciously
makes false statements about another party's ownership of real
property, which then results in the owner suffering a pecuniary
loss."49 Malice, as used here, refers only to "an intent to deceive or
injure."50 Nay, responds the Supreme Court. 51 The planning
board did not rely upon Wheeler's testimony or the letter she
presented to the planning board when it denied plaintiffs'
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id. (citing In re Comm'n on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 916 A.2d
746 (R.I. 2007)).
41. Id. (citing Comm'n on Judicial Tenure and Discipline, 916 A.2d at
751-52).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 440.
44. Id. at 438.
45. Id. at 441.
46. Id. at 440.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 441.
49. Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id. (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 442.
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application.52 The Court supports this proposition by referring to
the planning board's written decision that frequently references
the anthropologist's findings, and, according to the Court's
reading, only infrequently or unimportantly refers to the
cemeteries commission's "registration."53 While "the plaintiffs did
present competent evidence establishing a dispute concerning ...
whether the advisory commission made false statements and ...
acted with malice[, the record lacks competent evidence
showing] ... that the actions of the advisory commission resulted
in a pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs."54 The Court acknowledges
that Wheeler admitted that she intended for her statements to be
used by the planning board to block the planned development. 55
Yet, Chief Justice Suttell boldly opines, "[i]t is clear" that the
planning board did not actually rely upon Wheeler's allegations. 56
Finally, even if the planning board did rely upon Wheeler's
allegations, its independent decision to deny plaintiffs application
is a superseding cause of appellant's pecuniary loss.5 7 The Court
cites a First Circuit opinion dismissing a complaint against a
researcher, noting that "[e]ven if . .. government officials relied on
[the researcher's] research and opinions, the independent decision
to credit his views and [act upon them] stands as a superseding
cause of plaintiffs claimed harm."58 Finally, the Court notes that
there were a "host of [other] reasons" to deny the application. 59
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court. 60
COMMENTARY
The cemeteries commission is a creature of statute that may
only study cemeteries and make recommendations relative to
cemeteries in Rhode Island.6' It cannot actually register
cemeteries as a historic cemeteries; that privilege is reserved for
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 441.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 442.
58. Id.; see also Jacob v. Curt, 898 F.2d 838, 839 (1st Cir. 1990).
59. Narragansett Improvement Co., 21 A.3d at 442.
60. Id.
61. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.3-1 (2008).
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the recorder of deeds in the appropriate municipality. 62  Thus,
unremarkable is the conclusion that the cemeteries commission
did not violate plaintiffs' procedural or substantive due process
rights by merely mouthing off.
More suspect is the conclusion that the defendants did not
slander plaintiffs' titles. Slander of title requires that a party "[11
maliciously [2] makes false statements about another party's
ownership of real property, [3] which then results in the owner
suffering a pecuniary loss."63 The Court acknowledged that the
plaintiff had carried its burden (that is, showed a genuine issue of
material fact) on at least the first two elements, but failed on the
third. The Court reasoned that the defendants' conduct did not
proximately cause plaintiffs injury because 1) the planning board
did not rely upon the cemeteries commission's report, and because
2) even if it did, the planning board's decision represents a
superseding cause which negates proximate cause.64
The undersigned demurs. Ms. Wheeler, the chairperson of
the Rhode Island Advisory Commission on Historical Cemeteries,
informed the planning board that portions of the plaintiffs land
had been "identified and registered" as historic cemeteries.65 One
might easily mistake this as a legally operative registration:
Wheeler's word choice and grammar obscure the internal,
inoperative nature of the registration. 66 Who would guess that she
merely "inventor[ied]" them in an internal "database"?67 Perhaps
the members of the North Smithfield planning board sleep with a
dog-eared copy of title 23, section 18 of the Rhode Island General
Laws beneath their pillows. But the members' intimacy vel non
with the minutiae of state law is at least a genuine issue of
material fact.
The Court believes that the planning board's non-reliance
upon Wheeler's allegation is demonstrated by the planning board's
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18-10.1 (2008).
63. Narragansett Improvement Co., 21 A.3d at 441.
64. Id. at 442.
65. Id. at 434.
66. See, e.g., id. at 434 ("[The cemeteries commission] ha[d] been
informed by the Providence County Commissioner [of the cemeteries
commission], of the two (2) new cemeteries which ha[d] been registered with
the RI Historical Cemetery Database as NS 52 and NS 53.").
67. See id. at 434 n.8.
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written decision. 68 However, the plaintiffs' application was denied
on August 16, 2007. A written decision released in November is
thus watery, attenuated evidence of what the planning board
thought on August 16.69 Since it was released weeks after the
plaintiffs had filed suit in October, the planning board's decision
may have been trimmed of any references to the cemeteries
commission's finding. Even assuming the months-late, post-
litigation decision honestly reflected the planning board's
rationale on August 16, 2007, the decision contains repeated
references to the cemeteries commission's registration and even
adopts the purportedly internal nomenclature of the cemeteries
commission. 70 A jury may have found that the planning board
relied on Wheeler's statements.
The Court's fall-back justification is that, even if the planning
board had relied upon the cemeteries commission registration, the
planning board's independent deliberation and decision acted as a
superseding cause. This too is suspect. Imagine that the planning
board did indeed operate under the assumption that portions of
plaintiffs' land was registered as historical cemeteries under the
Rhode Island statute entitled "Registering historical cemeteries."
A dispositive legal classification clearly robs the planning board of
its ability to make independent decisions.
The Court's citation to Jacob v. Curt is inapt. There the
American defendant co-authored an article that criticized a
foreign clinic's safety and efficacy.7 1 But the American author was
clearly not acting as an employee of the foreign government, with
either actual or apparent authority to classify the clinic as
unsafe.72 Here Wheeler was the chairperson of a statutorily
created entity named the Rhode Island Advisory Commission on
68. Id. at 441.
69. Even if the planning board had learned at some point between
August 16 and the issuance of the written decision that Ms. Wheeler's
registration was legally inoperative and still decided to deny the application
on other grounds, then the plaintiffs would be entitled to damages for the
delay in developing the land between August 16 and the date that the
planning board realized its error and decided upon different grounds.
70. "Historic Cemetery NS 52 is comprised of a number of graves
marked by stone mounds . . . ." Narragansett Improvement Co., 21 A.3d at
442.
71. See id.; see also Jacob v. Curt, 721 F. Supp. 1536, 1538 (D.R.I. 1989)
aff'd, 898 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1990).
72. Narragansett Improvement Co., 21 A.3d at 442.
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Historical Cemeteries. And her allegation that land had been
registered as a historical cemetery at least superficially tracks the
language in the legally operative statute entitled "Registering
historical cemeteries." 73  Yet the Court cites no evidence
suggesting that the planning board was aware of the impotence of
Wheeler's classification. The Court's peremptory one-sentence
conclusion that the application would have been denied on other
grounds satisfies only the uncritical reader.74 Thus the author
offers that plaintiffs were entitled to test the credibility of the
planning boards' purported non-reliance on the cemeteries
commission registration in front of a jury; to explore the basis of
the August 16, 2007 denial without being forced to rely upon the
attenuated evidence of a written decision issued in November
(which arguably demonstrates reliance anyhow); and to have a
jury decide, to what extent if at all, Ms. Wheeler's machinations
deprived plaintiffs of their ability to lawfully develop their land.
CONCLUSION
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and
concluded that the plaintiffs have neither protected liberty
interest nor substantive due process rights in a purely advisory
body's actions. Furthermore, the defendants are not liable for
slander, if slander there was, because the planning board did not
rely upon the slander when it rendered its decision.
William Wray
73. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18-10.1 (2008).
74. "Moreover, the planning board conducted a comprehensive review of
the proposed development project and denied the plaintiffs' application for a
host of reasons other than the possible existence of historical cemeteries,
including the plaintiffs' failure to comply with a number of statutory
requirements and subdivision regulations." Narragansett Improvement Co.,
21 A.3d at 442.
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Administrative Law. Pierce v. Providence Ret. Bd., 15 A.3d 957
(R.I. 2011). After a review of Providence, Rhode Island Code of
Ordinances section 1-2 and section 17-189(5), the Rhode Island
Supreme Court determined that a firefighter, retired due to a
permanent disability resulting from several work-related injuries,
is entitled accidental disability retirement benefits so long as his
disability was the "natural and probable" result of a work-related
injury.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
During twenty-six years of service as a firefighter for the City
of Providence, Scott Pierce ("Pierce") sustained several accidental,
on-the-job injuries to his right ankle.' His first injury occurred
between May 1, 1989 and sometime in 1994.2 Finally, on June 29,
20063 Pierce sustained a final on-the-job injury while responding
to a fire. 4 The injury later resulted in Pierce's ankle being
surgically fused and he was unable to return to work.5 After being
unable to return to work, Pierce applied to the Providence
Retirement Board ("Board") for accidental-disability retirement
("ADR") benefits based on section 17-189(5) of the Providence,
Rhode Island Code of Ordinances ("the ordinance" or "section 17-
189(5)").6
1. Pierce v. Providence Ret. Bd., 15 A.3d 957, 958-59 (R.I. 2011);
PROVIDENCE, R.I. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189(5) (2011).
2. Pierce, 15 A.3d at 959 n.3. Here, the Court notes that there is some
discrepancy in the record about the date of the initial injury, but considers
1994 as the date of initial injury for consistency since it is not particularly
important to the appeal. Id.
3. Id. at 958 n.1. The Court notes that there is some discrepancy in the
record about the date of the June 2006 injury but uses the date June 29, 2006
for consistency because the exact date is irrelevant to their analysis. Id.
4. Id. at 959.
5. Id.
6. Id. Section 17-189(5) of the code is captioned "Benefits payable" and
creates a three tiered system of retirement benefits termed "service
retirement," "ordinary disability retirement," and "accidental disability
514
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As required by the ordinance, Pierce was examined by three
physicians.7 Each physician concluded, because of injuries related
to his employment Pierce was permanently disabled from
performing his full duties as a firefighter.8  Further, each
physician checked a box on a questionnaire supplied by the board
indicating that Pierce's "incapacity [was] the natural and
proximate result of an accident while in the performance of duty."9
On the same questionnaire, when asked to indicate the date and
location of the accident, each physician indicated in various ways
that the injury was the result of more than one accident at more
than one location.' 0 After receiving the opinions of the physicians,
the board had its medical advisor send follow-up letters asking the
physicians to clarify whether Pierce's injury was the result of the
single event in June 2006 or multiple events." Two of the
physicians responded that the disability was the result of
cumulative injuries and one physician responded that the injury
was the result of the original 1994 injury and would have
progressed regardless of Pierce's duties. 12
On May 23, 2007 the board voted to deny Peirce's ADR
benefits but made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in
support of its decision.13 Subsequently, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court granted Pierce's writ of certiorari to review the
May 23, 2007 decision by the board.14 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court vacated the board's decision on the grounds that it was
impossible to review the decision in the absence of findings of fact
requirement." The service retirement acts as a normal retirement pension
while accidental and ordinary disability are pensions for employees that
become permanently disabled in a manner that prevents them from
performing their normal work duties. The primary difference between
eligibility for ordinary and accidental disability retirement benefits is that
ordinary includes non-work-related injuries while accidental includes only
work-related injuries that disable the employee. The primary difference
between the two with regards to benefits is that accidental disability benefits
are significantly higher than ordinary disability benefits. Id. at 961.
7. Pierce, 15 A.3d at 959. (The physicians were James E. McLennan,
M.D., Randall L. Updegrove, M.D., and Thomas F. Morgan, M.D.).
8. Id.
9. Id. (brackets in original, internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 959-60.
12. Id. at 960.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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by the board and remanded for a new hearing with a written
decision setting including findings of fact and legal conclusions.15
On January, 28, 2009 and March, 25, 2009 the medical
disability subcommittee of the board once again reviewed Pierce's
application for ADR benefits. 16 The subcommittee recommended
that the board deny Pierce's application on the grounds that his
disability was not the result of a single accidental injury.1
Taking this recommendation under advisement, the board again
denied Pierce's application in a written decision.18 In the written
decision the board determined that "[t]he independent physician
reports and other evidentiary material ... do[ I not indicate that a
specific accident was the cause of Pierce's injury" but instead that
Pierce's disability flowed from many, repeated injuries, "none of
which could be said to be the natural or proximate cause of his
incapacitating disability."l 9 The board then concluded that, as a
matter of law, Pierce could not establish that he was
"incapacitated as a proximate result of an accident as required by
[the] ordinance."20  Therefore, the board denied Pierce's
application.2' It is from this denial that Pierce appealed.22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court began by establishing the appropriate
standard of review. The Supreme Court determined that it was
their task to "discern whether any legally competent evidence
supports the lower tribunal's decision and whether the decision[-
]maker committed any reversible errors of law in the matter
under review," and that "legally competent evidence" consists of
"some or any evidence supporting the agency's findings." 23 When
the Court evaluates a question of law the review is de novo and if
error of law is found it must "'so infect[ ] the validity of the
15. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Providence Ret. Bd., 962 A.2d 1292, 1292-93
(R.I. 2009)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted, brackets in the original).
20. Id. at 960-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 961.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Sobanski v. Providence Emps. Ret. Bd., 981 A.2d 1021
(R.I. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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proceedings as to warrant reversal,"' for the Court to reverse the
board's decision.24
The Supreme Court noted that ADR benefits are only
available to those employees that are disabled in the line of duty
and are more lucrative than those benefits available to those
injured outside of work (66 2/3 percent of final compensation for
ADR benefits as compared to 45 percent of final compensation for
non-work-related disability) .25 The Supreme Court also noted
that the greater ADR benefits require more stringent criteria than
other retirement benefits. 26 The Supreme Court pointed out that
Pierce met nearly all of the ADR benefits requirements set forth in
section 17-189(5), a fact confirmed by the board in its decision. 27
However, the board rejected Pierce's application because his ankle
disability resulted from multiple accidents and was therefore "not
the natural and 'proximate result of an accident,"' namely the
"specific" June 2006 accident. 28
The Supreme Court divided its review of the board's statutory
interpretation of section 17-189(5), specifically the "a natural and
proximate result of an accident" language, into two elements. 29
The first analysis was of the meaning of the phrase "natural and
proximate result" and the second was of the phrase "an
accident." 30  The Court prefaced its analysis by turning to
Providence Code section 1-2 ("section 1-2") which embodies a
canon of interpretation for Providence ordinances requiring that
words and phrases in the singular should be construed as plural
and vice-versa unless manifestly inconsistent with the evident
intent of the city council.3 ' Section 1-2 further provides that
24. Id. (citing Lynch v. R.I. Dept. of Env. Mgmt., 994 A.2d 64, 70 (R.I.
2010); quoting Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 850 A.2d 900, 903 (R.I.
2004) (brackets in original)).
25. Id. (quoting Connelly v. City of Providence Ret. Bd., 601 A.2d 498,
500 (R.I. 1992)).
26. Id. at 962.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 963.
30. Id. at 963, 966.
31. Id. at 963-64 ("[Providence Code § 1-2] requires that the
interpretations 'shall be placed on the words and phrases hereinafter
mentioned, unless such construction or interpretation shall be manifestly
inconsistent with the evident intent of the city council."); PROVIDENCE, RI.
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1.2 (2011).
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"[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to the common
and approved usage of the language," and "technical words and
phrases and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and understood
according to such meaning." 32
The Court determined that the phrase "a natural and
proximate result of an accident" has "acquired a peculiar and
appropriate meaning in the law," because the term is not defined
in the statute and its meaning is not "commonly known and
understood by the lay public." 33 Therefore, the Court applied the
legal definition to the terms "natural" and "proximate," in accord
with section § 1-2.34 The Court defined the term "natural" to
mean "consequences which are normal, not extraordinary, [and]
not surprising in the light of ordinary experience." 35  It then
defined the word "proximate" in the context of legal "proximate
cause" to mean that there be a factual finding that the "harm
would not have occurred but for the [accident] and that the harm
[was a] natural and probable consequence of the [accident]."36
The Supreme Court noted that neither the questionnaire nor
the follow up letters from the examining physicians address
whether Pierce's injury was a "proximate result" of his June 2006
injury, only whether the injury "[was] solely the result of the
accident [on] 6/29/06" or whether multiple accidents caused the
disability. 37  Since "sole cause" and "proximate result" are not
synonymous, the Court looked to the entirety of the physicians'
medical opinions to determine if their findings established that
the June 2006 injury was the proximate cause of Pierce's
disability. 38
The Supreme Court concluded that Pierce's disability was "a
32. Pierce, 15 A.3d at 964 (quoting Providence Code § 1-2) (internal
quotation marks omitted, brackets in original); § 1-2.
33. Pierce, 15 A.3d at 964.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts, § 43 at 282 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
36. Id. (quoting DiPetrillo v. Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677, 692-93 (R.I.
1999).
37. Id. at 965.
38. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
natural and probable consequence of' the June 2006 accident.39
The Court held that the physicians' opinions stated that the each
of Pierce's accidents, including the June 2006 accident, were part
of a causal matrix that resulted in Pierce's disability. 40 Since the
physicians' opinions show a causal matrix between the accidents,
the Supreme Court concluded that the June 2006 injury was one
of the proximate causes resulting in Pierce's disability.41 Because
the June 2006 injury was a proximate cause of Pierce's disability,
the board's requirement that Pierce show that the June 2006
injury was the sole cause of his disability was a legal error that
"infected the validity of the proceedings." 42
After analyzing the "natural and proximate" phrase the Court
turned its analysis to the phrase "of an accident."43 The Court
held that section 1-2 requires that the term "of an accident" must
be interpreted to include multiple accidents.4 4  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court concluded that since there was no other defect
with Pierce's ADR benefit application, the board had improperly
denied his application. 45  The Court went on to note that its
decision was in accord with several other jurisdictions including
New York, Maryland, and Louisiana. 46  As a result of its
reasoning the Supreme Court quashed the board's denial of
Pierce's benefits and remanded the case to the board with
directions to award Pierce ADR benefits retroactive to the date of
his original retirement on June 28, 2007.47
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 965-66.
42. Id. at 966 (quoting Cullen, 850 A.2d at 903) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 966-67. The Court cited to three cases from New York,
Maryland, and Louisiana respectively, where an injury was not the sole cause
of permanent disability to a state employee, but the courts individually held
that the disabling injury need not be the sole cause of the disability. See
Bridgwood v. Bd. of Trs. of the New York City Fire Dept., 2612 N.Y.S.2d 621,
622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Hers1 v. Fire & Police Emps. Ret. Sys., 981 A.2d
747, 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Bowers v. Firefighters' Ret. Sys., 6 So.3d
173, 179 (La. 2009).
47. Pierce, 15 A.3d at 968.
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clarified the meaning of
Providence, Rhode Island's statutory retirement plan for city
employees under section 17-189(5). It held that under the current
law an employee will not be denied ADR benefits because that
employee is permanently disabled by a series of injuries, rather
than a single disabling injury.48 The Court is clear that, given the
command of section 1-2, the Court will not require a single
accident to be the cause of disability in ADR cases.49 However,
the holding does not reach two related factual situations.
It is unclear what the result would be if an employee was
previously injured in non-work-related accidents which led to a
final disabling accident that was work related. It is equally
unclear what the result would be if an employee was injured many
times while on the job but the final disabling injury was non-work-
related. There is some evidence that in these situations the
Supreme Court would reverse a denial of benefits. In adopting a
torts based "proximate cause" standard in interpreting section 17-
189(5), the Court noted that "proximate cause need not be the sole
and only cause[,] [i]t need not be the last or latter cause."so This
certainly leaves open the possibility that as long as a work-related
injury was part of "the causal matrix" of the disability, ADR
benefits may be awarded if the proximate cause standard is
satisfied.51 The Court also bolstered its reasoning with, Hers1 v.
Fire & Police Employees' Retirement System 52, a case from
Maryland where the disabled employee originally injured his knee
outside of work but permanently disabled the knee in a work-
related accident. 53 The Court specifically stated that even though
the permanency of Pierce's condition was not attributed solely to
the June 2006 injury he was still entitled to ADR benefits. 54 The
Court leaves open the possibility that non-work-related injuries
would not preclude an award of benefits by its reasoning, so long
48. Id. at 966.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d
827, 830 (R.I. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. See id. at 965-66.
52. Id. at 967 (quoting Hersl, 981 A.2d at 758).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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as a work-related injury is the proximate cause of the permanent
disability, even though it is not directly addressed in the instant
case.
However, it is less clear what the outcome would be in the
second case where the disabling injury was non-work-related. At
a minimum, the appellant would have some heavy evidentiary
lifting to prove that there were enough significant work-related
injuries in "the causal matrix" to say that the permanent
disability was the "natural and proximate" result of work-related
injuries and not only the disabling non-work-related injury.s The
Supreme Court has not foreclosed this possibility, noting
"proximate cause 'need not be the sole and only cause. It need not
be the last or latter cause. It's a proximate cause if it concurs and
unites with some other cause which, acting at the same time,
produces the injury of which complaint is made."' 56 The obvious
hypothetical situation can be drawn from the facts of the instant
case. One of Pierce's examining physicians concluded that Pierce's
original injury in 1994 caused "degenerative arthritis" that "would
have progressed . .. regardless of his duties."5 7 If the other
examining physicians had accepted that opinion, it could certainly
be argued that the 1994 injury was the "natural and proximate"
cause of Pierce's disability even if his final disabling injury in 2006
had occurred at home.
One final note of interest relates to section 1-2, which the
Supreme Court used to interpret the singular form "of an
accident" in the ADR benefits ordinance. Instead of relying on
section 1-2 in his arguments, the appellant relied on Rhode Island
General Laws section 43-3-4 ("section 43-3-4"), which requires
that singular constructions of a word also must include plural
constructions.5 8  The Supreme Court acknowledged that section
43-3-4 would apply to the instant ordinance, but went on to
expound on the applicability and effect of section 1-2, the
analogous section of the Providence Code.59 In Murphy v. Zoning
55. Id. at 965-66.
56. Id. at 966 (quoting Hueston, 502 A.2d at 830).
57. Id. at 960.
58. Id. at 962-63, n.9; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 43-3-4 (1956).
59. Id. at 962 n.9 (citing Murphy v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of
South Kingstown, 959 A.2d 535, 541 (R.I. 2008)).
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Board of Review of South Kingstown60 , the Supreme Court held
that a more restrictive municipal ordinance interpretation applied
to a zoning ordinance because the state had clearly delegated the
power to define zoning subdivision to the municipality.61 It is not
clear how the analysis of the instant case would have changed had
the state and municipal statutory canons of interpretation been
different. It seems likely that the state canon would generally
preempt unless the state had delegated power for a more
restrictive interpretive canon to the municipality. 62 Though, the
full bounds of that state/municipal preemption question are
beyond the scope of this survey the state could clarify its canons of
interpretation to the extent that they are applicable to municipal
ordinances.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that disability caused
by multiple work-related injuries, based on the applicable canon of
statutory construction, section 1-2, and the legal definition of
proximate cause, qualified for accidental-disability retirement
benefits set forth in section 17-189(5), so long as the disability was
the "natural and proximate" result of the accidents. The Court
held that the board misinterpreted section 17-189(5) when it
determined that an employee's disability must be proximately
caused by a single work-related accident to receive ADR
benefits.63 Since there was no other defect in Pierce's ADR benefit
application, the Court quashed the board's denial of Pierce's ADR
benefits and remanded to the board with instructions to
retroactively award Pierce ADR benefits.6
Andrew K. Fischer
60. Murphy, 959 A.2d at 541.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Pierce, 15 A.3d 957 at 967-68.
64. Id. at 968.
Bankruptcy Law. In re Edwin H. Tetreault, 11 A.3d 635 (R.I.
2011). A devisee of real property under the residuary clause of a
will satisfies the ownership or possessory rights enumerated in
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-26-4.1 thereby qualifying for
the Rhode Island homestead estate exemption. A joint owner of
property, who is the sole occupant of the property, can acquire a
homestead exemption under section 9-26-4.1. The devisee of a
residuary interest in real property does not have legal standing to
occupy, or intend to occupy property, after the executrix has
initiated a procedure to evict the devisee and/or initiate probate
proceedings to sell the property.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 4, 2006, Ruth B. Tetreault (testatrix) passed away as
the sole owner of the disputed parcel of real property.' The
residuary clause of testatrix's will, which controlled the
disposition of the property, provides that "the rest, residue, and
remainder of the estate be divided equally between Ms. Anne M.
O'Mara and Mr. Edwin Tetreault."2 Following testatrix's death,
Mr. Tetreault resided alone at the property. 3
On June 6, 2007, Ms. Anne M. O'Mara (executrix) was
appointed executrix of testatrix's estate.4 A separate clause of
testatrix's will granted the executrix the power of sale over the
property in order to satisfy any debts and expenses of the estate.5
The executrix was authorized to exercise the power of sale over
the property "whenever in [her] opinion it shall be necessary or
advisable."6 On August 27, 2008, pursuant to Rhode Island
1. In re Edwin H. Tetreault, 11 A.3d 635, 636-37 (R.I. 2011). The real
property is located in Lincoln, Rhode Island (the property).
2. Id. at 637
3. Id. "Mr. Tetreault had lived at the property most, if not all, of his
life." Id.
4. Id. at 636-37.
5. Id. at 637.
6. Id. at 637 & n.2
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General Laws section 34-18-37, executrix mailed Mr. Tetreault a
notice of termination of tenancy directing him to vacate the
property by October 1, 2008.7 After Mr. Tetreault failed to vacate
the property by the set date, executrix initiated an eviction action
in District Court on October 7, 2008.8
The following day in Bankruptcy Court, Mr. Tetreault filed a
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 Mr.
Tetreault, in his bankruptcy schedules, listed a one-half interest
in the property and claimed therein a homestead exemption under
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-26-4.1.10 Mr. Tetreault
alleged "his claimed homestead interest in the property places any
interest that he may have in the property beyond the laws of
attachment, levy on execution and sale for payment of debts or
legacies."'I
On December 2 and 3, 2008, the bankruptcy trustee filed
objections to Mr. Tetreault's claim of homestead exemption.12 The
trustee had three points of contention against Mr. Tetreault
claiming a homestead exemption.13 First, Mr. Tetreault "lacked
sufficient ownership interest in the property to claim the
homestead exemption."' 4  Second, even if Mr. Tetreault's
ownership interest were sufficient to claim the exemption, "he
does not fall within the statutory definition of 'family' under the
homestead statute."15  Third, Mr. Tetreault "lacked the legal
standing to occupy or intend to occupy the property after executrix
had initiated the procedure to sell the property and/or evict him
from the property."' 6
Due to Mr. Tetreault's bankruptcy filing, the eviction action in
District Court was stayed in accordance with 11 U.S.C. § 362.17
7. Id. at 637; see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-37 (1995).
8. Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 637.
9. Id. "Mr. Joseph M. DiOrio (trustee) was appointed bankruptcy
trustee." Id.
10. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4.1 (1997 & Supp. 2010).
11. Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 637.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. As defined in R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-26-4.1 (1997 & Supp. 2010),
"family" includes "a parent and child or children, a husband and wife and
their children, if any, or a sole owner." Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 641.
16. Id. at 637.
17. Id. & n.3 (citing in relevant part 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006), concerning
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On January 5, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court ended the automatic
stay by discharging Mr. Tetreault. 18 Accordingly, by way of a
Bankruptcy Court order, executrix recommenced the eviction
action against Mr. Tetreault.19  Following cross-motions for
summary judgment in the probate estate's eviction action, the
District Court judge granted summary judgment for possession of
the property in favor of the estate, which Mr. Tetreault appealed
to the Superior Court.20
Further, executrix filed a petition in Probate Court for the
sale of the property in order to administer the estate in an
efficient and timely manner as well as to pay the debts and
expenses of the estate. 21 Executrix's petition for sale was granted
by the Probate Court on April 3, 2009, a decision which Mr.
Tetreault also appealed to the Superior Court.22
On April 29, 2009, four questions were certified and
submitted by the Bankruptcy Court judge to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, which accepted the certification order.23  Mr.
Tetreault's appeals to the Superior Court were consolidated and
after a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, a
Superior Court justice granted summary judgment in favor of the
estate on both appeals. 24  However, the Superior Court justice
held that the orders should not become final until the Rhode
Island Supreme Court either determined that the pendency of the
certified questions did not prohibit the orders from becoming final
or issued a final ruling on the case at bar.25
In response, executrix filed an emergency motion seeking
removal of the conditions imposed by the Superior Court and
automatic stays).
18. Id. at 637.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 638.
22. Id.
23. Id. In accepting certification on the four enumerated questions, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court declared its decision "should in no way be
construed as requiring or justifying the delay or postponement of any other
pending judicial proceeding involving the parties to this litigation." Id.
24. Id. This decision upheld the District Court's judgment of eviction and
affirmed the Probate Court's order permitting executrix to sell the property.
Id.
25. Id.
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entry of final orders and judgment. 26 In support of her motion,
executrix stated that since testatrix's death, Mr. Tetreault
"continued to occupy the property alone without paying real estate
taxes, insurance premiums, or rent to the estate or executrix." 27
Further, executrix declared that she could no longer pay the
property's expenses causing it to "become uninsured and
imperiled."28 Executrix argued it was necessary to effectuate a
timely sale of the property in order to limit the estate's liability,
pay the debts and expenses of the estate, and to administer the
estate in an efficient and timely manner. 29
In response to executrix's motion, the conditions of the
Superior Court order were removed and final judgments were
entered in favor of the estate. 30 Mr. Tetreault moved to stay the
enforcement of the judgments pending a timely appeal to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.31 Mr. Tetreault filed appeals which
were eventually withdrawn, making the Superior Court's final
judgments no longer contestable. 32
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The first question certified to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court was "[m]ay a devisee of real property under the residuary
clause of a Rhode Island will satisfy the ownership or possessory
rights enumerated in Rhode Island General Laws section 9-26-4.1
in order to qualify for the Rhode Island homestead estate
exemption?" 33  To answer this question, the Court had to
determine whether Mr. Tetreault had the requisite "ownership or
possessory rights" to satisfy the homestead statute.34  When
testatrix passed away, Mr. Tetreault and executrix were each
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Executrix provided documentation of two separate appraisals and
an inspection report of the property which demonstrated that the condition of
the property was worsening. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Therefore, both of Mr. Tetreault's appeals were denied and the
District Court's judgment of eviction was upheld. Further, the Probate
Court's order authorizing the sale of the property was affirmed. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 639.
34. Id.
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immediately vested with a one-half interest in the property as
tenants in common. 35 While the trustee argued Mr. Tetreault was
not an "owner" of the property because his interest in the property
was defeased at the commencement of the eviction action, the
Court held this was not consistent with the language of the
homestead statute. 36 Using a de novo standard of review of the
clear and unambiguous statutory language, the Court declared, "it
is clear that one in debtor's position-a general devisee with a
defeasible fee simple interest in the property as a tenant in
common-qualifies as an 'owner' of the property until such time
that his interest may become defeased."" Accordingly, the Court
held, "a devisee of real property under the residuary clause of a
Rhode Island will satisfies the ownership requirement
enumerated in the homestead statute to qualify for the homestead
estate exemption until that point when he or she is divested of
that interest."38
The second certified question was, "[m]ay a joint owner of
property, who is the sole occupant of the property, acquire a
homestead exemption therein under Rhode Island General Laws
section 9-26-4.1?"39 The trustee argued that even if Mr. Tetreault
satisfies the ownership prong of the homestead statute, he is
outside the scope of the exemption because he does not satisfy the
statutory definition of "family" since he is a tenant in common who
resides on the property alone.40 The trustee argued the statute
unambiguously requires the exemption be claimed for the benefit
of a "family" which the General Assembly intended to include "sole
owner[s]" but not tenants in common because the term "owner of a
home" was excluded from the statute. 41 Mr. Tetreault argued the
homestead statute is ambiguous because it authorizes a "family"
can be comprised of a "sole owner," while further providing an
35. Id. at 640 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-3-1 (2010)); see also
DiCristofaro v. Beaudry, 320 A.2d 597, 601 (1974).
36. Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 639, 640. According to § 9-26-4.1(b) of the
Rhode Island General Laws, an "'owner of a home' includes a sole owner, joint
tenant, tenant by the entirety or tenant in common." Tetreault, 11 A.3d at
640.
37. Id. at 639, 640.
38. Id. at 640.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 641.
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"owner of a home" can be a tenant in common. 42 The Court agreed
with Mr. Tetreault that the statutory use of "family" is ambiguous,
therefore, must take the entirety of the statute into consideration
to determine the legislative intent.43
Many jurisdictions have held that the homestead exemption
must be "construed liberally in favor of debtors"44 in order to
advance the underlying policy, which is to "promote the stability
and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so
that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the
reach of financial misfortune."45  Accordingly, the Court
interpreted the statute liberally in favor of debtors and
determined that while tenants in common are not explicitly
included in the statutory definition of family, the General
Assembly did not intend to allow a sole owner residing alone to be
eligible for the exemption but preclude a tenant in common who is
also residing alone. 46  Therefore, the Court held "a tenant in
common, who is the sole occupant of a property, may qualify as a
family and therefore may be eligible for a homestead exemption
under § 9-26-4.1."47 The Court reasoned that subsection (a) of the
homestead statute defines who may acquire the exemption while
subsection (b) limits the exemption to one homestead per family
and one family per homestead.48
The third certified question was, "[d]oes the devisee of a
residuary interest in real property have legal standing to occupy,
or intend to occupy property, after the executrix has initiated a
procedure to evict the devisee from the property, and/or initiate
probate proceedings to sell the property?" 49  Bankruptcy
exemptions are determined at the time of filing the bankruptcy
petition. 50 Mr. Tetreault did not file his petition for bankruptcy
until one day after executrix initiated the eviction action, which
42. Id.
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. Id. (referencing Dwyer v. Cempellin, 673 N.E.2d 863, 866 (Mass.
1996)).
45. Id. at 641 (citing Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So.
2d 946, 948 (Fla. 1988)).
46. Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 642.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing In re Cunningham, 354 B.R. 547, 553 (D. Mass. 2006)).
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was over a month after notice of termination of tenancy had been
issued.5 ' These affirmative actions taken by executrix clearly
demonstrated her intent to exercise her power of sale over the
property granted to her by testatrix's will.52
With public policy that favors the prompt settlement of
estates, the Court held, "the express testamentary grant of power
of sale includes the right of an executrix to immediate possession
and control of the generally devised property in order to make
such property marketable for sale." 53 The Court further stated
that this authority includes the power to evict a tenant in
common. 54 The Court reasoned that the executrix did not need to
invoke the statutory procedure of section 33-12-6 of the Rhode
Island General Laws, requiring Probate Court approval for the
sale of real property to settle an estate, because her affirmative
actions demonstrating her intent to sell were sufficient and in
accordance with public policy. 55 In conclusion, "a general devisee
of a residuary interest in real property does not have legal
standing to occupy or intend to occupy property after the executrix
has initiated a procedure to evict the devisee from the property
based on the authority granted in an express power of sale in the
testatrix's will" because they no longer have a possessory interest
in the property. 56  "In light [of the Court's] answers to the
previous three questions," the Court found that there was "no
need to answer question four."57
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in answering the questions
certified to it, demonstrated the importance of the public policy
behind both the homestead estate exemption and probate
proceedings. As previously mentioned, the policy behind the
homestead estate exemption is to "promote the stability and
51. Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 642.
52. Id. at 644.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 643, 645.
56. Id. at 645.
57. Id. at 636. Rhode Island Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 6 affords
the Rhode Island Supreme Court the discretion in deciding whether it should
respond to certified questions. Id. at 639.
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welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that
the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of
financial misfortune."58  The Court advanced this policy by
recognizing that a devisee of real property through a Rhode Island
will satisfies the ownership requirement of the homestead
statute. 59 Further, the Court interpreted the ambiguous language
in the homestead statute, specifically the term "family", to include
tenants in common who solely occupy the property. 60  These
decisions allow a larger class of people to qualify for the
homestead estate exemption which, in turn, will promote more
stability and welfare in those families.
Again, the public policy underlying probate proceedings is the
prompt and efficient administration of estates. 61  The Court
repeatedly stated the importance of this policy and took it into
consideration when making its decisions. 62 As such, the Court
held that even though Mr. Tetreault satisfied the ownership and
family requirements of the homestead estate exemption, executrix
could proceed with the sale of the property because she had taken
affirmative steps to exercise her power of sale before the
bankruptcy petition was filed.63 It is apparent that this decision
furthers the public policy as it denied Mr. Tetreault legal standing
to occupy the residence and allow executrix to administer the
estate, which took nearly four years.64 The Probate system would
be seriously hindered if proceedings were not dealt with in a
prompt and efficient manner. Further, as the administration of
estates drags out, negative consequences result on the property
such as becoming "uninsured and imperiled."65 Therefore, it is
necessary to adhere to the policy of administering probate estates
in a prompt and efficient manner.
58. Id. at 641 (quoting Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty., 531 So. 2d at
948).
59. Tetreault, 11 A.3d at 640.
60. Id. at 642.
61. Id. at 644.
62. Id. at 642-43, 644.
63. Id. at 645.
64. See id. at 638.
65. Id. at 638.
SURVEY SECTION
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a devisee of real
property satisfies the ownership requirement of the homestead
estate exemption. Also, the Court held that a tenant in common
who solely occupies the property qualifies as a "family" making
them eligible for the homestead exemption. Finally, the Court
held that a devisee of real property does not have legal standing to
occupy or intend to occupy property after the executrix has
initiated eviction proceedings or probate proceedings to sell the
property. The Court determined as long as the executrix has not
exercised her testamentary power of sale by initiating eviction
proceedings, or demonstrating her intent to do so, the policies
underlying the homestead estate exemption and probate
proceedings were intended to include tenants in common, that
solely occupy the property, to be able to claim a homestead
exemption.
Gregory N. Hoffman
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Criminal Law. State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326 (R.I. 2011). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a defendant was in a
substantive dating relationship in accordance with Rhode Island
General Laws section 12-29-2 and covered under the Domestic
Violence Protection Act, because the defendant had been in an
"intimate relationship" with the victim for six months and even
though the relationship had recently ended, the couple had
"communication since the breakup relative to affairs of the
heart."1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, James Enos, and the victim, Mary, met on the
dating website www.Match.com in January 2008.2 They began
dating and eventually this developed into an "intimate
relationship." 3 In August 2008, after dating for six months, Enos
broke off the relationship and subsequently asked for the return of
1. State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 327, 329-30, 331-32 (R.I. 2011). R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-29-2(a) (2002 & Supp. 2010) defines domestic violence as
"includ[ing] but not limited to, [a felony assault] when committed by one
family or household member against another." Id. at 329 (quoting R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-29-2(a)). The statute defines a family or household member as:
spouses, former spouses, adult persons related by blood or marriage,
adult persons who are presently residing together or who have
resided together in the past three years, and persons who have a
child in common regardless of whether they have been married or
have lived together, or if persons who are or have been in a
substantive dating or engagement relationship within the past one
year which shall be determined by the court's consideration of the
following factors: (1) the length of time of the relationship; (2) the
type of the relationship; (3) the frequence [sic] of the interaction
between the parties.
Id. at 329-30 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-2(b)). The Court further held
that unsolicited testimony by a police officer did not require the declaration of
a mistrial because the trial justice immediately instructed the jury to
"disregard the errant remark." Enos, 21 A.3d at 332, 333-34.
2. Id. at 327-28. The victim is only referred to as Mary throughout the
case.
3. Id. at 328.
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jewelry that he had given to Mary. 4 After unsuccessful attempts
to return the jewelry by mail, Mary agreed to meet Enos at a
restaurant in Wakefield to return it.5 Enos then suggested that
they go inside for a drink, which they did, and after talking for
more than an hour an altercation ensued.6 The defendant began
swearing at Mary, apparently about "some aspect of Mary's job as
a student-nurse."7 Mary attempted to leave but Enos "grabbed
her from behind in a bear hug and began hitting her on the head
with drinking glasses." Mary fell to the floor and the defendant
"continued to assault her by kicking her until restaurant
employees restrained him."9 The police arrived upon the scene
and found Enos outside lying on the ground holding onto his left
hand, which was "bleeding profusely."' 0 Prior to receiving his
Miranda1 1 rights, the defendant uttered to a police officer "oh my
God, what have I done? What have I done?"l 2  Enos was
subsequently given his Miranda rights and arrested.' 3
On December 8, 2008, Enos was charged with one count of
assault with a dangerous weapon, a drinking glass.' 4 The
defendant was convicted of domestic assault with a dangerous
weapon and sentenced to twenty years in prison with eighteen
months to be served and eighteen and a half years probation.15
The defendant appealed his conviction to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.16
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 328 n.1.
8. Id. at 328.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Enos, 21 A.3d at 328.
13. Id.
14. Id. The defendant was charged with violating R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-5-
2 (2002) and sentenced according to R.I. GEN. LAws §12-29-5 (2002 & Supp
2010).
15. Enos, 21 A.3d at 328. During the trial seven witnesses, including the
victim, restaurant patrons and employees testified. The defendant was also
ordered to have no contact with the victim, pay restitution, and attend a
mental-health program, substance-abuse counseling, and a batterers'
intervention.
16. Id. The defendant filed his appeal prior to the entry of judgment on
conviction. The appeal was premature under Article I, Rule 4(a) of the
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The defendant challenged his conviction on two grounds.17
First, he argued that the evidence presented by the prosecution
was insufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that the
defendant and Mary were in a domestic relationship as defined by
Rhode Island General Laws section 12-29-2.18 He argued that
"the trial justice erred when she denied [the] motion for acquittal
under Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure."1 9 The defendant also challenged his conviction on the
ground that "the trial justice erred when she refused to declare a
mistrial" after a police officer made unsolicited remarks during
testimony that the defendant declined to speak after being
informed of his Miranda rights.20
Substantive Dating Relationship
At trial, the defendant presented a motion for judgment of
acquittal, in which he argued that there were "insufficient facts to
allow a reasonable juror to find that the parties were in a domestic
relationship," but the trial justice disagreed and denied the
motion.21 When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal the Court applies the same standard as the trial justice,
which requires the Court to look at the "evidence in the light most
favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing
the credibility of the witnesses, and draw therefrom every
reasonable inference consistent with guilt."22  Viewing the
evidence in the totality, if the inferences drawn "would justify a
reasonable juror in finding a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the motion for the judgment of acquittal must be denied."23
The Court set out to determine what minimum facts were
Superior Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, the Court has
previously held that the appeal would be treated as timely, because of the
interests of justice and to prevent undue hardship. See Enos, 21 A.3d at 328
n.4.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 328-29.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 329.
21. Id. at 330.
22. Id. at 329 (quoting State v. Mercado, 635 A.2d 260, 263 (R.I. 1993)).
23. Id. (quoting State v. Forbes, 779 A.2d 637, 641 (R.I. 2001)).
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needed to serve as a foundation for the conclusion that a couple
had been in a substantive dating relationship under Rhode Island
General Laws section 12-29-2.24 The Court stated that this is a
somewhat flexible concept and that other jurisdictions handling
the problem have also struggled to effectively define it.25  In
deciding whether a couple is in a substantive dating relationship,
the Court takes into consideration three factors defined by the
statute, which are: '(1) the length of time of the relationship; (2)
the type of the relationship; [and] (3) the frequence of the
interaction between the parties."' 26  The Court stated that the
factors are just a guide for courts to consider when making the
determination of whether "the evidence is capable of proving" that
a couple was in a substantive dating relationship. 27 The Court
interpreted this to mean that it must look at the "substance of the
relationship as a whole." 28 The Court further stated that it is the
Court's "responsibility in interpreting a legislative enactment to
determine and effectuate the legislature's intent."29  The
legislature explicitly stated in Rhode Island General Laws section
12-29-1 that they wanted the laws to be enforced to "protect the
victim" and that "criminal laws [are to] be enforced without regard
to whether the persons involved are or were married,
cohabitating, or involved in a relationship." 30 The legislature
enacted this statute due to the lax enforcement of existing laws in
domestic assault cases.3 1  The Court therefore held that the
statute is flexible and does not require reaching "specific findings
about the precise number of times two people saw each other
before reaching a conclusion that the parties are in a substantive
dating relationship."32
The Court noted that when the trial justice ruled on the
motion, evidence had been offered to show the couple had "started
dating in January 2008," that "they had terminated the
relationship within a couple of weeks preceding the assault," that
24. Id. at 330; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-29-2(b).
25. Enos, 21 A.3d at 330.
26. Id at 329-30 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-29-2(b)).
27. Id. at 331.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 330-31 n.6 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-29-1(c) (2002)).
31. Id. at 330 n.6.
32. Id. at 331.
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they had spoken since the breakup on matters "relative to affairs
of the heart," and they got together so the victim could return
jewelry. 33 The Court also noted that this evidence, combined with
the fact that the defendant referred to Mary as his girlfriend, and
when asked, Mary stated it was "an intimate relationship," that "a
reasonable juror certainly could infer that the couple saw each
other on a regular basis over a period of six months."34 Given the
evidence and the nature of the interactions, the Court stated that
it was satisfied that the trial justice considered both of these
matters when reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state, as is required on motions of acquittal, and denied the
motion. 35  A majority of the Court affirmed the trial justice's
ruling. 36
Justice Goldberg issued a dissent which argued that there
was not enough evidence to establish that the defendant and Mary
were in a domestic relationship.3 7  Justice Goldberg could not
agree that the concept of a substantive dating relationship "is by
its very nature, a somewhat flexible concept."38 Justice Goldberg
further stated that this is an "element of the crime" and "it is well
established that 'the language of a penal statute must be read
narrowly, [and] that penal statutes must be strictly construed in
favor of the defendant."' 39 There was no evidence as to the length
of the relationship, the type of relationship, or the frequency of
interaction between Enos and Mary.40  Justice Goldberg also
stated that Mary's testimony did not suggest that she and the
defendant saw each other often or that they in fact had a serious
relationship.41 Justice Goldberg concluded by arguing that "[t]he
nature of the relationship must establish mutual affection, shared
expectations, or a growing expectancy, and a frequency of
interaction that reflects substance and meaning."42  Justice
Goldberg did not believe that the existence of a serious
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 331-32.
36. Id. at 332, 334.
37. Id. at 334 (Goldberg, J. dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689, 691 (R.I. 2004)).
40. Id. at 335.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 336.
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relationship was established here and would have reversed the
lower court on this issue. 43
Justice Robinson separately dissented from the majority's
opinion, arguing that the State did not sufficiently show that the
parties had "been in a substantive dating ... relationship within
the past one year."44 Justice Robinson further argued that "too
much was left unaddressed" as there was no evidence as to how
often Enos and Mary saw each other during the relationship.4 5
Accordingly Justice Robinson, dissented with the majority's
opinion and would have reversed the lower court's decision. 46
Witness's Remark
On appeal the defendant argued that the trial justice should
have granted a mistrial following Officer Joshua Eidam's
unsolicited statements made on the witness stand.47 At trial
while giving testimony as to the incident between Enos and Mary,
Officer Eidam gave unsolicited testimony that "after [he] advised
[the defendant] of his Miranda rights [the defendant] declined to
give [the officer] any information."48 Following this, the defendant
moved for a mistrial.49  The trial justice refused but did
immediately tell the jury that Enos had a right to remain silent
and that could not be used against him.50 The defendant argued
that this was not sufficient and a mistrial should have been
declared.5 When reviewing the denial of a motion for a mistrial,
the Court stated that "[a] trial justice's decision to deny a motion
for a mistrial is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is clearly wrong."52
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws §12-29-2(b). Justice Robinson also stated
that the "statute indicates that it is the Court's role" to determine "whether
or not there was a substantive dating relationship," however, here the
question was submitted to the jury. Neither party challenged this so the
Court did not review the decision. Id. at 337 n.14.
45. Id. at 337.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 332.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 332, 333.
50. Id. at 333.
51. Id. at 334.
52. Id. at 332 (quoting State v. Higham, 865 A.2d 1040, 1044 (R.I.
5372012]
538 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:532
In deciding this issue, the Court looked to a similar situation
that it took up in State v. Higham,5 3 although not involving
Miranda, where a witness also made an unsolicited comment that
could be viewed as prejudicial to the defendant. 54 The lower court
there also did not declare a mistrial but struck the comment from
the record and provided the jury with a curative instruction. 55
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the one statement was
not prejudicial to the defendant because it was only one
unsolicited comment, there was no follow up to the comment, and
the trial justice "immediately proceeded to give the . . . curative
instruction to the jury."56 The situation presented in this case was
virtually the same except for the facts that Miranda was
mentioned, and the officer's comments were not stricken from the
record.5 The Court held that "the trial justice was not clearly
wrong when she denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial and
instead opted to instruct the jury to disregard the errant
remark."5 8
COMMENTARY
In this case the Rhode Island Supreme Court struggled with
establishing the minimum requirement needed to determine
whether a couple is in a substantive dating relationship as
outlined by the statute.5 9  The Court established a flexible
standard that uses the factors enumerated in the statute as a
guide for courts to consider when deciding if a particular couple is
in a substantive dating relationship. 60 The majority noted that
many other states have also struggled with this issue and that a
number of states have also adopted a more flexible standard.6'
2004)).
53. Higham, 865 A.2d at 1046-47.
54. See Enos, 21 A.3d at 333.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 333-34.
58. Id. at 334.
59. R.I. GEN. LAws §12-29-2(b).
60. See Enos, 21 A.3d at 331.
61. See id. at 330. In discussing how other jurisdictions have also
struggled with this issue and how many have also decided on a flexible
standard, the Court cites to a number of cases from states ranging from
California to Alabama.
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This is an area in the law where a flexible standard is more
effective, as it allows a trial justice, who has the best view, to
evaluate each situation applying the factors as a guide. The trial
justice can then more accurately decide whether a particular
relationship falls within the statute. The dissenting Justices both
argued that the factors should be applied rigidly and that the
statute should be read narrowly.62 However, the very nature of
relationships arguably requires a flexible standard. A case could
present facts that when rigidly applied do not satisfy the factors
enumerated, however, because of the nature of the relationship it
in fact may be a substantive dating relationship.
The Court is supported in its decision to adopt a flexible
standard by the fact that every relationship is different. With the
advancements in technology and the widespread use of online
networking websites such as, Facebook, many people now have
less traditional dating relationships. These facts support the
Court's decision that a flexible system should be used to determine
if a couple is in fact in a substantive dating relationship.
The Court has established a system in which a trial justice is
able to view all of the facts in their totality.63 The trial justice is
then able to use the factors as a guide in order to decide whether a
couple is in fact in a substantive dating relationship. 64  This
system is better than being forced to rigidly apply the factors to
the facts of a case, and often reaching an arguably less accurate
decision. Furthermore, the majority, in applying a flexible
standard to the statute, appears to have acted in accordance with
the legislative intent, which was to provide couples in dating
relationships with protection of the statute. 65  Therefore, the
Court's decision to establish a flexible system was supported by
the facts and by the legislative intent of the statute. 66
The Court, in upholding the denial of the defendant's motion
for a mistrial, stated that the single statement by the police officer
was unlikely to be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, as it was
a single unsolicited comment and was not followed up with any
62. See Enos, 21 A.3d at 334 (Goldberg, J., dissenting), 337 (Robinson, J.,
dissenting).
63. See id. at 330, 331.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 330-31 n.6; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-2.
66. See id. at 330-31 n.6, 332.
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commentary. 67 Furthermore, the trial justice immediately gave a
curative instruction to the jury that was sufficient to alleviate any
possibility of prejudice. 68 Therefore, the Court's decision to uphold
the denial of the mistrial was supported by the facts.6 9
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Superior Court in denying the motion for judgment of
acquittal, and in denying the motion for a mistrial. 70 The Court
held that when viewing the "evidence in the light most favorable
to the state" that a reasonable juror could conclude the defendant
and Mary were in a substantive dating relationship, and
therefore, correctly denied the motion for dismissal.71 The Court
also stated that "the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she
denied the . . . motion for a mistrial and instead [instructed] the
jury to disregard" the comment, and therefore, the Court upheld
the denial of the motion for a mistrial.72
Matthew J. Pimentel
67. See id. at 333, 334.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 334.
70. Id. at 332, 334.
71. See id. at 329, 331, 332.
72. See id. at 334.
Criminal Law. State v. Graff, 17 A.3d 1005 (R.I. 2011). The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that sentencing is a discrete,
one-time event. If a defendant is not ordered to a work release
program at the time of sentencing, the defendant can only gain
access to a work release program through the Rhode Island
Department of Corrections procedures. An inmate's motion to
modify her sentence and be transferred to the work release
program two years after her original sentencing was granted by a
Superior Court justice, who determined that because the term
"sentencing" was ambiguous, it could be interpreted to grant him
continuing authority. The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated
the motion, finding that the Superior Court justice did not have
the authority to modify the defendant's sentence by ordering her
to a work-release program.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 18, 2007, defendant Brandy Graff received a
concurrent sentence of fifteen years, ten to serve and five years
suspended with probation, after pleading nolo contendere on April
23, 2007 to two counts of driving under the influence, death
resulting.' On April 27, 2009, Graff filed a "Motion to Modify
Sentence for Court Ordered Work Release," seeking an order to
allow her to participate in the work release program during her
incarceration at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI).2
Graffs motion was granted and the order issued on May 26, 2009
by a justice of the Superior Court.3 The Rhode Island Department
of Corrections (DOC) moved to vacate the order, arguing that the
Superior Court justice lacked the authority to issue such an order
because under State v. Pari and section 12-19-2 of the Rhode
1. State v. Graff, 17 A.3d 1005, 1006 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id. Defense counsel's certificate of the motion was sent to the Office
of the Attorney General, but there is no record that it was served upon the
DOC.
3. Id.
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Island General Laws there are only two ways for a defendant to
gain access for participation in the work release program: "(1) by a
court order to that effect at the time of sentencing where the
relevant statute so permits ... or (2) by placement in the program
pursuant to the DOC's 'standard classification/re-classification
system."'4 The DOC argued that since Graff had not been ordered
to participate in the work release program at her June 18, 2007
sentencing, her only path to participation in the "program would
have been through the DOC's classification procedures."5
At the July 10, 2009 hearing on the DOC's motion to vacate
the hearing justice rejected Graffs argument that the DOC did not
have standing and vacated the order of May 26, ruling that had
the DOC been given notice by Graff, they "certainly would have
had the right to be heard" on Graffs April, 27, 2009 motion. 6 A
new hearing on the motion commenced immediately.7
At this second hearing, Graff acknowledged the significance of
State v. Pari, but suggested that its age lessened it precedential
value and that because the case never defines "sentencing," the
term remains ambiguous.8 Graff argued that "sentencing is not a
discrete, one-time event."9  The prosecutor responded to the
defense's argument first by saying that the definition of
sentencing is obvious; it is in fact a one-time event, which, in this
case, occurred on June 18, 2007.10 The DOC also suggested that
creating yet another way to access work release for inmates who
do not qualify under the rules of the Department of Corrections
4. Id. (emphasis added); State v. Pari, 553 A.2d 135 (R.I. 1989). R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 12-19-2(b) (2002) provides that: "The court upon the sentencing
of a first time offender, excluding capital offense and sex offense involving
minors, may in appropriate cases sentence the person to a term of
imprisonment, and allow the person to continue his or her usual occupation
or education and shall order the person to be confined in a minimum security
facility at the A.C.I. during his or her non-working or study hours." Graff, 17
A.3d at 1006 & n.4.
5. Id. at 1006.
6. The defendant argued that the Department of the Attorney General
became the "voice" of the DOC, and put them on notice of the May 26
proceeding, and that the DOC was therefore "estopped" from being entitled to
ask the court "to do anything." Id. at 1007.
7. Id.
8. Id; Pari, 553 A.2d 135.
9. Graff, 17 A.3d at 1007.
10. Id. at 1008.
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would open the "floodgates."' 1 In response to defense counsel's
argument that Pari is too old to follow, the prosecutor noted that
"the age of a judicial opinion should not have a bearing on whether
or not the holding set forth in the opinion is to be followed," and
added that Pari "has never been overruled and remains 'bedrock
law."' 12
The Superior Court justice relied on section 31-27-2.2 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, which establishes sentencing
parameters within the judge's discretion, not section 12-19-2
which governs work release.13 The justice ruled that in addition to
the avenues to work release described in State v. Pari, which
construed section 12-19-2, section 31-27-2.2 provides "another
way" pursuant to which he, as the sentencing judge, could order
defendant to the work release program at this time.14  Having
determined that he, as the sentencing judge, was authorized to
hear the motion, he proceeded to grant the motion, deciding that
while Graff had a lack of remorse at the original sentencing, she
appeared to finally accept responsibility for her crime and
understand the gravity of it, and therefore deserved to be allowed
to "continue along this path."15
After granting Graff's motion and ordering her to be
transferred to the work release program, the DOC requested the
hearing justice stay the order pending appeal; he granted the
stay.16  The hearing justice recognized that there was a
substantial legal issue "as to what sentencing means or when
sentencing occurs, whether it's a one-time event or [an] ongoing
process."l 7 Graff s motion was granted on July 21, 2009 and the
DOC appealed in a timely manner.'8
11. Id.
12. Id; Pari, 553 A.2d 135.
13. Graff, 17 A.3d at 1008. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.2(b) (2010) says "(1)
Every person convicted of a first violation shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for not less than five (5) years and not for more than
fifteen (15) years, in any unit of the adult correctional institutions in the
discretion of the sentencing judge." Graff, 17 A.3d at n.9 (emphasis added).
14. Graff, 17 A.3d at 1008-09.
15. Id. at 1009.
16. Id.
17. Id. (brackets in original).
18. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the DOC
contended that the hearing justice erred in granting the motion
because: (1) the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure do
not provide for a motion to modify a sentence; (2) the DOC
controls the classification of inmates in the Adult Correctional
Institutions, and Graff was subject to their existing work release
procedures; and (3) the order granting her work release violated
the doctrine of the separation of powers. 19 In response, Graff
argued that the hearing justice's ruling was correct because
section 31-27-2.2 of the Rhode Island General Laws, the specific
statute, governs section 12-19-2, the general statute. 20 In addition,
Graff argued that Pari did not provide a definition of the word
"sentencing," which gave the hearing judge, who was also the
original sentencing judge under section 31-27-2.2, continuing
authority to transfer Graff to the work release program. 21
The standard of review applied by the Supreme Court in cases
of statutory interpretation is de novo.22  This requires a close
review of the language of section 31-27-2.2, which the hearing
justice concluded granted him "residual authority to order
defendant to work release long after he had sentenced her."23 it
appeared that the hearing justice's decision to grant the
defendant's motion to modify "was predicated on a notion that
sentencing is not a singular event and on a belief that the judicial
officer who is the 'sentencing judge' . . . continues to have the
discretionary powers accorded by that statute even after the
sentence has been meted out."24
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected this "expansive
interpretation" of sentencing under section 31-27-2.2 as erroneous,
finding nothing in the statute that suggests that sentencing is
"some sort of ongoing process."25  The Court held that the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1008-09.
21. Id.; Pari, 553 A.2d 135.
22. Graff, 17 A.3d at 1010.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1010-11.
25. Id. at 1011. The Court also noted the absurdity on which defendant
based her argument. During oral argument, defense counsel stated that
under the interpretation of "sentencing judge" that she was urging the Court
to adopt the result would in fact depend on whether or not the particular
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discretion given to the sentencing judge is only exercisable at the
time he pronounces the sentence, and that except in
circumstances provided for under Rule 35 of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that discretion "ceases to exist after
that event takes place." 26 In support of their holding, the Court
examined dictionary definitions of the words "sentence" and
"sentencing" finding "nothing ... even remotely suggestive of an
ongoing process." 27 Furthermore, the Court found it noteworthy
that Rule 35 "is replete with language that presupposes that the
imposition of sentence is a discrete act and not a sort of continuing
process which ... the sentencing judge may from time to time
revisit."28 Perhaps most tellingly, the 120-day period for filing
most Rule 35 motions is measured from the date when "sentence
is imposed."29
Since the Court decided that "sentencing" was a one-time
event, it determined that the hearing justice did have the
authority at the original sentencing hearing on June 18, 2007 to
order the defendant to the work release program, but that the
justice did not have continuing authority after that time and had
erred in granting the defendant's motion. 30
COMMENTARY
Although the definition of "sentencing" seemed to be obvious
to the Department of Corrections and the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, defense counsel and the hearing justice apparently inferred
a level of ambiguity great enough to argue, and decide, against
logic. The hearing judge based his continuing authority on the
fact that he had been the sentencing judge, differentiating
between the original sentencing, and what he apparently
perceived to be subsequent sentencing. The hearing justice was
judge that sentenced the defendant was the same judge considering the
motion to modify; if the judge had retired or died, the defendant would be out
of luck. However, the court rejected this argument and noted that it is a
fundamental principle that the Court "will not construe a statute to reach an
absurd result." Id. at n.11 (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 1011.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1011-12.
29. Id. at 1012.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1009.
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attempting to create another loop-hole through which Brandy
Graff could be ordered to work release, perhaps because he
believed that her indiscretion as a twenty-year old should not be
determinative of her future success. Whatever the reason, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court easily identified the absurdity of
defense counsel's argument and the absurd result which would be
created if they were to affirm the hearing justice's decision.3 2 The
Court bitingly noted that when a statute does not define a word,
"'courts often apply the common meaning as given by a recognized
dictionary."' 33 Defense counsel defied common sense by asking
"When is sentencing?" 34 The hearing justice defied common sense
by deciding in her favor. The Court was forced to resolve this issue
in order to place on the record what common sense already tells
us-that sentencing is a one-time event. Although the result may
seem harsh for Ms. Graff, this decision does not preclude her from
gaining access to the work release program through the DOC's
classification system.
CONCLUSION
The Court vacated the order of the Superior Court granting
the defendant's motion and concluded that "sentencing" is a
discrete, one-time event and the judicial officer who is "the
sentencing judge" referred to in section 31-27-2.2 of the Rhode
Island General Laws does not continue to have discretionary
powers after a sentence has been issued.
Kendra Levesque
32. See id., at 1011 & n.11.
33. See id. at n.13 (emphasis added) (quoting Defenders of Animals Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I. 1989)).
34. Id. at 1007.
Criminal Law. State v. Sampson, 24 A.3d 1131 (R.I. 2011). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed a defendant's second degree
child abuse conviction after finding that his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had been violated given that his waiver of counsel
was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Court ruled that
the defense counsel's statement that it was he, and not the
defendant, who had the ultimate power to decide between a bench
or jury trial, coupled with the trial justice's affirmation of that
statement, rendered the defendant's subsequent waiver of counsel
inadequate under the Sixth Amendment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 27, 2007, Mark Sampson was charged with
second degree child abuse for allegedly abusing his son at some
point between July 30 and August 3, 2007.1 The defendant was
charged under "Brendan's Law," which criminalizes the knowing
or intentional infliction of serious physical or bodily injury upon a
child.2 The statute defines "serious physical injury" as "any
injury, other than serious bodily injury, which arises other than
from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment."3 On
February 26, 2008, after Mr. Sampson's first attorney was
permitted to withdraw, Mr. Sampson's second attorney made his
first appearance and, in early March, filed a motion to dismiss
challenging both the constitutionality of Brendan's Law as well as
the specific allegations pending against Mr. Sampson.4 Later that
month, Mr. Sampson's second attorney filed a motion to withdraw,
citing a "'complete and total breakdown of communication"' that
had led to his being fired by Mr. Sampson; however the hearing
1. State v. Sampson, 24 A.3d 1131, 1132 (R.I. 2011).
2. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-5.3 (2002).
3. Id. § 11-9-5.3(d).
4. Sampson, 24 A.3d at 1143 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The names of
Mr. Sampson's attorneys were not provided in the opinion.
547
548 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:547
ended with Mr. Sampson retaining his attorney.5
Mr. Sampson's trial was set to begin on April 7, 2008, but
prior to the start of voir dire, Mr. Sampson raised the issue of
ineffective counsel and cited disagreements between him and his
attorney regarding whether or not to call the defendant's other son
to testify and whether to proceed with a bench or jury trial.6 With
regard to the witness selection disagreement, the trial justice
stated that he presumed that there was a valid reason for defense
counsel's decision not to call the defendant's son, but that the
issue would be on the record for post conviction relief.7 However,
with respect to the jury dispute, the trial justice asked defense
counsel whether he believed that the decision between jury or
bench trial was within his purview, to which defense counsel
responded in the affirmative.8 Following this exchange, the trial
justice informed Mr. Sampson of his attorney's duty to make
decisions that he believed were in his client's best interest and
told Mr. Sampson, as he did on the witness selection issue, that if
Mr. Sampson still believed after the trial that his attorney had not
made the proper decision then he could argue that issue on
appeal.9
After this exchange, the parties moved forward to voir dire
and a jury was impaneled, at which point Mr. Sampson again
requested to address the court and expressed serious concern with
the composition of the impaneled jury.10 Next, the defendant
reiterated his dissatisfaction with his current counsel along with
his desire to represent himself and the trial justice began an
5. Id. at 1143-44, 1146 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 1133.
7. Id.
8. Id. The trial justice's question to defense counsel was preceded by
counsel's statement that: "I do believe it is in Mr. Sampson's best interest ...
not to waive the jury trial . . . these are decisions that are made by counsel,
not by the client. The client decides whether or not he wants to testify. I've
advised Mr. Sampson in this regard." Id.
9. Id. at 1134. The Supreme Court decision later criticized the Superior
Court's repeated suggestions that post conviction relief was Mr. Sampson's
only option for addressing his disagreement with counsel's decisions. Id. at
1140-41.
10. Id. at 1134. Mr. Sampson's chief concern was that there were no
black jurors impaneled, an argument that he advanced by asking the trial
justice whether there were "no blacks in Coventry, West Warwick and East
Greenwich?" Id. at 1152 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
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extensive inquiry of the defendant to determine whether his
waiver of counsel was voluntary, intelligent, and knowing." The
hearing was continued and, on April 9, the trial justice asked Mr.
Sampson why he wanted to represent himself to which the
defendant responded that he wished to have a bench trial but that
his attorney wanted to continue with the jury. 12 At the end of the
hearing the trial judge found that Mr. Sampson had knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, allowed Mr. Sampson
to represent himself, and granted Mr. Sampson's motion to waive
jury trial and to proceed with a bench trial.13
After a three day bench trial, the trial justice found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant had struck his son on his
buttocks and that the contact had been intentional and
excessive. 14 Furthermore, the trial justice ruled that a second
degree conviction under Brendan's Law did not require a finding
of whether the injury was "serious," but merely that there was an
injury and that the injury arose from excessive corporal
punishment, which the trial justice found had been established.15
Accordingly, Mr. Sampson was found guilty of second degree child
abuse and on June 17, after his motion for a new trial was heard
and denied, he was sentenced to five years in prison.16  Mr.
Sampson appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court arguing,
inter alia, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been
violated given that the trial justice had effectively "forced" him to
choose between exercising his right to counsel and exercising his
right to waive jury trial and that the Brendan's Law statute is
unconstitutionally vague. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court conducted a de novo review
11. Id. at 1134-35.
12. Id. at 1135.
13. Id. at 1136.
14. Id. at 1137.
15. Id. at 1138-39.
16. Id. at 1139. Mr. Sampson was sentenced to serve fifteen months and
the remainder suspended with probation. Id.
17. Id. at 1132. The defendant also argued that reversible error had been
committed given that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a
conviction and that the trial justice had abused his discretion in denying the
defendant's motion for a new trial.
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to determine whether the defendant's waiver of counsel was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, as required by the Sixth
Amendment.18 In reviewing the constitutionality of a defendant's
waiver of counsel, the court engages in a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis to determine if the defendant knew what
he was doing and whether his 'choice [was] made with eyes
open."'l 9 The Court focused its review on Mr. Sampson's
attorney's erroneous claim to the right to decide whether to opt for
a jury or bench trial and the trial justice's affirmation of that
illegitimate claim. 20 At the outset, the Court definitively stated
that the decision regarding whether a trial will be conducted in
front of a jury or judge is ultimately the defendant's to make.21
The Court found that the trial justice had essentially given Mr.
Sampson two options: "(a) a trial by jury, against his wishes,
represented by counsel or (b) a bench trial, in accordance with his
wishes, representing himself."22  The Court held that he was
entitled to a third option: "(c) a bench trial, in accordance with his
wishes, represented by counsel."23 The Court held that this
missing third option had infected Mr. Sampson's waiver of
counsel, that the waiver was not intelligent, knowing, and
voluntary, and that Mr. Sampson's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had indeed been violated.24 Accordingly, the Court
vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial.25
The dissent, written by Justice Goldberg, with whom Chief
Justice Suttell joined, agreed that the trial justice had erred in his
interpretation of the law, but focused less on that single mistake
and engaged in a broader review of the proceedings. 26 Justice
18. Id. at 1139 (citing State v. Laurence, 848 A.2d 238, 253 (R.I. 2004)).
19. Id. at 1140 (quoting State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1379-80 (R.I.
1996)).
20. Id. The Court did make a point to acknowledge that they held no
suspicions that Mr. Sampson's attorney had intentionally misled the trial
court. Id.
21. Id. (citing State v. Moran, 605 A.2d 494, 496 (R.I. 1992)).
22. Id. at 1141.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1142, 1149 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion
focused a portion of its analysis on the fact, one largely ignored in the
majority's opinion, that at one point during the April 9 inquiry Mr. Sampson
stated: 'I have no problem with jurors taking over [the] case, but at least
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Goldberg cited the "defendant's knowledge of the law, experience
with the criminal system, and obvious motivation to inject error
into the record" as factors that the majority's analysis should have
more strongly considered.27 The dissent commended the trial
justice in his thorough inquiry of the defendant's ability to waive
counsel 28 and found that, given the defendant's behavior during
the proceedings, the trial would not have been able to continue
unless the justice allowed the defendant to represent himself.29
The dissent further emphasized the fact that, during the trial
justice's three inquiries into Mr. Sampson's ability to knowingly
waive counsel, Mr. Sampson became extremely impatient with the
need for such an extensive examination. 30 After reviewing the
entirety of the circumstances, the dissent was satisfied that the
defendant's waiver had been knowing and intelligent and
therefore his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not been
violated.'
Given that the Court had already vacated Mr. Sampson's
conviction based on the inadequate waiver of counsel issue, the
Court found it unnecessary to rule on whether Brendan's Law is
unconstitutionally vague. 32 The Court did, however, criticize the
trial justice's interpretation of Brendan's Law and, more
specifically, the justice's decision to read the word "serious" out of
the "serious bodily injury" requirement for a second degree child
abuse conviction. 33 The justice ruled that the injury element of
second degree child abuse was satisfied if the prosecution
established that the defendant had engaged in excessive
punishment which caused an injury, an interpretation that the
justice found to be most congruent with the legislature's intent.34
The Supreme Court disagreed.35 The Court held that the
discuss what you're doing before you do it instead of telling me after you did
it after you do it and then telling me there is nothing I can do about it."' Id. at
1155 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1147 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1156 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1152.
31. Id. at 1157.
32. Id. at 1141.
33. Id. at 1141-42.
34. Id. at 1138.
35. Id. at 1142.
5512012]
552 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:547
legislature's specific inclusion of the word "serious" in Rhode
Island General Laws section 11-9-5.3(b)(2) clearly indicates their
intent to require courts to find that the defendant had inflicted a
serious physical injury before a second degree child abuse
conviction could be sustained.36
COMMENTARY
In State v. Sampson, both the majority37 and dissenting3
opinions agreed that, mistake aside, the trial justice had engaged
in a thorough inquiry of whether the defendant was waiving his
right to counsel in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner.
Accordingly, the point of contention between the two opinions was
whether the defense counsel's misstatement of law had
irreparably "infected" the defendant's waiver, as the majority
contended,39 or whether this error was but one blemish on an
otherwise clean set of circumstances. 40  While the traditional
analysis regarding the constitutionality of a waiver requires the
court to engage in a totality of the circumstances review, the
majority seemingly forwent that traditional review in light of the
constitutional conundrum that it found that the defendant had
been placed in.41
While the Court certainly made clear the irreversible effect
36. Id. The dissent also objected to the majority's handling of the
defendant's constitutional challenge to Brendan's Law, stating that it could
remember no other case in which the Court had vacated a conviction and
remanded for a new trial without deciding whether the statute under which
the new trial would be conducted was constitutional. Id. at 1157 (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
37. Justice Robinson, despite the trial justice's clear mistake of law, did
"pause to observe that the trial justice's inquiry into Mr. Sampson's waiver of
counsel was, in fact, extraordinarily extensive-touching upon Mr. Sampson's
education, occupation, familiarity with the rules of evidence and procedure,
familiarity with the charge he faced, and the penalties that could be imposed
.... Id. at 1136 n.6 (emphasis in original).
38. Justice Goldberg commented that "the record depicts a jurist who
was committed to protecting this defendant's rights at every point in this
trial." Id. at 1147 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1140.
40. Id. at 1149 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 1143, 1155 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The majority did
recognize that there were numerous disagreements between counsel and Mr.
Sampson but ultimately refocused its attention back to the misstatement. Id.
at 1141 n.12.
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that such a legal mistake can have on a defendant's ability to
waive their right to counsel, the Court was much less clear with
respect to future application of Brendan's Law. As stated above,
Brendan's Law criminalizes the intentional infliction of injury
upon a child and distinguishes between first degree child abuse,
carrying a ten year minimum sentence, and second degree child
abuse, carrying a five year minimum sentence. 42 However, the
law differentiates the two by requiring the prosecution to show,
for first degree child abuse, that the defendant inflicted "serious
bodily injury" while requiring, for second degree child abuse, the
infliction of "serious physical injury."43 The remaining provisions
are no more helpful in distinguishing these injury elements as the
statute merely defines "serious physical injury" as "any injury,
other than a serious bodily injury."44 Accordingly, a strict reading
of Brendan's Law would suggest that the sentence of a defendant
convicted under the statute could vary up to five years based
merely on the difference between the words "bodily" and
"physical."45  To add to the confusion, section 11-9-5.3(d), in
defining the type of injury needed to sustain a second degree child
abuse conviction, inexplicably deletes the word "serious" from the
"other serious physical injury" requirement found in section 11-9-
5.3(b)(2).4
The trial justice in Sampson attempted to wade through this
forest by ruling that a second degree child abuse conviction did not
require the prosecution to establish that Mr. Sampson had
inflicted "serious" physical injury, but merely that he had inflicted
"any injury, other than a serious bodily injury."47 The Supreme
Court found this ruling to be in error because section 11-9-
5.3(b)(2) explicitly requires "serious physical injury."48 However,
in doing so, the Court gave no further guidance regarding how the
trial justice, on remand, or future trial justices were to
differentiate between the requirements for a first degree child
abuse conviction and those needed for a second degree conviction.
42. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-5.3 (2002).
43. Id. § 11-9-5.3(b)(1), (b)(2) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 11-9-5.3(d).
45. See id. § 11-9-5.3.
46. Id. §§ 11-9-5.3(d), (b)(2).
47. Sampson, 24 A.3d 1131, 1138 (R.I. 2011).
48. Id. at 1142.
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The Court noted that the deletion of the word "serious" from the
injury element for second degree child abuse was problematic
because it would essentially mean that section 11-9-5.3(b)(2) made
a felony of the same conduct that constitutes simple assault and
battery, a misdemeanor. 49 The dissent rejected this concern by
reminding the majority that simple assault and second degree
child abuse would remain different given that misdemeanor
simple assault does not requires a showing of physical injury and
that second degree child abuse requires a showing of excessive
corporal punishment. 50 Regardless of the arguments on either
side, the Court's ruling in Sampson has made it no clearer how
conduct constituting first degree child abuse is any different from
conduct constituting second degree child abuse, despite the fact
that the former carries a punishment twice as harsh as the latter.
However, the Rhode Island General Assembly has subsequently
alleviated the issue. The General Assembly amended Brendan's
Law by deleting the word "serious" from the second degree injury
element so that it now reads the same way that the trial justice in
Sampson originally interpreted it. 51
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the defendant's
second degree child abuse conviction after finding that his right to
counsel had been violated and remanded the case for new trial.52
The Court's de novo review of the proceedings commenced with
their finding that, given the misstatement of law made by the
defense counsel and affirmed by the trial justice, the defendant's
waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent as required by the Sixth Amendment. 53
Nicholas L. Nybo
49. Id. at 1142 n.15.
50. Id. at 1157.
51. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-5.3 (b)(2)(amended 2011).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1141.
Criminal Law. State v. Barros, 24 A.3d 1158 (R.I. 2011).
Neither the federal due process clause nor the Rhode Island
criminal due process clause provides criminal suspects with a
right to have their custodial interrogation electronically recorded
in toto. The federal due process clause does not require electronic
recording of custodial interrogations, and there is no basis under
the Rhode Island criminal due process clause for holding that
mandatory recording of custodial interrogations is constitutionally
required.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The body of Deivy Felipe was found in the driver's seat of a
SUV parked in Providence at roughly 1:30 a.m. on April 27, 2005.1
At the scene, it appeared that Mr. Felipe was struck by multiple
gunshots. 2 After the vehicle was processed, detectives found
nothing more than smudges on the outside of the vehicle.3
However, inside of the vehicle, detectives were able to locate one
fingerprint on a drinking glass; but they were unable to establish
whose fingerprint it was. 4 The autopsy concluded that Mr. Felipe
died as a result of bleeding from several wounds caused by a total
of five gunshots.5 Yet, police were not able to establish a single
eyewitness to the murder or even develop a list of suspects. 6
Several months later, at about 11:30 p.m. on December 29,
2005, the defendant Tracey Barros was arrested by the Providence
1. State v. Barros, 24 A.3d 1158, 1162 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. The State explained at Mr. Barros's trial the absence of complete
fingerprints was a result from heavy rain at the crime scene.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Providence Police Detective Daniel O'Connell was the lead
detective assigned to the Felipe homicide investigation and was the detective
who testified at Mr. Barros's trial about the lack of an eye witness and
possible suspects.
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police for gun possession without a license.7  Mr. Barros
underwent two separate interrogations the following day at
Providence police headquarters.8 The two interrogations finally
led to a confession by Mr. Barros that he in fact murdered Deivy
Felipe at the command of Tonea "Nutt" Sims.9 Even though the
interrogations of Mr. Barros took place over the course of many
hours, only the final twelve minutes of the interrogations were
recorded by police. 10 Mr. Barros may possibly be heard confessing
to "(1) having shot Mr. Felipe with a gun provided by Mr. Sims
and (2) having done so at Mr. Sims' direction." I
Mr. Barros was arraigned on the firearms charge on
December 31, 2005.12 Afterwards, on January 3, 2006, he was
also arraigned with respect to the murder of Mr. Felipe.13 On
June 20, 2006, Mr. Barros was indicted by a Providence County
grand jury; the indictment charged him with the following: "(1)
the murder of Deivy Felipe, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1; (2)
conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6;
(3) carrying a pistol without a license, in violation of G.L. 1956 §
11-47-8(a); and (4) discharging a firearm during a crime of
violence, causing the death of Deivy Felipe, in violation of G.L.
1956 § 11-47-3.2(b)(3)."14
On May 30 and 31, 2007, a hearing took place in the Rhode
Island Superior Court on Mr. Barros's motion to suppress the
inculpatory statements that he had made while at the Providence
police station on December 30, 2005.15 That motion was denied on
June 1, 2007.16 A jury trial proceeded on June 4, 2007, but on
June 12, the jury reported they were unable to reach a verdict,
7. Id. The arrest of Mr. Barros was several months after the Deivy
Felipe murder had been committed. Mr. Barros also contended the arrest
actually occurred on December 28, rather than on December 29.
8. Id. The first interrogation of Mr. Barros took place very early in the
morning of December 30. The second, longer interrogation began at
approximately 8 a.m. on the same morning, after Mr. Barros had been
allowed to sleep for several hours.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1163.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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and a motion for a mistrial was granted.17 On January 4, 2008,
before the start of the second trial, Mr. Barros once again renewed
his motion to suppress the statements. 18 The motion was again
denied and the second trial began.19 After only three days of
deliberations, the jury found Mr. Barros guilty on all four
counts. 20 Subsequently, on March 10, 2008, a hearing was held on
the defendant's motion for a new trial and that motion was
denied.2 1 On June 2, 2008, Mr. Barros was sentenced to "(1) the
statutorily mandated consecutive life terms for murder and for
causing death by means of a firearm; (2) a concurrent ten-year
term to serve for conspiracy to commit murder; and (3) a
consecutive ten-year term to serve for unlawful possession of a
firearm."22
A notice of appeal was filed on June 4, 2008.23 Mr. Barros
contended on appeal that the "trial justice erred (1) in not
suppressing his confession that he murdered Deivy Felipe and (2)
in barring cross-examination of a prosecution witness concerning
purported third-party perpetrator evidence." 24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Mr. Barros's first contention on appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was "custodial interrogations conducted in a place
of detention should be electronically recorded from start to finish
and that his confession should have been suppressed due to the
fact that the interrogations that he underwent were not recorded
in toto."25 Mr. Barros argued that recording requirements should
be "derived from the due process provisions of the United States
and Rhode Island constitutions or from the exercise of this Court's
supervisory authority."26 Furthermore, Mr. Barros argued that
the admissions of his statements found in the twelve-minute
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1164.
26. Id.
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recording should have included a cautionary instruction to the
jury, making them aware that the police did not record the
interrogations in its entirety. 27 The Court focused on the fact that
neither the federal due process clause nor the Rhode Island
criminal due process clause provides a criminal suspect with a
right to have their interrogation electronically recorded in toto.28
The Court also noted a criminal defendant in Rhode Island is
provided with enough procedural safeguards even in the absence
of a recording requirement. 29  The Court concluded the first
contention on appeal by stating, "whether the failure of the police
to create a record of the defendant's confession undermines its
accuracy and detracts from the credibility of later testimony is an
issue uniquely left to the sound discretion of the trier of fact."30
Mr. Barros's second contention on appeal was "this Court,
pursuant to its supervisory authority with respect to
the administration of justice, should rule that the inculpatory
statements were erroneously admitted into evidence."3' The
Court declined to exercise its supervisory authority "so as to
promulgate a mandatory recording requirement."32
Mr. Barros's third contention was that "if his unrecorded
custodial statements should not have been suppressed, they
should have been accompanied by a cautionary instruction to the
jury concerning the inferences which could be drawn from the
police failure to fully record the interrogation."33 Here, the Court
also declined to require that a cautionary instruction be given
whenever the prosecution uses an unrecorded or partially
recorded interrogation because such a mandate would be
conflicting with well-established Rhode Island principles. 34 The
Court reasoned juries receive adequate instructions with the
respect to the voluntariness of interrogations because of Rhode
Island's Humane Practice Rule, a rule which provides important
procedural safeguards with respect to the Constitutional rights of
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1165. (The Court reasoned these sufficient procedural
safeguards are under R.I. Const. Art. I, § 10 (2011).
30. Id. at 1166.
31. Id. at 1163-62.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1166.
34. Id.
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defendants. 35 Finally, the Court reasoned the defense attorney
can always raise questions related to witness credibility on cross-
examination and can also argue credibility during closing
arguments. 36
Mr. Barros's fourth contention on appeal was "the trial justice
also erred in denying the motion to suppress because, in
defendant's view, the prosecution failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Barros's inculpatory statements
were voluntary and were made after a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his constitutional rights."37  The Court pointed out
"[w]hen ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial
justice should admit a confession or a statement against a
defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in
Miranda v. Arizona."38 The Court stated Rhode Island's "review
of a trial justice's ruling with respect to a motion to suppress a
statement which a defendant has alleged was made involuntary
requires a two-step analysis." 39 In the first step, the Court will
review the trial justice's findings of historical fact in relation to
the voluntariness of the confession. 40  The Court will give
deference to the trial justice's fact findings unless those findings
are clearly erroneous. 41 The Court will move on to step two if they
conclude that the trial justice's findings were not clearly
erroneous.42  At the second step, the Court will "apply those
historical facts and review de novo the trial justice's determination
of the voluntariness of the statement."43  Here, the Court held
that Mr. Barros made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
Miranda rights and it was not an error for the trial justice to deny
35. Id. at 1167. (The Humane Practice Rule "requires that judge and
jury make separate and independent determinations of voluntariness." Citing
State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250, 261-62 (R.I. 2006)).
36. Id. at 1168.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1179 (quoting State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142,1146 (R.I.
2009)).
39. Id. (citing Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146-47).
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his motion to suppress.44 The Court reasoned that after accepting
both the factual findings and credibility determinations of the
trial justice, there was nothing left to support Mr. Barros's
argument that the statements made to Providence police were
involuntary.45
Mr. Barros's fifth contention was that it was an error to deny
his motion to suppress his statements made to the Providence
police because "his statements were the product of a failure to
promptly present him before a judicial officer."46 The Court held
that Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
governs this exact argument made by Mr. Barros. 47 The Court
noted "Rule 5(a) unambiguously indicates that a defendant who
seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an
unnecessary delay in presentment must demonstrate both: (1)
that the delay in presentment was unnecessary and (2) that such
delay was 'causative' with respect to the making of the inculpatory
statement."48  The trial justice ruled that any delay in
presentment was not effective in inducing Mr. Barros's confession;
rather, he found that Mr. Barros "was very much overcome by the
knowledge of his good friend Sim[s]'s death, and [this] state of
upset clearly led to his desire to unburden himself."49 The Court
agreed with the trial justice's holding and also reasoned there was
nothing in the record to suggest that any delay in presentment
had any effect on Mr. Barros or his statements made to the
Providence police.50
Lastly, Mr. Barros contended the trial justice erred "when he
ruled that the defense would not be permitted to cross-examine
Detective O'Connell with respect to a statement made to the
detective which suggested that one or more third parties may have
had a motive to perpetrate the murder of Deivy Felipe."5 1 The
Court explained that it is their duty to consider whether the
evidence was erroneously excluded and if it was, whether the
44. Id. at 1181.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1182 (quoting State v. King, 996 A.2d 613, 622 (R.I. 2010)).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1183.
SURVEY SECTION
exclusion constituted reversible error. 52 The majority stated that
they have repeatedly indicated that "when a criminal defendant
wishes to mount such a third-party-perpetrator defense, the
defendant must make an offer of proof that is reasonably
specific."53 The Court held that the trial justice did not err in
granting the prosecution's motion in limine to prevent the
admission of the third party perpetrator evidence. 54 The Court
reasoned that Mr. Barros offered absolutely no evidence "(1) to
establish that the individuals to whom Ms. Roca5 5 referred in her
statement had an opportunity to commit the crime or (2) to
establish a proximate connection between these individuals and
the murder of Deivy Felipe."56
Justice Flaherty dissented in part and concurred in the
result.5 7  The dissent differed from the majority decision which
declined to require that a cautionary instruction be given
whenever the prosecution attempts to meet its evidentiary burden
by relying on either an unrecorded or partially recorded
interrogation.5 8 Furthermore, Justice Flaherty explained that he
would hold that "when a suspect is interrogated in a detention
setting for a crime punishable by life, and law enforcement has
the ability to video record the interrogation but declines to do so,
the jury should be informed by instruction that this was so, if such
an instruction is requested by the defendant."59 Nevertheless,
Justice Flaherty stated that he would affirm the judgment of
conviction in this particular case. 60 Justice Flaherty reasoned Mr.
Barros was being questioned for a weapons offense, not a crime
punishable by life imprisonment, and the police had no duty to
end the interrogation to obtain a video recording before continuing
with the interview. 61
52. Id. at 1183 -84.
53. Id. (citing State v. Scanlon, 982 A.2d 1268, 1275 (R.I. 2009)).
54. Id.
55. Mr. Felipe and Ana Roca were living together at the time of Mr.
Felipe's death. It is unclear from the record whether Ms. Roca was Mr.
Felipe's girlfriend or wife. Id. at 1183.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1185. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1190-91. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1191. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Suttell
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COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly states that criminal
suspects do not have a constitutional right to have their custodial
interrogations electronically recorded in toto. 62  The majority
noted that Alaska is the only American jurisdiction to hold that its
state constitution provides a defendant with a due process right to
have his or her custodial interrogations recorded.63 However, the
dissent points out that several state Courts have held that
recording confessions promotes or even assures accuracy. 64 The
dissenting opinion notes that most Courts have contemplated this
issue regarding electronic recording, and have concluded that
adopting the practice significantly improves the criminal justice
system.65  The dissent's analysis on the benefits electronic
recordings have in the criminal justice system is persuasive. The
dissent discusses how many states across the country record such
interviews not because of a constitutional requirement, but
because of sound policy and best practice. 66 The majority does not
contemplate this fact and instead attempts to show how limited
the persuasive authority is on this issue by discussing how Alaska
is the only state to hold that its state constitution provides a
defendant with a due process right to have his or her custodial
interrogations recorded.67 The dissent acknowledges Alaska is the
only state with this constitutional requirement; however, the
dissent further discusses that even absent a constitutional
requirement, many other states have routinely adopted the
practice of recording interrogations. 68
Here, the Court's holding was accurate because it was
unknown that Mr. Barros was going to confess to the murder of
Mr. Felipe. On the other hand, Justice Flaherty departed from
the majority by holding that "in cases which a confession to a
concurred, but wrote separately to point out his endorsement of Justice
Flaherty's comments relating to the benefits resulting from electronic
recordings of police interrogations. Id. at 1184.
62. Id. at 1164.
63. Id. at 1165.
64. Id. at 1186. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 1188. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1164.
68. See id. at 1188. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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crime punishable by imprisonment for life is garnered in a
detention setting, justice is best served if the trial justice, upon
request, instructs the jury that it may consider that the police had
the opportunity to video record the confession but did not do so." 69
It is again a persuasive argument that Justice Flaherty makes
here. It is obvious that not every single interrogation can be
recorded electronically. A standard like that would certainly be
too much of a burden on the criminal justice system. However, as
technology is improving and becoming more available, the
recording of interrogations is becoming a more common practice.
The majority's decision not to incorporate the dissent's view in this
case may lead to further implications and more litigation in Rhode
Island because confessions are many times important issues in
murder cases. It seems logical to record a murder suspect's
interrogation when a confession could make the difference
between guilty or not guilty. Here, the Court had an opportunity
to perhaps implement a standard that when the crime at issue is
punishable by life imprisonment, the Court should instruct the
jury when the police had the opportunity to record the
interrogation, but chose not to do so. This Court could have put
this reasonable standard in place while still coming to the same
conclusion and adhering to the federal due process clause and the
Rhode Island criminal due process clause. Implementing this
standard would surely provide the jury with a helpful general
guideline in their responsibility of truth-seeking. 70
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that neither the
federal due process clause nor the Rhode Island criminal due
process clause provides criminal suspects with a right to have
their custodial interrogation electronically recorded in toto.n The
Court reasoned that the federal due process clause does not
require electronic recording of custodial interrogations, and there
is no basis under the Rhode Island criminal due process clause for
holding that mandatory recording of custodial interrogations is
69. See id. at 1190. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
70. See id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1164.
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constitutionally required.72
Andrew C. Covington
72. Id.
Family Law. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031 (R.I. 2011). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court promoted the financial needs of a
child when it held that an order of child-support must be
calculated with a parent's total income, including locality
adjustment pay and actual income minus actual expenses for
rental properties. The Court further held that any reasonable
child-care costs must also be included when calculating child-
support.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Cesar Tamayo, plaintiff, and Paula Arroyo, defendant, are the
unmarried parents of the minor child Samantha Tamayo.1 In
March 2007, plaintiff filed a miscellaneous action seeking to
establish custody, visitation, and child support for the minor
child.2 Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking sole custody, child
support, and medical insurance for the minor child.3
Plaintiff worked as a military technician and was also a
member of the Rhode Island National Guard.4 During trial before
the Family Court magistrate, Lieutenant Colonel Ricottilli, who
was an accountant with the Rhode Island National Guard,
testified that plaintiff received a one-time bonus from the National
Guard in March 2007 and regularly received a "locality
adjustment payment."5 Also, plaintiffs Family Court filings
reported that he received $1,350 per month in rental income,
although his 2006 tax return reflected a loss of nearly $18,000
from those properties. 6
Defendant testified to the minor child's day-care expenses but
1. Tamayo v. Arroyo, 15 A.3d 1031, 1033 & n.1 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id. at 1033.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. "Locality adjustment pay" is "a cost of living benefit that any
federal government employee may receive based on his or her geographical
assignment." Id. at 1034 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 5304 (1990)).
6. Id. at 1033.
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the magistrate refused to allow the day-care provider to testify
after the plaintiff indicated the day-care provider might have been
paid in cash and that she might have been in the United States
illegally.7 The magistrate demanded that the day-care provider
produce immigration documents and tax returns showing reported
income in order to testify.8 When the day-care provider failed to
return to court with the documents, the magistrate inferred that
the day-care provider was "cheating the government."9 Plaintiff
also proposed free future day-care provided by his mother or wife,
although no evidence was introduced to support this offer. 10
The magistrate's February 2008 bench decision excluded
plaintiffs BAQ military income,11 which is not reportable to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), from being calculated into the
child-support order. 12 However, no evidence was presented to
show the plaintiff received BAQ income, a term the magistrate
seemed to use interchangeably with locality pay. 13 The
magistrate explained he was excluding "regulatory or locality
pay," or "other income that [plaintiff] receives which would be
generally speaking for quarters, uniforms, et cetera".14
The magistrate excluded from the child-support calculation
any income plaintiff received from his rental properties because
the properties generated at a loss, according to the plaintiffs 2006
tax return.1 5 The magistrate also refused to include past payment
of day-care costs because of the inference the day-care provider
was "cheating the government."' 6 Furthermore, the magistrate
refused to include future payment for day-care costs because the
plaintiff had offered free day-care.' 7 Finally, the magistrate did
not order a specific dollar amount of child-support; instead he
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1034.
10. Id.
11. Id. "BAQ" is a colloquial term for "basic allowance for quarters" and
"it refers to an allowance that members of the military receive for housing if
they are not assigned to a military housing facility." Id. (referencing 37
U.S.C. § 403(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011)).
12. Id. at 1034.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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directed the parties' attorneys to "draft an agreed-upon order that
simply reiterated his bench decision."1 8
Defendant sought review, and in November 2008 the Family
Court affirmed all but one of the magistrate's findings.'9
Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and
plaintiff asked the Court to either affirm the Family Court's order
or hold that the appeal was not properly before the Court since
defendant failed to file a petition for writ of certiorari.2 o On
December 1, 2010, the parties appeared before the Court to show
cause as to why the Court should not summarily decide the issues
raised on appeal.21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that this case was
properly raised on appeal because the child-support order was the
result of the Family Court's final decision. 22 The Court explained
that the child-support guidelines, as outlined in the Rhode Island
Family Court Administrative Order 87-2,23 "are based on the
incomes of both parents" and are intended to provide the child
with the "greatest possible support."24  Therefore, the Family
Court should "'consider every factor that would serve to reveal in
totality the circumstances and conditions' bearing on the welfare
of the children."25
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1034-35. The magistrate also found that plaintiff was entitled
to a credit for adding the minor child to his health insurance but the
reviewing Family Court judge reversed and remanded for the magistrate to
determine whether plaintiff incurred any costs to justify the credit. Id. at n.6.
20. Id. at 1035. The Rhode Island Supreme Court will hear a
modification of child-support after a party files a petition for writ of certiorari
and the discretionary writ is issued. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-52(b)
(1956)).
21. Id. at 1033.
22. Id. 1035-36 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-52(a) (1956) stating in
relevant part: "From any final decree, judgment, order, decision, or verdict of
the [Family [Clourt, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section there
shall be an appeal to the [S]upreme [C]ourt ... .")(Id. at 1036 n.7).
23. Id. at n.8. The child support guidelines are revised every five years,
but the 1987 instructions on how to use the guideline worksheet continue to
be followed. Id.
24. Id. at 1036 (quoting the R.I. Fam. Ct. Admin. Order 87-2, I.).
25. Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Sullivan, 460 A.2d 1248, 1250 (R.I. 1983)).
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The Court held that the magistrate erred in not including
plaintiffs "other income" even though such income was not
reportable to the IRS.26 The magistrate further erred by not
indicating whether the one-time bonus was included in the child-
support order.27 The Court relied on the child-support guidelines,
which contains a non-exhaustive list of types of income to be
included when calculating child-support, with the only exception
being income from qualified public benefits programs. 28 Because
the magistrate based plaintiffs income for the child-support order
on whether the income was taxable, his decision was erroneous
and "contrary to the inclusive definition of income set forth in the
child-support guidelines." 29 Furthermore, the Court held that the
locality adjustment should have been viewed as income since it is
directly related to plaintiffs cost of living. 30  Furthermore,
plaintiffs one-time bonus should have been included when
calculating the child-support payments based upon plaintiffs
income as set forth in his employment records.31
The Court ruled that the magistrate abused his discretion by
confining his review to plaintiffs 2006 reported earnings when
plaintiffs 2007 tax return was available for review.32 Also, the
income and expenses of plaintiffs rental properties should have
been carefully reviewed to determine "an appropriate level of
gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support
obligation" because "taxable income does not always indicate one's
ability to pay."33
26. Id. at 1036.
27. Id.
28. Id. The definition set forth in the child-support guidelines ends by
including "all other forms of earned [or] unearned income. Specifically
excluded are benefits received from means-tested public assistance programs
.... Id. (alterations in original).
29. Id. at 1037.
30. Id. The Court relied on the R.I. Fam. Ct. Admin. Order 87-2, IV.B.1.,
which mandates "[e]xpense reimbursements or in-kind payments received
[shall be considered income] ... if they are significant and reduce(] personal
living expenses" when calculating child support. Id. (alterations in original).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Court cites the child-support guidelines that clearly mandate
"income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business should
be carefully reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income
available to the parent to satisfy a child support obligation. In some
instances, this amount will differ from a determination of business income for
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The Court also held that the only requirement for day-care
expenses to be included in a child-support order is that the cost be
reasonable, 34 and that the magistrate abused his discretion when
he based his decision on accusations of unreported income and the
possibility of free day-care. 35 The Court held that defendant was
entitled to a portion of day-care expenses, made retroactive to the
date of the petition. 36 The case was remanded to Family Court for
review and to make a specific finding for the amount of child-
support available to the child.37
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that all income should
be included when calculating a child-support order, as per the
child-support guidelines. 38 The policy behind the guidelines is to
ensure every child receives the maximum financial benefit a
parent can afford. 39 The Court adhered to this policy when it held
that the income and expenses of plaintiffs rental properties must
be examined independent of the federal tax return, which may not
reflect actual income correctly. 40 The Court was also acting in the
best interests of the child in allowing defendant to recover for past
child-care expenses as long as they were reasonable and including
future child-care expenses, although other options might have
been available.41 Should the Court have mandated that future
child-care expenses were not permitted, then defendant would
income tax purposes." Id. (quoting R.I. Fam. Ct. Admin. Order 87-2,
IV.B.1.)(emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 1038. "The guidelines allow for reimbursement of child-care
expenses, conditioned on such costs being "reasonable; that is, such costs
should not exceed the level required to provide quality care for the
child(ren)." Id. at 1037-38 (quoting the R.I. Fam. Ct. Admin. Order 87-2,
IV.B.7.a).
35. Id. at 1038. The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that the day-
care provider should have been allowed to testify as there is "no law or court
rule that requires a witness to prove his or her legal status or compliance
with federal tax laws as a condition precedent to testifying in our courts." Id.
at n.4.
36. Id. at 1038.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1037.
39. Id. at 1036.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1038.
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either have to pay for such expenses alone or rely on the only
other option the court permitted: entrusting the minor child to
plaintiffs wife or mother.
The Court correctly decided that defendant's locality pay
should be included as income because it is money received each
month in order to help pay for the cost of living. One concern with
including locality pay is that if plaintiff should move, as is
customary when working for the military, his locality pay may
change, forcing him to return to court to adjust the child-support
order. While this may be a burden on the courts, it is necessary to
ensure that plaintiffs child is receiving the full benefit of his
financial support.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the amount
plaintiff must pay in child-support is to be determined using the
child-support guidelines laid out in Family Court Administrative
Order 87-2, which include income, locality pay, and actual income
minus actual expenses from rental properties, instead of the
amount cited on past federal income tax returns. Furthermore,
defendant was entitled to reimbursement for past child-care and
future child-care, as long as expenses were reasonable.
Malorie R. Diaz
Family Law. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138 (R.I. 2011). The
Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) is required
to make "reasonable efforts" to reunify parent and child before
petitioning to terminate parental rights. If DCYF believes that
substance abuse issues bar reunification, it must refer a parent to
treatment or counseling before terminating parental rights, even
if that parent is in denial of their substance abuse problem.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 14, 2007, the Rhode Island Department of
Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate
the parental rights of Kathleen D. and Ronald D.1 pursuant to
Rhode Island General Law section 15-7-7(a)(3). 2 DCYF contends
that there was no "substantial probability" that the children,
Steven and Zachary, would be able to be reunified with their
parents within a reasonable time, and therefore were in need of a
permanent home. 3 DCYF also contends that the children were in
legal custody for almost 12 months and the parents were offered
services in order to correct the situation that led to the children
being displaced.4
The children were first removed from the home on July 21,
2005 when Kathleen was suffering from a viral infection and was
in a medically induced coma.5 One of the nurses called DCYF
because they were concerned that Ronald would be unable to care
for the children due to his health problems, including epilepsy and
rheumatoid arthritis. 6 On July 22, 2005, DCYF filed ex parte
neglect petitions with the Family Court in conjunction with a
1. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d 1138, 1140 (R.I. 2011).
2. R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-7-7(a)(3) (1956).
3. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1140.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1141.
6. Id.
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request for an order of detention, which were granted. The
children were then placed with Ronald's sister and DCYF assigned
Jennifer Jawharjian to work with Kathleen and Ronald.
After an initial investigation, Ms. Jawharjian created a plan
to reunify the children with their parents, which required
Kathleen and Ronald to be cooperative with DCYF and to
maintain a substance free lifestyle. 9  Ms. Jawharjian
recommended Kathleen for domestic violence and mental health
counseling and referred Ronald to anger management counseling,
and determined that neither Kathleen nor Ronald had a substance
abuse problem at that time.lo Kathleen participated in
counseling, however Ronald was unable to complete anger
management counseling because of his difficulties traveling."
Ms. Jawharjian testified that the couple was affectionate with the
children during the supervised visits, and that the family had a
close bond, however, Kathleen and Ronald were not cooperative
and had cursed at her.12 Additionally, on one occasion, Kathleen
"smelled of alcohol," and told Ms. Jawharjian that "she was of age"
and had drunk "hours before" the visit.13  On November 17,
Kathleen and Ronald "admitted to dependency", and the Family
Court then ordered the children to be placed in DCYF's care.14
The Court then decreed that the children could return home
provided that the respondents complied with certain services.' 5
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1141-42. Kathleen and Ronald were to "(1) develop and
maintain a substance-free lifestyle; (2) prevent domestic disputes from
affecting their children; and (3) cooperate with DCYF." In order to reach
these goals, Kathleen and Robert were to "(1) refrain from using any illegal or
intoxicating substances, including alcohol; (2) cooperate with a substance
abuse evaluation and follow treatment recommendations; (3) submit to
supervised urine screens, both random and scheduled; and (4) utilize a
network of 'clean and sober supports such as church, AA/NA, and community
providers."' Id.
10. Id. at 1142.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Respondents must comply with the following services: "(1)
[engage] in 'outpatient counseling;' (2) [participate] in the CEDARR and
CASSP programs; (3) [attend] Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings; and
[avail] themselves of parent aide services and anger management
counseling." Id. at 1142-43.
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The case was then transferred to Greg lafrate, another case
manager, who made a second case plan with the goal of
"maintaining the children at home", and required Kathleen and
Robert to sustain a substance-free lifestyle, prevent domestic
disputes from affecting their children, and to cooperate with
DCYF. 16  These plans did not mention any further substance
abuse evaluations or treatment, and urine screens were no longer
required.17 On January 20, "DCYF filed an emergency motion in
the Family Court seeking a change of placement, and the children
were briefly removed from respondents' home."18 An order was
then entered on February 21, 2006 by the Family Court to return
the children to the respondent's home with the requirements that
DCYF make weekly visits to the home and that Kathleen
cooperate with services provided.19 The children were removed
after it was determined that Kathleen was not cooperating with
the services provided, and on April 26, 2006 the Family court
ordered the children to again be placed with Ronald's sister.20
The family's next caseworker, Erin Cuddy,21 testified that
Kathleen swore at her during a supervised visit in front of the
children and acted aggressively toward her.22 In her case plans,
Ms. Cuddy noted that the children had been removed due to
"alcohol abuse, mental health, and [the] physical health" of the
parents.23 After Kathleen exhibited aggressive behavior to Ms.
Cuddy, the visits were moved to a DCYF office. 24 Ms. Cuddy
referred the respondents for new substance abuse evaluations,
16. Id. at 1143.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Ms. Cuddy became the couple's caseworker after Mr. Iafrate left
the department and after the couple had also worked with another
caseworker, Marcie Baker. Ms. Cuddy testified that three of the four aids
terminated their relationship with the family due to lack of cooperation. Id.
at 1146.
22. Id. at 1143-44.
23. Id. at 1144. The respondents were not to have any alcohol in their
home, must participate in parent-child evaluation, and must refrain from
"swearing at or making threats towards DCYF workers or service providers."
Id.
24. Id. at 1145.
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which concluded that Kathleen did not have a drinking problem. 25
The Family Court entered a decree which approved another
set of case plans developed by Ms. Cuddy, in which respondents
were also required to remain calm and cooperative during the
visits.26 On April 19, 2007, Ms. Cuddy requested that Kathleen's
counselor, Ms. Harrower, attend a family visit after Ms. Cuddy
smelled alcohol on Kathleen, to which Ms. Harrower agreed.27
Kathleen, however, refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test and
explained that Ronald had "had just as much to drink as she did
prior to that visit."28 Kathleen also explained that she only said
she would not show up drinking, but "never said [she] wouldn't
show up drunk."29 Ms. Cuddy did testify to the fact that Kathleen
was never offered formal substance abuse counseling, even though
Ms. Cuddy had discussed the possibility of Kathleen's counselor,
Ms. Harrower, incorporating substance abuse counseling with the
anger management counseling Kathleen was already receiving. 30
On September 14, 2007, DCYF filed petitions to terminate
Kathleen and Ronald's parental rights,31 pursuant to Rhode
Island General Law section 15-7-7(a)(3).32 During the trial in
Family Court, Kathleen was disruptive and was told she may be
held in contempt of court, and therefore agreed to substance abuse
testing. 33 On May 14, 2008, defense counsel submitted a motion
to suppress the results of this test because there were no
25. Id. at 1144.
26. Id. at 1145. The Family Court decree stated that: "(1) Kathleen
would cooperate with a psychiatric evaluation at Family Services; (2) that
Kathleen and Ronald would cooperative with a parent aid during family
visits; (3) that Kathleen would submit to an 'alcohol screen' if DCYF
determined that it was warranted due to her behavior or if she appeared to
be 'under the influence' and that, if she refused to submit to the screen, it
would be considered positive and the visit would end; and (4) that Ronald
would undergo a neurophysical evaluation." Id.
27. Id. at 1146.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1148-49.
31. Id. at 1146.
32. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(3).
33. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1146-47. During the April 4, 2008 trial
date, the counsel for DCYF explained to the court that the Breathalyzer came
back positive, which DCYF wanted to put on the record, to which the Defense
counsel objected, however the trial judge allowed the test to go on the record
because "the report was very clear that she was beyond the legal limits for
alcohol." Id.
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"foundational testimony" supporting the results, however the trial
judge denied this motion. 34
During trial, the testimony of Dr. Brian Hayden was heard,
after he had completed a psychological evaluation of Kathleen.35
He found her to be "rather feisty, opinionated, somewhat
confrontational, argumentative" and "somewhat paranoid."36 He
also testified that Kathleen had told him "she had lost three
children when she lived in Florida because 'Ronald was accused of
domestic violence and they were both accused of alcoholism,'
however she also explained that she was currently attending AA
meetings.37  During her evaluation, however, Kathleen insisted
that "there was nothing wrong with her" and she never recognized
whether or not alcohol was an issue.38
Kathleen testified during the trial and admitted to swearing
at Ms. Cuddy, but also testified that she thought that Ms. Cuddy
"had a personal vendetta against her," and that "she would do
anything she could to make sure [Kathleen did not get her
children back]."39 She also testified that Ms. Cuddy believed that
Kathleen had a drinking problem, and told her that she was in
"denial of her problems." 40
On July 2, 2008, the trial judge granted the petition to
terminate the respondent's parental rights, and found by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) Steven and Zachary would not be
able to return safely to Kathleen and Robert's care within a
reasonable period of time; (2) DCYF had made all "reasonable
efforts" to reunify the family; and (3) it was in the children's best
interests for the parental rights to be terminated.41 The trial
judge reasoned that for two years DCYF had been caring for the
children, that the family had undergone four case plans, and "the
matter of substance abuse in the form of alcohol has been a matter
of great concern [as] has the matter of abuse and anger
management."42 With respect to Kathleen, the trial judge found
34. Id. at 1149.
35. Id. at 1147.
36. Id. at 1147.
37. Id. at 1147.
38. Id. at 1147-48.
39. Id. at 1152.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1153.
42. Id.
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that she had a substance abuse problem, and that she had "been
offered services to correct the situation to no avail."43 He noted
that even on one of the days of the trial, she has been "highly
intoxicated."44 With respect to Ronald, the trial judge reasoned
that he had severe physical limitations who "comes across as
victim who cannot or will not change the situation, and that he
"drank but not to the extent of his wife." 45
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
When the Supreme Court reviews a decision to terminate
parental rights, the Court "remain[s] keenly mindful that the
natural parents have a 'fundamental liberty interest' in the care,
custody, and management of their children."46  Because of the
"vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of ... [the]
natural relationship" between parent and child, 47 "the state must
support its allegations by clear and convincing evidence."48 The
Supreme Court uses a three-step process in cases involving the
termination of parental rights: "(1) examine the trial justice's
finding of parental unfitness; (2) review the finding that
reasonable efforts at reunification were made by the state agency
charged with that duty; and (3) review the finding that
termination is in the children's best interests." 49
On appeal before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Kathleen
argued that the trial justice erred in finding that DCYF had
shown by clear and convincing evidence that they had made
"reasonable efforts" to reunite the family. 5 She argued that
DCYF believed she had alcohol problems and should have referred
her to alcohol counseling before terminating her parental rights.5 1
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the
decision of the trial court. 52
The Supreme Court stated that a "finding of parental
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1153-54.
46. Id. at 1154 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
47. Id. at 1154-55.
48. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a).
49. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1155.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1155-56.
52. Id. at 1156.
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unfitness is insufficient in and of itself for the court to terminate
parental rights: subsequent to presenting sufficient evidence to
support such a finding, DCYF must additionally demonstrate to
the Family Court that it has made reasonable efforts to strengthen
the parent-child relationship in accordance with the provisions of
§ 15-7-7(b)(1)." 53  The Court further explains that what is
"reasonable" shall be resolved on a case-by-case basis, and will
'"vary with the differing capacities of the parents involved' and it
is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances in
each case." 54 DCYF need not "undertake extraordinary efforts to
reunite parent and child,"55 however; the department must ensure
the services provided were offered "regardless of the unlikelihood
of their success."5 6
Despite DCYF's contentions that they made all reasonable
efforts to address Kathleen's alcoholism, 57 the Court found that
she was neither offered nor received alcohol counseling.s The
Court explained that Dr. Hayden's testimony also makes clear
that Kathleen would benefit from substance abuse counseling, and
the court was "troubled" that DCYF did not refer her to
counseling, especially after three of her caseworkers said they
thought that Kathleen had a substance abuse problem, and
continued to include in their case plans that she must maintain a
"substance free lifestyle." 59 Even though Kathleen was in denial
about her alcohol abuse problems, the Court held DCYF "was
required at the very least to offer services to" help her overcome
her denial."60
With respect to the termination of Ronald's parental rights,
the Court held that the trial court was clearly erroneous in
terminating his parental rights. 61 The Supreme Court ruled the
53. Id. (quoting In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1125 (R.I. 2007)); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(b)(1).
54. In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156 (quoting In re Natayla C., 946 A.2d
198, 203 (R.I. 2008)).
55. Id. (quoting In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d 875, 882 (R.I. 2009)).
56. Id. (quoting In re Natayla C., 946 A.2d at 203).
57. Id. at 1157. DCYF contends that it referred her to substance abuse
evaluations and that Kathleen also attended AA meetings.
58. Id. at 1157.
59. Id. at 1157-58.
60. Id. at 1160.
61. Id. at 1161.
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trial court did not indicate how DCYF proved Ronald's parental
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. 62 All that was noted
was that Ronald had physical limitations; that he drank, although
not to the same extent as Kathleen; and that he was a victim in
his relationship with Kathleen. 63 The Court held that this was a
violation of Ronald's due process rights since he has a right to
have his parental unfitness proven by clear and convincing
evidence. 64 Ronald was physically capable of walking into the
courtroom, and nothing was made of the fact that Ronald was
taking care of the children on his own while his wife worked full
time, or the fact that he also had the support of family members to
care for the children. 65 Therefore, the Supreme Court found the
trial court was completely erroneous in their termination of
Ronald's parental rights.
Kathleen also argued that the substance abuse test
administered during the Family Court proceedings should not
have been admitted because the person who performed the test
did not offer the test results and there was no other foundation for
admitting the test results. 66 DCYF merely told the court that the
test results were positive and that they should be admitted.67 The
Court also concluded that the evidence cannot be included in the
"catchall provision", because this provision is not intended to
"confer a broad license on trial judges to admit hearsay
statements that do not fall within one of the other exceptions."68
Therefore, the Court found the admission of the substance abuse
test administered during trial was in error.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Justice
Suttell and Justice Goldberg departed from the majority and
concluded that there is enough evidence on the record to
terminate Kathleen's parental rights, however both agreed that
Ronald's parental rights were terminated erroneously. 69  They
argued that in cases involving the termination of parental rights,
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1162.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1164.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1166. (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Dep't of Energy, 99 F.3d 387, 392
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
69. Id.
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the findings of the trial court are given great weight and not
overturned unless "clearly wrong or the trial justice misconceived
or overlooked material evidence."70 The Justices found that DCYF
made reasonable efforts to offer substance abuse services to
Kathleen because she was referred to three different agencies for
evaluations, Ms. Cuddy recommended to Ms. Harrower that
alcohol abuse treatment should be incorporated into the
treatment, and Kathleen was receiving services through AA.71
They therefore found that the efforts on behalf of DCYF were
reasonable and the termination of Kathleen's parental rights was
valid.
COMMENTARY
It is surprising that despite the fact that several caseworkers
described Kathleen's alcohol abuse problem, DCYF did not take
any substantial proactive steps to try and get her the necessary
services to reunify the family. When DCYF has a belief that there
is a barrier that may prevent reunification, they should take all
appropriate measures to try and reunify the family, despite how
uncooperative a couple may be. Unfortunately in this case,
despite the substance abuse evaluations and that fact that she
was visibly intoxicated in the presence of several caseworkers, no
actual therapy or counseling was offered to rectify this problem. 72
It also appears that the Family Court based their decision to
terminate Ronald's parental rights based on the fact that they
decided to terminate Kathleen's parental rights. It is frightening
that an adequate, separate determination was not made with
respect to Ronald. Despite finding that Ronald had physical
limitations and was in an unhealthy relationship with Kathleen, 73
the trial court did not provide any evidence as to why they thought
that Ronald was an unfit parent. It seems that the trial court was
relying solely on the recommendations of DCYF without making
an appropriate determination as an unbiased body.
70. Id. at 1169. (quoting In re David L., 877 A.2d 667, 671 (R.I. 2005)).
71. Id. at 1170.
72. Id. at 1157-58.
73. Id. at 1162.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the Family Court's
decision to terminate Kathleen and Ronald's parental rights
because DCYF did not make all "reasonable efforts" to reunite the
family. 74 The case plans should have included alcohol treatment
for Kathleen if DCYF determined that was a barrier to the
reunification of the family. The Court also held that the trial
court was completely erroneous in terminating Ronald's parental
rights because virtually no evidence was offered to show his
parental unfitness, clearly not meeting the "clear and convincing
standard" necessary in these cases.
Alexandra C. Hudd
74. Id. at 1157.
Insurance Law. DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585 (R.I.
2011). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held, as a matter of first
impression, the rule espoused in Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co.-
that an insurer assumes the risk of judgment in excess of policy
limits after declining to settle with a third party claimant-
applies to cases involving multiple claimants. Whether an insurer
is subject to Asermely liability in the multiple claimant context
will depend upon a comprehensive factual analysis that considers
circumstances such as the number of claimants, the relative
extent of the damages each claimant suffered, amounts of
claimants' settlement demands, the wishes of the insured, the
timing and character of the insurer's attempt to settle, the
likelihood of litigation, and the willingness of the claimants to
settle. Furthermore, after a judgment in excess of the policy
limits has been rendered, a subsequently executed general release
of liability between the insured and claimant, which relieves the
insured of the excess exposure, may not release an insurer from
liability under Asermely if the claimant has been assigned the
insured's rights against the insurer.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 10, 2003 Wayne DeMarco ("DeMarco" or
"plaintiff') was seriously injured when the vehicle he was
traveling in, owned by Virginia Transportation Corporation and
operated by the company's owner, Leo H. Doire ("Doire"), veered
off the road and struck two utility poles. A second passenger,
Paul Woscyna ("Woscyna"), was also seriously injured.2 Travelers
Insurance Company insured the vehicle under a policy that had a
$1 million limit of liability.3 After incurring extensive medical
bills, DeMarco's attorney submitted a demand letter to Travelers'
claim services director on February 2, 2004 that ignited a
1. DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 587 (R.I. 2011),
2. Id.
3. Id.
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prolonged series of correspondence between DeMarco and
Travelers, which lasted for three years, and resulted in no
resolution. The letter proposed to settle the claim for the $1
million policy limit.4
On February 25, 2004 DeMarco's attorney sent a second letter
to Travelers' claim services director informing him that plaintiffs
claim would exceed the policy limits, and again requested that the
claim be settled for the policy limit.5  Citing Asermely, the
attorney noted that a settlement within the policy limit would be
in Travelers' best interest. 6  Travelers' claim services director
replied via a letter dated February 27, 2004, and took the position
that Travelers was unable to exhaust the policy limit on the
plaintiffs claim at that point given that the accident involved two
claims and that the bills attributed to the second claim could
equal or exceed those of plaintiffs.7
Soon afterwards, on March 4, 2004, the plaintiff filed a
personal injury action against Travelers' insureds-Virginia
Transportation and Doire.8  Almost a year lapsed before any
further correspondence was exchanged between plaintiff and
Travelers. On February 7, 2005, DeMarco's attorney wrote to the
attorney, which Travelers retained to represent its insureds
(hereinafter the Travelers' retained attorney), that she was aware
Woscyna's attorney had submitted a settlement demand totaling
$829,747.00, and DeMarco's claim was expected to be five times
that amount.9 She asked the Travelers' retained attorney to
"respond with his thoughts."10 The Travelers' retained attorney
4. The letter indicated that DeMarco had already sent hospital bills
totaling $190,932.56 to Travelers but that his attorney was still in the
process of obtaining "voluminous medical records and bills." Also enclosed in
the letter was a copy of the lawsuit the attorney intended to file for Travelers
to "review and advise." Id. at 588.
5. Id.
6. Id.; see also Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999)
(holding that an insurer has a fiduciary duty to engage in timely and
meaningful settlement negotiations on behalf of the insured and assumes the
risk of a judgment if the judgment results in an amount that exceeds policy
limits, regardless of whether the insurer acted in bad faith, unless the
insured was unwilling to accept the third-party's settlement offer).
7. The second claim was Mr. Woscyna's, who was not a party to this
suit. DeMarco, 26 A.3d at 589.
8. Id. at 589-90.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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responded on February 23, 2005 with a notice of deposition and a
letter stating that the best way to assess the injured parties'
claims would be through deposition.II
From April 19, 2005 to July 22, 2005, DeMarco's attorney sent
Travelers' retained attorney four more letters requesting that the
parties proceed to arbitration or mediation, and she attached
records pertaining to DeMarco's medical records, tax returns,
course of treatment and lost wages.12 Travelers' retained attorney
wrote to the attorneys representing DeMarco and Woscyna on
July 11, 2006 and offered the remaining policy limit of
$995,000.00 to be shared between the parties.'3  DeMarco's
attorney rejected the offer as an "eleventh hour" attempt that
could not cure Travelers' obligation under Asermely because
Travelers had known about the severity of the accident since
September 2003.14 Travelers' retained attorney responded that
DeMarco had placed Travelers and its insureds in an "impossible
situation" because his demand to settle for the policy limit was
never a "reasonable offer to settle" given Travelers' fiduciary
obligation to protect the assets of its insured from exposure to
other claims.15
Approximately a month prior to the personal injury trial,
Travelers commenced an interpleader action in the Superior Court
for Providence County and filed a motion seeking leave to deposit
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Between the letter that plaintiffs attorney sent on July 22, 2005,
and the Travelers' retained attorney's response, almost a year later, the
Travelers' retained attorney had been in contract with Travelers' claim
services director over the evaluation of the two claims. Both plaintiffs' claims
were estimated at $885,000.000 including prejudgment interest. The
Travelers' retained attorney opined, "'[s]o long as we offer the policy for all
claimants to share on a pro rata basis, there will be no 'Asermely' problem."'
This statement was premised on the belief that the combined demands of
DeMarco and Woscyna exceeded the policy limit and Asermely would not
apply in a multiple claimant context. Id. at 591.
14. Id. at 591-92; see also Asermely, 728 A.2d 461, 464 (creating a per se
rule that "[i]f the insurer declines to settle the case within the policy limits, it
does so at its peril in the event that a trial results in a judgment that exceeds
the policy limits.").
15. Travelers' retained attorney mentioned to DeMarco's counsel,
"Perhaps you should study Asermely a bit more closely." DeMarco, 26 A.3d at
592.
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the policy proceeds with the court. 16 Travelers simultaneously
requested that it be allowed to deposit the policy limits in the
registry of the court.1 7  After Travelers' motion was denied,
DeMarco's attorney made one last, albeit unsuccessful, attempt to
settle with Travelers for the policy limits.18  Following an
unsuccessful mediation, Travelers' claim services director again
wrote the attorneys for DeMarco and Woscyna on September 14,
2006 offering to pay $550,000 to DeMarco and $450,000 to
Woscyna in exchange for a complete release from both
claimants.19 This attempt at settlement was again denied as
"another eleventh hour attempt by Travelers to avoid
responsibility above and beyond [the] policy limits."20
At the personal injury trial that followed, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of DeMarco for $2,801,939.07, a sum that included
interest.21 Afterward, Doire's independent counsel wrote
Travelers' claim services director to express that he believed
Travelers was responsible for the entirety of the judgment entered
against him under Asermely.22 Soon after, on September 29, 2006,
DeMarco's attorney wrote a letter to Travelers' claim services
director alleging that Travelers' failure to settle prior to the
personal injury lawsuit stemmed from a company-wide policy of
delaying potential settlements within multiple claimant
contexts. 23 Travelers then retained a different attorney who
responded by letter on October 30, 2006 and noted that the
allegation that Travelers' conduct infringed the fiduciary duty it
owed to its insureds was untenable-there was no factual basis
upon which to base its assertion that Travelers had a company-
16. Id. at 593.
17. DeMarco's attorney objected to the motion in light of the fact that the
personal injury trial against the insureds was set to begin in less than two
weeks and that the plaintiff would like to pursue an Asermely claim. The
hearing justice ruled that an interpleader was not warranted at the time and
denied Travelers' motion seeking leave to deposit the policy proceeds into the
court registry. Id. at 593-94.
18. Travelers' claim services director wrote to plaintiffs attorney, "As we
have previously informed you, as a result of the duty owed to our insureds,
we cannot pay the entire policy limit to your clients." Id at 593.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 594-95.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 595-96; see also Asermely, 728 A.2d 461, 464.
23. DeMarco, 26 A.3d at 596.
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wide policy of delaying claims. 24 The second Travelers' retained
attorney cited DeMarco's attorney's letter of February 7, 2005,
which suggested that Travelers should wait to settle until all the
claims had been determined, as support that Travelers was not
acting pursuant to any company policy. 25
Meanwhile, Virginia Transportation, which had problems
securing financing from creditors because of the large judgment
rendered against it in the personal injury suit, was on the brink of
bankruptcy. 26  On November 7, 2006, corporate counsel for
Virginia Transportation relayed these concerns to both Travelers'
retained attorneys and expressed a willingness to attempt
mediation again. 27  Virginia Transportation's counsel also
informed Travelers that Woscyna had offered to settle his claim
for $500,000, and requested that Travelers immediately pay that
amount and accept responsibility for the DeMarco judgment. 28
That same day, Travelers brought a declaratory judgment action
in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, naming Virginia Transportation, DeMarco, and Woscyna
as defendants. 29
24. Id. at 596-97.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 597-98.
27. Id. at 598.
28. Counsel for Virginia Transportation also noted in the letter, "the
DeMarco claimants appear willing to release your insured from the judgment
in consideration of an assignment of the claims of your insured against
Travelers;' and he stated that, unless Travelers was willing to accept
responsibility for the entire judgment, the insureds 'may have no . . . means
of avoiding the need for chapter 11 protection [other than by] the assignment
of those claims." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. The action sought a declaration that:
(1) . . . Travelers' duty to defend or settle the claims against its
insureds would end when it exhausted the $1 million policy limits;
(2) that Travelers was entitled to exhaust the policy limits by paying
$1 million to Mr. DeMarco in partial payment of the judgment
against Travelers' insureds; (3) that Travelers had not been required
to pay the policy limits to Mr. DeMarco prior to entry of the
judgment in the personal injury case; (4) that Travelers was not
required to make any payment to Mr. Woscyna or National Grid
(absent a judgment favorable to them) where such payment would
reduce sums available to pay Mr. DeMarco's judgment; (5) that
Travelers was not required to pay any interest that had accrued
after the entry of the judgment in the personal injury case; (6) that
Travelers was not required to make any payment to Mr. DeMarco,
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Ten days later Travelers arranged a mediation involving
counsel for Virginia Transportation, Doire, DeMarco and
Woscyna. 30 At the mediation, Woscyna accepted a settlement of
$450,000 from Travelers and agreed to release Virginia
Transportation, Doire and Travelers from liability.31 DeMarco
also agreed to release Virginia Transportation and Doire from
liability in exchange for payment of $550,000 of the policy
proceeds and an assignment of rights against Travelers for "any
and all claims and causes of action that [the insureds] may have"
against Travelers. 32 The assignment gave DeMarco the right to
pursue any claim against Travelers that related to Travelers'
conduct in the handling of DeMarco's personal injury claim. 33
Subsequent to this assignment, Travelers filed an amended
complaint in the then-pending federal district court declaratory
judgment action.3 4
On November 22, 2006 Demarco initiated a six-count civil suit
against Travelers in Providence Superior Court naming Travelers,
the Travelers' retained attorney, and his law firm as defendants. 35
The suit demanded a declaratory judgment ordering Travelers to
pay the entire judgment amount under Asermely as well as
interest, attorney's fees and costs. 36 On January 3, 2007, the trial
Mr. Woscyna, or National Grid in excess of the policy limits; and (7)
that Travelers was not required to indemnify or pay its insureds for
any amount in excess of the policy limits.
Id. at 598-99
30. Id. at 599.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 599-600.
33. Id. at 600.
34. "Travelers alleged in the amended federal court complaint that it
had exhausted the policy limits in paying $1 million to settle the claims of
Mr. DeMarco and Mr. Woscyna, and it requested that the federal court enter
the following judicial declarations: (1) that Travelers had satisfied its
contractual duties to its insureds; (2) that Travelers had not been required to
pay the entire policy limits to Mr. DeMarco where doing so would have left
Virginia Transportation and Mr. Doire uninsured against other claims; (3)
that Travelers was not required to pay any sums in excess of the policy
limits; and (4) that Travelers was not required to indemnify or pay its
insureds any sums that they might have agreed to pay Mr. DeMarco in
connection with an assignment." Id. at 601.
35. Id.
36. The other counts in the complaint alleged breach of contract, bad
faith, breach of fiduciary duty, interest pursuant to Rhode Island General
Laws § 27-7-2.2 (1956), that Travelers was liable to DeMarco "separate and
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justice who presided over the personal injury litigation entered an
order that the judgment was "satisfied in full."3 7 DeMarco filed a
motion for summary judgment with respect to the allegations that
Travelers was liable under Asermely and was required to pay
interest on the entire amount under Rhode Island General Laws
Section 27-7-2.2.38 Travelers objected and filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment with respect to all counts on grounds that
neither Asermely nor Section 27-7-2.2 applied when there were
multiple claimants, and that DeMarco had failed to establish that
Travelers breached its duty under Asermely.39 A hearing was held
on the motions on October 16, 2007, and 11 months later the
hearing justice issued a written decision granting DeMarco's
motion for summary judgment and denying Travelers' cross
motion. 40 Travelers subsequently appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court on grounds that the hearing justice committed
reversible error because (1) the DeMarco release and the
judgment-satisfied order of January 3, 2007 extinguished any
claim against Travelers that might have been brought by its
insureds; (2) Asermely did not apply in multiple claimant cases;
and (3) there were facts in the record from which a finder of fact
could conclude that Travelers acted in its insureds' best
interests.4 1
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Applicability of Asermely in Multiple Claimant Context
The applicability of the Asermely rule in a multiple claimant
context was an issue of first impression for the Rhode Island
Supreme Court when Travelers raised it on appeal.42 The Court
apart from [his] legal status" as assignee, and legal malpractice by the
attorney and firm retained by Travelers. DeMarco, 26 A.3d at 601.
37. Id. at 601-2.
38. Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
39. Id (citation omitted).
40. With respect to count one, the hearing justice noted, "[i]t is
undisputed that Travelers did not attempt to negotiate any of the claims
until days before the DeMarco trial was locked on to begin and, instead,
refused to consider all of the three claimants' settlement offers, relying on the
claimants to negotiate their claims vis-A-vis each other and reach a global
settlement within the policy limits." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 604.
42. Id. at 606.
2012] 587
588 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:581
first examined the reasoning in Asermely v. Allstate and noted
that the general rule stemmed from the fiduciary obligation that
the insurer has towards its insured, and those to whom insureds
have assigned their rights.43 One such fiduciary obligation is to
make sure that the insured is protected from excess liability by
refraining "from acts that demonstrate greater concern for the
insurer's monetary interest than the financial risk" of the
insured.4 As such, the Court recognized that Asermely held that
the question of whether an insurer acted in bad faith is
irrelevant-if a judgment is rendered against an insured that
exceeds the policy limits after an offer to settle within the policy
limits has been rejected, the insurer is potentially liable for the
amount of the judgment that exceeds the policy limits, absent a
showing that the insured was unwilling to accept the initial
settlement offer.45
Travelers contended that a rejected settlement offer in and of
itself should not determine that the insurer breached its fiduciary
obligations in the multiple claimant context-rather, the proper
inquiry should be a "reasonableness standard."46 Travelers
argued that a reasonableness standard would ensure that an
inflexible rule requiring the insurer to pay the policy limits to one
of numerous claimants, simply to avoid the Asermely liability,
would not harm an insured by leaving them without coverage on
the remaining claims as well, and with the burden of covering
defense costs for those claims once the limits were exhausted.47
Approaching the proper applicability of Asermely in the
multiple claimant context, the court looked to Peckham v.
Continental Casualty Insurance Company as well as the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v.
Davis.48 In light of this precedent, the Court concluded that, in
43. Id. at 607.
44. Id. (quoting Asermely) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. at 607-608.
46. Id. at 609.
47. Id. at 610.
48. Id. at 611-13 (citation omitted); see also Peckham v. Cont'l Cas. Ins.
Co., 895 F.2d 830, 835 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting, "[tihe insurer has both the
right and the duty to exercise its professional judgment in settling, or
refusing to settle, such claims-but it must do so mindful of the insured's best
interest and in good faith . . . . The insurer's goal should be to try to effect
settlement of all or some of the multiple claims so as to relieve its insured of
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the multiple claimant context where the claims in the aggregate
exceed the policy limits, "the insurer has a fiduciary duty to
engage in timely and meaningful settlement negotiations in a
purposeful attempt to bring about settlement of as many claims as
is possible" so as to "relieve its insured" from so much of "potential
liability as is reasonably possible given the policy limits and
surrounding circumstances." 49 The Court came to this conclusion
by recognizing that the insurer has an ongoing fiduciary duty to
bring about settlement of as many claims as possible.5 0 The Court
also noted, however, that an insurer whose insured is faced with
multiple claims may have to engage in a more complex assessment
of those claims in order to protect the insured's interests.5 ' This,
combined with the language in Asermely that an insured need
only show "that the insurer did not act reasonably and in its
insured's best interests in light of the surrounding circumstances"
provided the relevant applicable standard for Asermely in the
multiple claimant context. 52
The Court also concluded that the Asermely inquiry requires a
comprehensive factual analysis that would include taking account
circumstances such as the number of claimants, the relative
extent of the damages each claimant suffered, the amounts of each
claimants' settlement demands, the wishes of the insured, the
timing and character of the insurer's attempt to settle, the
likelihood of litigation, and the willingness of the claimants to
settle.53 Here, the Court found that the hearing justice erred in
granting summary judgment because the record contained
evidence upon which a trier of fact could conclude that Travelers
acted reasonably and in the insured's best interests. 54 Therefore,
so much of his potential liability as is reasonably possible, considering the
paucity of the policy limits."); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d
475,481 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that in the multiple claimant context, "efforts
to achieve a prorated, comprehensive settlement may excuse an insurer's
reluctance to settle with less than all of the claimants, but need not do so.")
(Also postulating that whether an insurer fulfills his fiduciary duty is
determined by whether the insurer acted "in a manner reasonable calculated
to protect the insured by minimizing his total liability").
49. DeMarco, 26 A.3d at 613-14.
50. Id. at 613.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 614 (citing Asermely, 728 A.2d at 464).
53. Id. at 614.
54. Id. at 615.
2012] 589
590 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:581
with respect to Travelers' liability under Asermely, the court
remanded the case back to the trial court.ss
Effect of Release and the Judgment Satisfied Order
Travelers next argued on appeal that, regardless of Asermely's
applicability, any claim DeMarco might otherwise have had under
the assignment of rights was extinguished by virtue of the
documents releasing Travelers' insureds and/or the trial justice's
order that the judgment had been satisfied.56 Travelers argued
that the assignment between DeMarco and its insureds actually
assigned nothing because the insureds suffered no harm that
afforded a basis for legal relief.57 Travelers argued the release
between DeMarco and the insureds extinguished all liability in
excess of the $1 million policy limit and therefore the insureds
were not liable for an excess judgment and suffered no harm.58
Therefore, because the insureds suffered no harm, they had no
legally cognizable claim against Travelers that could be assigned
to DeMarco. 59  To this point, Travelers argued that DeMarco
executed a "general release" as opposed to a covenant or promise
not to execute upon the judgment against the insureds, which, in
turn, relieved the insureds from any liability and extinguished the
insured's rights against the insurer.60
In response, DeMarco argued that the release was only a
"part and parcel" of a larger settlement agreement that also
included the assignment of rights against Travelers, and this
settlement would have been reached regardless of the $550,000
payment. 61 DeMarco claimed the $550,000 was not necessarily
consideration for the general release because he would have
released the insureds for nothing more than an assignment of
55. Id.
56. The "judgment satisfied order" argument was dismissed because it
was not raised at the trial court level. Id. at 617.
57. Id. at 617-18.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Travelers argued that courts outside Rhode Island have held that a
general release fully discharges an insured and therefore discharges any
rights against the insurer. A covenant not to execute, on the other hand, does
not discharge the insured's underlying liability and the insured still retains
its rights against the insurer. Id. at 618.
61. Id. at 618-19.
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rights against Travelers anyway. 62 DeMarco also contended that
Travelers' argument only promoted the technical legal distinctions
between a general release and a covenant not to execute judgment
over the intent of the parties executing the agreement. 63
The Court first noted that the "differential effect" of a general
release as opposed to a covenant not to execute was irrelevant
here, given the explicit language in the release that indicated
Travelers was not released, as well as the simultaneous execution
of the assignment and release.6 As such, the Court proceeded to
analyze the legal effects of the release and assignment. 65  The
Court determined that the proper method for determining the
legal effect of the release and assignment was to ascertain the
intention of DeMarco and the insureds so as not to deprive the
assignment document of meaningfulness. 66 In order to do so, it
was necessary to examine the release and assignment, together,
as part of the same settlement agreement; in the instant case the
court determined the language of the release and assignment
made it clear that the contracting parties sought to make it
possible for DeMarco to pursue claims against Travelers. 67 This
was further evidenced by the language in the assignment which
stated it was executed, "in consideration of the General Release
executed contemporaneously herewith .. "68 Furthermore, the
intention of the parties was further solidified when Travelers'
insureds explicitly promised to assist DeMarco pursue claims
against Travelers as well as DeMarco's clear indication that he
would not have released the insureds but for the right to pursue
62. Id. at 619.
63. In support of his argument, DeMarco claimed that Virginia
Transportation needed the release so as to satisfy its lenders and save it from
financial ruin. Furthermore if the assignment was held invalid, DeMarco
would be forced to pursue litigation against the insureds because the
settlement agreement would fail for lack of consideration. Id.
64. Id. at 619-20.
65. Id. at 620.
66. Id. at 624-26.
67. Id. at 624 (noting the language of the release, "This General Release
shall not in any way be construed, nor is it intended, to release Travelers . . .
from any and all claims that Releasors may have against Travelers in any
way arising from the Litigation or any aspect thereof. The same are
specifically reserved by Releasors.").
68. Id. at 624-25.
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the claims assigned to him against Travelers. 69 In light of these
facts, the Court determined that DeMarco was not barred from
pursuing an Asermely claim and bad faith action against
Travelers. 70 In so concluding, the Court recognized the value an
assignment of rights has for an insured that wishes to seek
protection from its insurance.7 1
COMMENTARY
A look at the insurance litigation over the past decade shows
a growth in bad faith litigation against insurers as the judiciary
and legislature have made it easier for plaintiffs to reach the deep
pockets of an insurance company. Legislatures have accomplished
this through the enactment of bad faith statutes, while Asermely
and DeMarco are examples of judicial action. However, under
Asermely and its progeny, i.e. DeMarco, a plaintiff need not even
show bad faith. Rather than holding an insurance company from
acting recklessly or wantonly, as is the usual language found in
bad faith statutes, Asermely's "reasonableness" standard, now
extended to the multiple claimant context by DeMarco, holds an
insurer to little more than a simple negligence standard. DeMarco
makes this particularly troublesome for insurers faced with
multiple claims. As Travelers' arguments point out, DeMarco
creates the penultimate catch-22 for an insurer, a "darned if you
do", "darned if you don't" situation. Unfortunately, such exposure
for insurance companies will translate into higher premiums for
insureds.
Finally, and even more troubling, the Court's decision to
uphold the assignment of rights--despite the presence of the
General Release-displays a conscious indifference towards the
applicable standard of review. The General Release is considered
a contract; as such, the general principles of contract
interpretation apply. 72 When a contract is clear and unambiguous
the words are to be given their plain, ordinary and usual
69. Id. at 625.
70. Id. at 626.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 624 (citing Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Ctr.,
Inc, 973 A.2d 553, 558 (R.I. 2009) (holding that a release is a contractual
agreement and the principles of contract interpretation apply)).
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meaning. 73  The release signed by DeMarco between himself,
Virginia Transportation, and Doire explicitly provided that
DeMarco released Virginia Transportation and Doire from any
causes of actions and claims, and further provided that it was not
intended to release Travelers from any claims that the insureds
may have against Travelers. 74 This language is not ambiguous; it
proposes that Travelers is not released from any claims that the
insureds may have against it. The release itself, however,
disposed of the insureds' excess liability. Asermely only applies
where there has been a judgment in excess of the policy limits-
this was not the case here because the General Release
extinguished the excess judgment. Therefore, the release disposed
of any claims that Virginia Transportation or Doire would have
had against Travelers. As such, there was no cognizable legal
right that could be assigned to DeMarco.
Rather than treat the General Release as unambiguous,
however, the Court, without expressly finding so in the opinion
itself, considered it ambiguous and delved into an unnecessary
analysis of the parties' intent. It was only after this needless
foray that the Court determined that what was termed a General
Release was, in fact, not one. The result is an otherwise
unexplainable "mulligan" for DeMarco, and a rather confused
legal community left wondering whether the Court's decision was
influenced by well-settled legal principles or sympathy for
DeMarco.
CONCLUSION
In DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Company, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that an insured may pursue an
Asermely claim against its insurer, even in the multiple claimant
context, if the insurer did not act reasonably and in the insured's
best interests in settling a claim and which results in a judgment
in excess of the policy limits. Further, the Court held that a third-
party claimant is not barred from pursuing an Asermely, or other,
claim against an insurer, which is assigned to it as part of a
settlement agreement with an insured, simply because a
73. Id.
74. DeMarco, 26 A.3d at 624; see also, supra text accompanying note 69.
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document may be termed a general release, as opposed to an
agreement not to execute judgment.
J.H. Oliverio
Legal Malpractice. Sharkey v. Prescott, 19 A.3d 62 (R.I. 2011).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in
part a trial justice's grant of summary judgment on two claims of
legal malpractice that were filed after Rhode Island's three-year
statute of limitations. The Court found that although one claim
was excepted from the statute of limitations because it was not
discoverable at the time of the instance of malpractice, the second
claim was merely a drafting error that could be discovered with
reasonable diligence at the time of the occurrence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1999, plaintiff Virginia Sharkey and her husband retained
the defendant, George M. Prescott, to prepare their estate plan. 1
Pursuant to the Sharkeys' requests, Prescott established a trust
indenture called "The Sharkey Family Trust" and prepared
quitclaim deeds conveying the Sharkeys' two lots of land in
Narragansett to the Sharkeys as trustees.2 The title of one of the
lots was in the names of both Mr. and Mrs. Sharkey and on which
was located a vacation home (42), while the other lot's title was in
Mrs. Sharkey's name alone and was vacant (43).3 Before
conveyance to the trust, the Sharkeys intentionally kept the
ownership of the two lots separate so that their titles would not
merge.4 The trust included the two lots, a brokerage account, and
the Sharkeys' home in Woonsocket, and upon the death of either
Mr. or Mrs. Sharkey the trust estate would be divided into two
trusts.5 The "Marital Trust" would contain the home and a small
portion of the estate, and the "Residuary Trust" would contain the
balance of the estate. 6
1. Sharkey v. Prescott, 19 A.3d 62, 63 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id. at 63.
3. Id. n.3.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 64.
6. Id.
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Prescott claimed that Mrs. Sharkey came to his office in July
2001 to ask why both lots were transferred to the trust, after
which Prescott sent Mrs. Sharkey a letter to "memorialize the
conversation" and ask the reason for her complaint.7  Mrs.
Sharkey claimed she never received Prescott's letter, and in an
affidavit she stated that she never complained to Prescott about
his preparation of the estate plan.8 Mr. Sharkey died in 20029,
and on October 8, 2003, Mrs. Sharkey met with a Narragansett
zoning official to prepare to sell lot 43, where Mrs. Sharkey
learned that the titles to lots 42 and 43 had merged when they
were deeded to the trust and that lot 43 could not be sold
separately.' 0 In December 2003, Mrs. Sharkey met with another
attorney who told her that she could have kept separate
ownership of lot 43 rather than put it into the trust." In July
2006, Mrs. Sharkey met with a Citizens Bank representative,
where she found that she could not access the principal of the
brokerage account in the "Residuary Trust."l 2
After her meetings with the Narragansett zoning official and
the Citizens Bank representative, Mrs. Sharkey believed that
Prescott had been negligent in preparing the estate plan.13
Because the purpose of the plan was to provide for the surviving
spouse and Mrs. Sharkey was deprived of both the principal of the
brokerage account and the value of lot 43, on October 3, 2006,
Mrs. Sharkey filed a complaint in Providence County Superior
Court against Prescott for legal malpractice.14  Mrs. Sharkey
alleged that Prescott's advice to convey both lots to the trust and
his drafting resulting in her inability to access the principal of the
trust 'was a breach of [Prescott's] duty of reasonable care, skill,
and diligence."'"5 Mrs. Sharkey requested relief in three forms:
damages in the amount of $400,000, the approximate fair-market
value of lot 43; equitable modification of the terms of the trust,
which would enable her maximum access to the principal with
7. Id. Prescott's letter was dated July 19, 2001.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 65, n.1.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 64-65.
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minimum tax liability; and equitable cancellation of the deed that
conveyed lot 43 to the trust. 16
On May 22, 2009, Prescott filed a motion for summary
judgment,1 7 arguing that Mrs. Sharkey's claim was barred by the
statute of limitations for legal malpractice.1 8 In opposition to the
motion, Mrs. Sharkey argued that her claim fell under the
"discovery" exception, which provided that for instances of
malpractice not discoverable with "exercise of reasonable
diligence" at the time of their occurrence, a plaintiff may file a
claim within three years of discovery of an instance of malpractice
when "reasonable diligence" had been exercised.' 9 The Superior
Court justice granted Prescott's motion because Mrs. Sharkey had
failed to prove that the discovery exception applied to her
malpractice claim, and judgment was entered for Prescott on July
24, 2009.20 On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Mrs.
Sharkey argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the
discovery exception did not apply to Mrs. Sharkey's claims and
that her affidavit and exhibits did not contain enough evidence to
support genuine issues of material fact to survive summary
judgment.21
16. Id.
17. Id. at 65.
18. Id. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.3 (West 2011):
Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 9-1-13 and 9-1-14, an action for
legal malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years of the
occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action; provided,
however, that:
(1) One who is under disability by reason of age, mental
incompetence, or otherwise, and on whose behalf no action is brought
within the period of three (3) years from the time of the occurrence of
the incident, shall bring the action within three (3) years from the
removal of the disability.
(2) In respect to those injuries due to acts of legal malpractice which
could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at
the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the
action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time
that the act or acts of legal malpractice should, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, have been discovered.
19. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-14.3(2) (West 2011); Sharkey, 19 A.3d
at 65.
20. Sharkey, 19 A.3d at 65.
21. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The two issues decided on appeal were whether it was proper
for the trial justice to grant summary judgment to Prescott on
Mrs. Sharkey's claims that Prescott committed malpractice when
(1) he advised the Sharkeys to convey their separately owned lots
into one trust and (2) he drafted the terms of the trust so that the
surviving spouse could not access the principal of the "Residuary
Trust."22 The Court reviewed the evidence de novo, noting that a
grant of summary judgment is "'an extreme remedy that should be
applied cautiously' 23 and emphasizing that the purpose of the
rule was to 'identify disputed issues of fact necessitating trial, not
to resolve such issues."' 24
Advice to Convey Lot 43 to the Trust
The trial justice found that the discovery exception did not
apply to Mrs. Sharkey's claim because both parties agreed that
Mrs. Sharkey knew that the titles of lots 42 and 43 would merge
when conveyed to the trust.25 On appeal Mrs. Sharkey argued
that her claim was based not on the merging of titles, but rather
that Prescott was negligent in advising Mrs. Sharkey that she had
to convey all of her assets to the trust, including the lot she owned
separately from her husband, and that this negligence was not
discoverable until she consulted with another attorney who
advised that there may have been an alternative. 26
Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to Mrs.
Sharkey, the Court agreed that Mrs. Sharkey, exercising
reasonable diligence, could not have discovered Prescott's
negligent advice until she consulted with another lawyer who
would have offered different advice. 27 In finding that there was a
genuine issue of material fact, the Court relied on the conflicting
testimony that Mrs. Sharkey complained to Prescott in July of
2001 and that Prescott sent Mrs. Sharkey a letter as a record of
22. Id.
23. Id. at 66 (quoting Plainfield Pike Gas & Convenience, LLC v. 1889
Plainfield Pike Realty Corp., 994 A.2d 54, 57 (R.I. 2010).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 66-67.
27. Id. at 67.
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their conversation. 28 Given the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the Court found that the trial justice erred in
granting summary judgment on the claim of legal malpractice in
advising the conveyance of lot 43 to the trust.29
Access to Principal of Residuary Trust
The trial court also granted summary judgment on Mrs.
Sharkey's claim that Prescott negligently drafted the trust so that
the surviving spouse could not access the principal of the
"Residuary Trust" in contravention to the Sharkeys' intention for
the estate plan to provide for the surviving spouse financially.30
On appeal, Mrs. Sharkey argued that even with reasonable
diligence, the drafting error was not discoverable until she
consulted the Citizens Bank representative in July 2006 and
found out she could not access the principal of the trust." On this
claim the Court disagreed with Mrs. Sharkey that the error was
not discoverable at the trust's execution. 32  Instead, the Court
relied on basic contract law, which states that "a party who signs
an instrument manifests his assent to it and cannot later
complain that he did not read the instrument or that he did not
understand its contents." 33  Because the Sharkeys signed the
document, manifesting assent to its terms that were allegedly in
contravention to their plan, and because the Court found that "the
provisions of the residuary trust were not beyond the
apprehension of lay people," the Court agreed with the trial justice
that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Prescott's
drafting error was not discoverable at the time of the trust's
execution.34
Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Goldberg offered an opinion concurring in part and
28. Id.
29. Id. at 67-68.
30. Id. at 68.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Shappy v. Downcity Capital Partners, Ltd., 973 A.2d 40,
46 (R.I. 2009).
34. Id. at 68-69 & n.7 (noting that the terms of the trust would put a
reasonable person on notice for a potential malpractice claim).
2012] 599
600 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:595
dissenting in part; while concurring with the Court's grant of
summary judgment on the discoverability of Prescott's drafting
error at the time of the Sharkeys' manifested assent to the trust's
terms, Justice Goldberg dissented from the Court's finding of a
genuine issue of material fact and application of the discovery
exception to Mrs. Sharkey's claim that Prescott's advice
concerning the conveyance of lot 43 was negligent.35  Justice
Goldberg noted that Mrs. Sharkey's affidavit, while asserting that
Prescott advised that "the [Sharkeys'] estate plan could not have
been accomplished without placing lot 43 in the trust," fails to
support this claim with either evidence of the Sharkeys' goals for
their estate plan or evidence that shows that the plan could have
been executed without conveying lot 43 to the trust.36 Justice
Goldberg also stated that her dissent especially relies on Mrs.
Sharkey's failure to prove that she and her husband would have
acted differently if they had known that they did not have to
convey lot 43 to the trust in order to carry out their estate plan. 37
COMMENTARY
Although this case concerns a simple issue of civil procedure,
imbedded in the Court's ruling are warnings to laypersons,
admonitions against relaxing diligence and reasonable care in
everyday transactions. 38  The big lessons are: read contracts
before signing them and get a second opinion for legal questions.
One would expect people to at least have considered the first
admonition when clicking assent to a webpage's terms of use or
signing a lease or even a credit card slip at the grocery store.
Courts will not be sympathetic to the litigant who was too lazy or
too impatient to read and understand the promises he made.
But who thinks of getting a second opinion, unless it concerns
a medical diagnosis? No one would suppose that an attorney paid
to set up a trust would make a mistake requiring continued,
unresolved litigation eight years after the death of a spouse. And
few people would be as willing to pay more than one attorney to
set up a trust as they would be to pay more than one doctor to
35. Id. at 70.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 67-68.
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diagnose an illness. And if one were to have two trusts set up,
would this require a third attorney to determine which follows the
intent and desires of the client?
If the Court had not found that Mrs. Sharkey exercised due
diligence, she may have been left with no remedy, when all she did
was rely on the advice of her attorney. The Court's implicit
admonition suggests the legal community would just shuffle its
feet, shrug its shoulders, and say "Too bad she didn't get a second
opinion."
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a genuine issue of
material fact exists when there is some conflict in evidence of
whether an instance of legal malpractice was discoverable at the
time of its occurrence, and that a genuine issue of material fact
does not exist when a legal malpractice claim is based on a
drafting error that was clear at the time of signing.
Tracy Harper
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Municipal Law. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565 (R.I. 2011).
The Rhode Island Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
constitutionality of a statute authorizing the state's Department of
Revenue to appoint a receiver to a financially-distressed
municipality. The Court held the statute does not violate a
municipality's right to self-governance granted by the Home-Rule
Amendment to the Rhode Island State Constitution, nor does it
violate the separation of powers doctrine or the rights of the
Mayor and City Council to due process and equal protection under
the Rhode Island State Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 18, 2010, the Mayor and City Council (collectively,
Plaintiffs) petitioned under the then-current municipal
receivership statute for a judicially-appointed receiver to assist
with the financial management of the "financially distressed" City
of Central Falls.1 The next day, the Superior Court appointed a
temporary receiver pending a final appointment no later than
June 8, 2010.2 On June 11, 2010 the General Assembly enacted
an amendment to title 45, chapter 9 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, namely chapter 27, section 1 of the Rhode Island Public
Laws of 2010, new legislation prohibiting municipalities from
petitioning for receivership and authorizing the Director of the
Department of Revenue (DOR) to oversee rehabilitation of a
financially distressed municipality, making the statute retroactive
to May 15, 2010 (Act).3 On June 17, 2010, Plaintiffs sought
1. Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 570 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id. Pfeiffer was replaced as receiver by Robert G. Flanders, Jr., Esq.,
before oral argument. Id. at 569 n.1.
3. Id. at 571. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-1 (2010):
It shall be the policy of the state to provide a mechanism for the
state to work with cities and towns undergoing financial distress
that threatens the fiscal well-being, public safety and welfare of such
cities and towns, or other cities and towns or the state, with the
state providing varying levels of support and control depending on
602
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consent for dismissal of the May 18, 2010 petition, as it was now
newly prohibited, and the Superior Court promptly entered its
consent order permitting withdrawal of the petition, with
prejudice.4
In accordance with the newly-enacted statute, on July 16,
2010, the director of the Department of Revenue appointed retired
Superior Court Justice Mark A. Pfeiffer (Pfeiffer) as receiver to
the City of Central Falls (City).5 Pursuant to his position as
receiver, and with no notice or hearing, on July 19, 2010, Pfeiffer
notified the Mayor of Pfeiffer's appointment as receiver of the City
and "that [Pfeiffer had] assumed the duties and functions of the
Office of Mayor . .. [and that as] a result of [Pfeiffer's] role, [the
Mayor's] responsibility [would] be limited to serving in an
advisory capacity ... and [the Mayor's] compensation [would] be
reduced."6  Despite the appointment of Pfeiffer as receiver, on
September 20, 2010, the City Council passed a resolution to
challenge the constitutionality of the state-appointed
receivership.7 Two days later, Pfeiffer rescinded the City Council
resolution and, without notice or hearing, informed the City
Council that their new capacity was an advisory one only.8 On the
same day, Pfeiffer filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Plaintiffs to
prevent the City Council from pursuing the constitutionality
claim. 9 On September 27, 2010, Plaintiffs filed suit in Superior
Court on grounds of unconstitutionality, naming the director of
the Department of Revenue and Pfeiffer as defendants. 10
Pfeiffer's and Plaintiffs' causes of action were consolidated and on
October 21, 2010, the Superior Court ruled the Act
the circumstances. The powers delegated by the General Assembly
in this chapter shall be carried out having due regard for the needs
of the citizens of the state and of the city or town, and in such a
manner as will best preserve the safety and welfare of citizens of the
state and their property, and the access of the state and its
municipalities to capital markets, all to the public benefit and good.
Id.
4. Moreau, 15 A.3d at 570.
5. Id. at 572.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 573.
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constitutional.11 On February 1, 2011, the parties appeared
before the Rhode Island Supreme Court.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Arguments Raised
Plaintiffs raised several arguments supporting their claim
that the Act violated the Rhode Island Constitution. First,
Plaintiffs argued the Act violated the rights afforded to
municipalities by the Home-Rule Amendment of the Rhode Island
Constitution.1 3 Next, Plaintiffs presented their argument that the
Act violated the separation of powers doctrine and the Substantive
Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution.14 Finally, Plaintiffs argued that the
Act produces absurd results.1 5
The Standard of Review
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court began with a
discussion of the standard of review for challenges to the
constitutionality of statutes enacted by the Rhode Island General
Assembly.16  Any such statute is accorded a presumption of
validity and constitutionality, any constitutional defect must be
found beyond a reasonable doubt, and the challenger has the
burden to prove any violation of "an identifiable aspect of the
Rhode Island ... Constitution" beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7
Standing
The Court addressed the question of whether the Plaintiffs
have standing to bring this cause of action. In order to have
standing, a plaintiff must allege that "the challenged act or action
'has caused him or her injury in fact, economic or otherwise" and
the injury must be "concrete and particularized, and actual or
11. Id.
12. Id. at 569, 573, 589.
13. Id. at 574.
14. Id. at 579, 581, 586, 587.
15. Id. at 584.
16. Id. at 573
17. Id. at 573-74 (quoting Newport Court Club Assoc. v. Town Council of
Middletown, 800 A.2d 405, 409 (R.I. 2002)).
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imminent, and not merely conjectural or hypothetical."' 8 Here,
the Court found that the Plaintiffs' duties and authorities had
been curtailed, and their reputations were vulnerable to adverse
impacts as a result of the Act.19 The Court, therefore, found that
the Plaintiffs had standing to bring this cause of action.20
Home-Rule Amendment
The Court considered the Plaintiffs' claim that the Act
violated the rights afforded to municipalities by the Home-Rule
Amendment, Section 1, article 13 of the Rhode Island
Constitution.21 The Home-Rule Amendment grants the right of
municipalities to self-government in all local matters, and the
General Assembly has the power to act only "in relation to the
property, affairs and government of any city or town by general
laws which shall apply alike to all cities and towns, but which
shall not affect the form of government of any city or town."2 2 The
Court undertook to determine whether the Act is an enactment of
general application (whether the Act "applies alike" to all cities
and towns) and whether the Act alters the form of government of a
municipality. 23
General Application ('Applies Alike")
In determining whether the Act is an enactment of general
application, the Court reviewed and considered precedent. 24 The
Court had previously held that a statute which by its terms and
provisions did not apply to any specific town or city was clearly an
enactment of general application. 25 In one such precedent, the
Court noted that a statute which expressly and solely authorized a
18. Id. at 574 (quoting Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 862 (R.I.
1997)).
19. Id. at 574.
20. Id.
21. Id. Article 13, Section 1 of the Rhode Island State Constitution
provides "[iut is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people
of every city and town in this state the right to self government in all local
matters." R.I. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1.
22. Id. at 574-75 (quoting R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4) (emphasis in
original).
23. Moreau, 15 A.3d at 574-76.
24. Id. at 575-76.
25. Id. at 575 (citing Marran v. Baird, 635 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1994)).
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suit against the City of Newport was found not to apply alike to all
cities and towns and was, therefore, not an enactment of general
application. 26 The Court found that the Act applies on its face to
all cities and towns and does not refer to any municipality by
name, and therefore the Court held that the Act is an enactment
of general application that "applies alike" to all municipalities. 27
Alteration of Form of Government
In considering whether the Act alters the form of government
of the municipality, the Court again referred to precedent,
wherein the Court concluded that a statute "did not
unconstitutionally alter a municipality's form of government ...
where the impact 'on a local government [was] contained,
delineated, and temporary"' (the Marran standard).28 Under the
plain language of the Act, the receiver has the right to exercise all
powers of elected officials under the law.29 The Court found that
the powers granted to the receiver are contained and channeled,
resulting from the deliberate and progressive mechanism for state
support of the municipality through the process, the ability of the
Director of DOR may remove the receiver at any time, and the
limitations on the powers of the receiver to actions with
[D]ue regard for the needs of the citizens of the state and of
the city or town, ... as will best preserve the safety and welfare of
citizens of the state and their property, and the access of the state
and its municipalities to capital markets, all to the public benefit
and good."30
26. Id. at 575-76 (citing McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229 (R.I.
1990)).
27. Id. at 576.
28. Id. at 577 (quoting Marran, 635 A.2d at 1178).
29. Id. at 576-77. Section 45-9-7(c) of the Rhode Island General Laws
provides:
Upon the appointment of a receiver, the receiver shall have the right
to exercise the powers of the elected officials under the general laws,
special laws and the city or town charter and ordinances relating to
or impacting the fiscal stability of the city or town including, without
limitation, school and zoning matters; provided, further, that the
powers of the receiver shall be superior to and supersede the powers
of the elected officials ...
R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-9-7(c) (2010).
30. Moreau, 15 A.3d at 577 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-1 (2010)).
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The Court held that the impact of the Act on local government
was sufficiently contained and channeled.3'
Plaintiffs contended that the Marran standard was no longer
applicable, because the statute reviewed at that time limited the
term of the receiver to the end of the municipality's fiscal year,
clearly a temporary term, and the term of the receivership under
the Act is not explicitly time-limited, and therefore could be
permanent. 32  The Court agreed that the absence of a "sunset
provision" is a flaw, but found it not a fatal flaw, because the Act
contains sufficient standards for objective measure of the end of
the receiver's term.33  The Act provides for conclusion of the
receiver's term within a reasonable time after achieving financial
stability, allows for judicial relief in the form of declaratory
judgment or injunctive relief, and provides for the termination of
the receiver when the fiscal health of the municipality is
improved.34 Notably, the Court pointed out that the Act provides
that "elected officials 'shall continue to be elected in accordance
with the city or town charter, and shall serve in an advisory
capacity to the receiver."'35  Since the Act includes "express
preservation of elected offices and the incumbents who hold those
offices, even those serving under onerous impositions of state
authority," the Court held that "the impact of the [A]ct on a town
or city's form of government remains temporary" and the Marran
standard continues to be applicable. 36 As a result, the Court held
that because the Act is channeled, incidental and temporary, and
does not permanently alter the form of government, it does not
violate the rights afforded to municipalities by the Home-Rule
Amendment to the State Constitution. 37
Separation of Powers
The Court next considered the Plaintiffs' claim that the Act
violates the rights afforded to municipalities by the separation of
31. Moreau, 15 A.3d at 577.
32. Id. at 577-78 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3 (2009) (repealed 2010);
Marran, 635 A.2d at 1178).
33. Id. at 578.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 578-79 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(c) (2010)).
36. Id. at 579.
37. Id.
6072012]
608 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:602
powers doctrine of the Constitution by usurping the powers of the
municipal executive and legislative branches and collapsing them
into one entity, the state-appointed receiver. 38  The Court has
previously held that "the separation of powers doctrine prohibits
the usurpation of the power of one branch of government by a
coordinate branch of government." 39
First, the Court promptly discarded the notion that the
separation of powers doctrine applies at the municipal level, since
"nothing in the Rhode Island Constitution or in our case law ...
guarantees, or even implicates, separation of powgrs
considerations at the municipal level."40  Next, the Court
considered whether, if the separation of powers doctrine applied at
the municipal level, the Act violated the municipality's rights
under the doctrine. After considering the case law provided by the
Plaintiffs, the Court came to two conclusions: 1) where a state
legislature granted power to municipalities, state sovereignty
remains intact and the state legislature may interfere with that
grant, and 2) the "tension of power" is between a state agency and
a municipal government, which are not two coordinate branches of
government. 41 The Court held that because 1) the doctrine does
not apply at a municipal level, and (2) even if it did, the Act here
does not promote the usurpation of power of one branch of
government by a coordinate branch of government, the Act does
not violate the rights afforded to municipalities by the separation
of powers doctrine of the State Constitution.42
Substantive Due Process
The Court considered Plaintiffs' claim that the Act violates a
municipality's right to substantive due process under the
Constitution because the power granted to the receiver via the Act
"shocks the conscience because it permits the receiver to act
38. Id.
39. Id. at 579 (quoting Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104,
107 (R.I. 1992)).
40. Id. at 579.
41. Id. at 580-81 (citing State v. Holton, 997 A.2d 828, 845 (Md. 2010);
Lynch v. King, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (R.I. 1978); Marro v. Gen. Treasurer of
Cranston, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (R.I. 1971); State v. Krzak, 196 A.2d 417, 421
(R.I. 1964); City of Providence v. Moulton, 160 A. 75, 79 (R.I. 1932)).
42. Id. at 581.
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arbitrarily and capriciously."43 Rhode Island Case law provides
that substantive due process "guards against arbitrary and
capricious government action . .. having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare ... [and]
prevents the use of governmental power for purposes of
oppression, or abuse of governmental power that is shocking to the
conscience." 44
The Court observed thee ways that the Act affects matters of
the entire state's interest: the state consistently exercises
oversight of municipal budgets and debt, the insolvency of one city
or town affects the ability of all cities and towns in the state to
obtain credit, and it is necessary and desirable to achieve the state
government's goal of fiscal stability.45  As a result, the Court
concluded that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the
Act arbitrary, unreasonable, lacking substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, shocking to the
conscience, or capricious. 46 Therefore, the Court held that the Act
does not violate a municipality's right to substantive due process
under the Rhode Island Constitution. 47
Procedural Due Process
The Court considered Plaintiffs claims that the Act violates a
municipality's right to procedural due process due to its vagueness
(effectively lack of notice and violation of the nondelegation
doctrine) and its removal of elected city officials without notice or
a hearing.48
Vagueness and Nondelegation
Plaintiffs contended that the Act is unconstitutionally vague
in its authorization of the appointment of a receiver after the
director of the Department of Revenue has found that a "fiscal
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Bd. of Review,
875 A.2d 1, 10 (R.I. 2005); Brunelle v. Town of S. Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075,
1084 (R.I. 1997); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Cumberland, 698 A.2d
202, 211 (R.I. 1997)).
45. Id. at 581-82 (quoting Marran, 635 A.2d at 1178-79).
46. Id. at 582.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 582, 587.
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emergency" exists, where "fiscal emergency" is not explicitly
defined within the Act, and that the Act impermissibly delegates
legislative power to an administrative agency without protecting
citizens against discriminatory and arbitrary actions of public
officials. 49
The standard regarding vagueness established in Rhode
Island case law suggests that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
where it "fails to delineate or to suggest any standards and
contemporaneously fails to properly delegate rule making powers
sufficient to provide the omitted standards," allowing officials to
act arbitrarily and with unchecked discretion.50  The standard
regarding delegation established in the case law is that a
delegation is "reasonable, and thus constitutional, as long as. . .
[there are] intelligible standards or principles to confine and guide
the agency's actions." 51
The Court observed that under the Act, the director of the
Department of Revenue must consult with the auditor general to
determine the existence of a fiscal emergency before appointing a
receiver, and, therefore, may not act arbitrarily or with unchecked
discretion.52 Further, the Act contains five factors the director of
the Department of Revenue and the auditor general must consider
when assessing the existence of a fiscal emergency: "projected
deficits, missed audit filings, downgrading by recognized rating
agency, inability to access credit market on reasonable terms,
and ... failure to respond timely to state requests for financial
information."53 The Court found that the delegation of power to
the director of the Department of Revenue is not
unconstitutionally vague, because the five factors delineate clear
standards, eliminating any need to guess or speculate about the
meaning of fiscal emergency. 54 The Act specifies the policy by
which the receiver or any official tasked by the director of the
Department of Revenue with administering the Act are directed
and constrained, and the deliberate triggering mechanisms of the
49. Id. at 582-83.
50. Id. at 582 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Pare, 568 A.2d 1012, 1013 (R.I.
1990)).
51. Id. at 584 (citing Marran, 635 A.2d at 1179).
52. Id. at 583.
53. Id. at 583-84 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3(b)(1)-(5) (2010)).
54. Id. at 583-84.
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Act provide for varying levels of support and control depending on
the circumstance.5 5 As a result, the Court found ample intelligible
standards or principles to confine and guide agency actions. 6 The
Court held that Plaintiffs' claim of vagueness without merit and
the Act's delegation of power permissible.57
Removal
The Court considered Plaintiffs claim that removal of the
Mayor under the Act without notice or a hearing constitutes a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, since the
Mayor was deprived of his position without procedural due
process.58 Rhode Island case law provides that whether
procedural due process is applicable depends on "the presence of a
legitimate 'property' or 'liberty' interest."59  Plaintiffs provided
past Rhode Island case law wherein municipal appointees had
been afforded a protected interest in their positions, and their
removal was conditioned on due process. 60 The Court found that
elected officials stand in a critically different position from
appointed officials purely because they have been publicly elected
rather than appointed, and, therefore, Plaintiffs' case law was not
applicable and Plaintiffs had not shown the Mayor had a protected
interest in his position to which the due process clause was
applicable. 61 The United States Supreme Court has historically
held that "an officer elected by the general public does not have a
property right in his elected office that is subject to due process"
and "the nature of the relation of a public officer to the public is
inconsistent with either a property [right] or a contract right," also
supporting the Court's position.62
Noting that even if the Mayor had a protected interest in his
position, the Court found that the Mayor had not been removed
from his office and was only temporarily impacted by the
55. Id. at 584 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-1 (2010)).
56. Id. at 584.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 587-88.
59. Id. at 588 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974)).
60. Id. at 588 (citing Doris v. Heroux, 494, 47 A.2d 633, 635 (R.I. 1945);
Brule v. Bd. of Aldermen of Central Falls, 175 A. 478, 479 (R.I. 1934)).
61. Id. at 588-89.
62. Id. at 588 (quoting Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (1900)).
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appointment of the receiver, and the Mayor's office had been
preserved.63 As a result, the Court held that the Mayor did not
have a contract or property interest in his elected office that was
subject to due process, and regardless the Mayor had not been
removed from office. 64
Equal Protection
Plaintiffs argued that the Act violates the equal protection
clause of the Rhode Island Constitution because the Act
differentiates between union members and non-union members,
treating union members more favorably.65 The Court agreed with
the receiver's contention that the Plaintiffs failed to raise this
issue during trial, and only raised it in their post-decision motion
for stay and relief, thereby procedurally waiving the right to raise
* 66it on appeal.
Lateness notwithstanding, the Court considered Plaintiffs'
claim. 67 The Court noted that the Trial Judge considered and
denied the post-decision motion for stay and reconsideration. 68
The Rhode Island case law provides that under the equal
protection clause of the State Constitution, an unconstitutional
classification "treats one class of people less favorably than others
similarly situated."69 Further, "where it has not been shown that
a 'fundamental right' has been affected or that the legislation sets
up a 'suspect classification,' a statute will be invalidated .. . only if
the classification established bears no reasonable relationship to
the public health, safety, or welfare."70
Here, the Court found that union employees are not similarly
situated to elected public officials, because union employees are
not selected by vote, union employees do not develop or implement
public policy, and union employees have a profoundly different
63. Id. at 588.
64. Id. at 588-89.
65. Id. at 586.
66. Id. at 586-87.
67. Id. at 587.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 587 (quoting Perrotti v. Solomon, 657 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I.
1995)).
70. Id. at 587 (quoting Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Bd. of
Review, 875 A.2d 1, 11 (R.I. 2005)).
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relationship to the public trust.7 1 As a result, the Court held that
because union members are not similarly situated to elected
public officials, the distinction between union members and non-
union members is permissible within the Act, and the Act may
apply differently to union members and elected public officials and
remain consistent with the equal protection clause. 72
Absurd Results
The Court considered Plaintiffs' claim that the Act produces
absurd results, and determined that Plaintiffs provided only
purely speculative examples of absurd results and a speculative
and unpersuasive argument. 73 The case law requires that claims
of unconstitutionality must be supported by real damages and
may not be merely "conceivably" unconstitutional.74 The Court
found that under the Act, the receiver may exercise the powers of
the authority or office to the limits inherent in that office and no
further, therefore no absurd results can follow.75
Additionally, the Court noted that since there is no person
complaining of wrongful or abusive conduct by the receiver
appointed under the Act, no judicial relief can follow. 76 Finally,
the Court noted that the Act includes a severability clause, so that
even if abuse or absurd results could be shown, the remainder of
statute would still be constitutional. The Court held that the
Plaintiffs' claim that the Act produces absurd results is without
merit.7 8  On March 29, 2011, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the decision of the Superior Court and
upheld the constitutionality of the Act.79
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court displayed great generosity
71. Id. at 587.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 584-85
74. Id. at 585 (citing State v. Perry, 372 A.2d 75, 81 (R.I. 1977))
75. Id. at 585.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 586.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 589.
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in considering the many facets of Plaintiffs' arguments. Clearly,
the issue of the constitutionality of the new receivership statute is
a question of great importance, but unfortunately, Plaintiffs here
presented relatively weak arguments on many sub-issues. The
weak arguments presented by the Plaintiffs include the home-rule
general application argument, where there was a clear precedent
showing the statute was generally applicable, the absurd results
argument, where Plaintiffs offered only speculative examples, and
the removal question, where the Plaintiffs were clearly not
removed from their offices and there was a United States Supreme
Court case directly analogous. Procedural error on the part of the
Plaintiffs was received with magnanimity by the Court - the equal
protection argument never raised during trial was nonetheless
considered carefully by the Court even though the Court was
under no obligation to do so. Finally, the Plaintiffs appear slightly
disingenuous, having petitioned for a receiver under the former
law merely days before enactment of the current law, and
subsequently complaining vehemently that the terms of the
appointment of the receiver are unconstitutional.
The first central question of this case, whether it is
appropriate for the Director of the Rhode Island Department of
Revenue working in consultation with the Auditor General to
appoint a receiver for a financially distressed municipality (rather
than for the municipality to request a judicially appointed
receiver), seems clearly answered in the Court's discussion of the
Plaintiffs' Substantive Due Process claim.80 Financial distress in
one municipality of the state impacts all the municipalities of the
state and the state itself, and therefore, it is entirely appropriate
to take the decision as to whether or when to appoint a receiver
out of the control of the municipality's government and place it
squarely in the control of the state government. 8'
The other central question of this case, whether it is an
infringement on a municipality's rights under the Home-Rule
Amendment of the Rhode Island Constitution for the Director of
the Rhode Island Department of Revenue working in consultation
with the Auditor General to appoint a receiver for a financially
distressed municipality (rather than for the municipality to
80. Id. at 581-82.
81. Id.
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request a judicially appointed receiver), is addressed in the
Court's discussion of the Home-Rule Amendment implications of
the Act. 82 Appointment of a receiver under the Act applies alike
to all municipalities and does not permanently alter a
municipality's form of government, and therefore is not
inconsistent with the Home-Rule Amendment of the Rhode Island
Constitution. 83
The case presented to the Court was not the ideal case for
discussion of the various constitutional issues which could be
raised, but the Court crafted a thoughtful and thorough analysis
of all the threads of constitutionality questions which might be
raised, creating a broad resource for future questions surrounding
the constitutionality of the Act. Many future questions about
municipal receivership will likely be resolved based on the Court's
extensive analysis of the Act's constitutionality in Moreau v.
Flanders.84
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that "An Act Relating
to Cities and Towns - Providing Financial Stability" does not
infringe on the rights of municipalities under the Home-Rule
Amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution because it is
generally applicable to all cities and towns and does not
permanently alter the municipality's form of government. 8' The
Court also determined that the Act does not violate the separation
of powers doctrine because it does not provide for usurpation of
power between coordinate branches of government and because
the separation of powers doctrine does not apply at the municipal
level.86 The Court held that the Act does not violate the due
process or equal protection clauses because it does not allow
arbitrary and capricious government action unrelated to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, it is not
unconstitutionally vague, it provides for permissible delegation of
legislative power to an administrative agency, it does not effect a
82. Id. at 574-79.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 569.
85. Id. at 576, 579.
86. Id. at 581.
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permanent removal of the Mayor from his office, and its different
treatment of union members and non-union members is
permissible.87 Finally, the Court concluded that the Act does not
lead to absurd results because of the inherent limits to the powers
the receiver may exercise, and that Plaintiffs did not meet their
burden by providing only speculative examples of possible absurd
results.8 8 The Court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court
that the Act is not unconstitutional.89
Karin S. Holst
87. Id. at 581-82, 587, 589.
88. Id. at 585-86.
89. Id. at 589.
Municipal Law. N. End Realty, LLC v. Mattos, 25 A.3d 527 (R.I.
2011). Cities and towns in Rhode Island cannot institute fees-in-
lieu of construction of affordable housing. Although the Rhode
Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act requires cities and
towns to ensure that greater than ten percent of its year-round
housing is affordable housing, the statute does not authorize
municipalities to assess fees against private developers who
choose not to develop affordable housing units, unless the plan is
specifically authorized by the Rhode Island General Assembly.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In response to the shortage of affordable housing, the Rhode
Island General Assembly enacted the Rhode Island Low and
Moderate Income Housing Act ("LMIHA") in 1991.1 LMIHA
requires that at least ten percent of each town's year-round
housing qualify as affordable housing. 2 A study by the Rhode
Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation revealed that
as of 2004 the Town of East Greenwich ("the town") did not meet
the ten percent affordable housing requirement. 3
On December 14, 2004, the town council adopted a
comprehensive plan that would bring East Greenwich into
compliance with LMIHA.4 This plan was a compilation of
proposed strategies to bring the town into compliance, and it
included a requirement that major residential developers dedicate
at least fifteen percent of their developments to affordable housing
or pay a "fee-in-lieu" to the town.5  The state director of
1. N. End Realty, LLC v. Mattos, 25 A.3d 527, 530 (R.I. 2011); see R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 45-53 (2009).
2. N. End, 25 A.3d at 530-31 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-53-3(4)(i),
regarding LMIHA's housing requirements).
3. Id. at 531. The study revealed that only 4.36% of East Greenwich's
housing qualified as affordable. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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administration approved this plan on September 26, 2005.6 On
November 6, 2006, pursuant to the town's home rule charter,7 the
town passed three ordinances to execute the plan.8 Ordinance 778
required that developers designate fifteen percent of development
projects as affordable housing or else pay a fee-in-lieu to the
town.9
On March 28, 2006, North End Realty, LLC ("North End")
filed a pre-application with the town's planning board to develop a
five-lot subdivision in the town.10 North End filed its preliminary
plans with the town's planning board on February 20, 2007 and
indicated that none of the developments would be affordable
housing." In response, the town refused to approve North End's
project unless North End paid a $200,000 12 fee-in-lieu pursuant to
the ordinances.13
North End filed suit in Kent County Superior Court against
the town finance director, the town planner, and the town
council. 14 The complaint alleged that the fee-in-lieu violated
North End's due process rights and that the fee-in-lieu constituted
an illegal taking and an illegal tax.1 5  North End later filed a
6. Id.
7. East Greenwich had adopted a home rule charter pursuant to the
Rhode Island Constitution, which allows the town to "enact, amend or repeal
ordinances for the preservation of the public peace, the health, safety, comfort
and welfare of the inhabitants of the Town. . . ." Id. at 531 n.3 (quoting EAST
GREENWICH, R.I., TOWN CHARTER, art. VIII, § C-67A (2000), available at
http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/StateLawLibrary/Pages/CityA
ndTownOrdinances.aspx).
8. N. End, 25 A.3d at 531; see EAST GREENWICH, R.I. TOWN ORDINANCES,
art. III, §§ 93-12 et seq. (2006); EAST GREENWICH, R.I., TOWN ORDINANCES, art.
XVII, §§ 260-98 et seq. (2006); EAST GREENWICH, R.I., TOWN ORDINANCES, art.
IX, §H 34-31 et seq. (2006), supra note 7. The case provides the ordinance
numbers as § 93-13C for Ordinance 778, and § 260-99B for Ordinance 779.
Section numbers listed in this citation are based on the current town
ordinances available on the state courts website.
9. N. End, 25 A.3d at 532.
10. Id. at 528.
11. Id. at 529.
12. Ordinance 778 indicates that the fee-in-lieu shall be $200,000 for
each affordable housing unit the developer builds that should qualify for
affordable housing, but will not qualify. See EAST GREENWICH, R.I., TOWN
ORDINANCES, art. III, § 93-13(B) (2006), supra note 7.
13. N. End, 25 A.3d at 529.
14. Id. at 528-29.
15. Id. at 529.
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motion for injunctive relief preventing the town from enforcing the
fee-in-lieu provision, and added to its arguments that the fee-in-
lieu was improper because it had been imposed "without any
explicit authority from the General Assembly." 16 The court denied
North End's motion and on September 8, 2008 entered final
judgment for the town, holding that the fee-in-lieu was an
"acceptable fee" and did not violate North End's due process
rights. 17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, North End
raised four contentions: (1) the town did not have statutory
authority to impose this fee-in-lieu; (2) the fee-in-lieu was an
illegal tax; (3) the fee-in-lieu violated North End's due process
rights; and (4) the fee-in-lieu was equivalent to a regulatory
taking without provision of compensation.' 8  North End argued
that only the General Assembly can enact laws with statewide
impact, and imposition of fees for failure to construct affordable
housing is "an issue of statewide concern."19 Therefore, because
the General Assembly had not expressly authorized this fee-in-
lieu through statute, North End argued that the town lacked
authority to impose the fee. 20 In response, the town contended
that it was authorized to impose the fee-in-lieu for two major
reasons: (1) it adopted the fee-in-lieu in order to work towards
compliance with a state law, LMIHA; and (2) the state director of
administration approved the town's comprehensive plan, which
included references to charging a fee-in-lieu when developers did
not develop affordable housing.21
The consideration of whether a town may institute a fee-in-
lieu of constructing affordable housing was an issue of first
16. Id. (quoting North End's motion for injunctive relief).
17. Id. The presiding justice held that the fee-in-lieu was a valid fee and
not a tax, which would have required authorization by the Rhode Island
General Assembly. Id. at 534.
18. Id. at 529-30. The Rhode Island Supreme Court did not reach the
illegal tax, due process, or illegal takings issues because it held that the town
did not have the statutory authority to impose the fee-in-lieu. Id. at 538 n.10.
19. Id. at 532.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 533.
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impression to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 22 The Court first
looked to the language of LMIHA in considering the validity of the
town's fee-in-lieu provision. 23 LMIHA requires that towns develop
comprehensive plans to establish compliance with the statute, and
it additionally requires that these plans be submitted to the state
director of administration for approval.24 However, LMIHA is
"completely silent" regarding a town's power to grant fees-in-
lieu. 25
Given that the Court could not infer authority to impose fees
from the language of LMIHA, it held that the only possible source
for the grant of such authority would be the town's home rule
charter. 26 However, the Court held, citing two previous Rhode
Island Supreme Court cases,27 that home rule charters only give
towns the authority to legislate over local matters, not concerns
that are statewide and therefore reserved to the General
Assembly.28 Three variables are to be considered in determining
whether a matter is a state or local concern: (1) whether
statewide, uniform regulation is necessary; (2) whether a matter is
traditionally left for one body to decide; and (3) whether residents
of other municipalities will be affected by the actions of one
individual municipality. 29
The Court held that here, the need to regulate and provide
affordable housing for Rhode Island residents was a statewide
concern that would require legislation by the General Assembly
before a municipality could choose to impose fees-in-lieu of
development. 30  The General Assembly needed to consider all
22. Id. at 535.
23. Id. at 530-31.
24. Id. at 531 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-53-4(c) (2009) and R.I. GEN.
LAws § 45-53-3(4)(ii) (2009)).
25. Id. at 533. The Court noted that LMIHA made only two references to
fees. One reference was regarding a town's ability to charge permit
application fees consistent with the fees charged for projects outside the scope
of LMIHA. The second reference was permission for the State Housing
Appeals Board to establish fee schedules in execution of its business. Id.
26. Id. at 534.
27. Westerly Residents for Thoughtful Dev., Inc. v. Brancato, 565 A.2d
1262, 1263-64 (R.I. 1989); Newport Court Club Assoc. v. Town Council of
Middletown, 716 A.2d 787, 790 (R.I. 1998).
28. N. End, 25 A.3d at 535.
29. Id. (citing Town of E. Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 111 (R.I.
1992)).
30. Id. at 538.
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possible implications on statewide housing of imposition of such
fees and provide guidelines for calculating and imposing them
before municipalities could do so. 3 1  The state director of
administration's approval of the town's plan did not equate to
approval by the state General Assembly. 32
COMMENTARY
To support its holding that specific authority to impose a fee-
in-lieu is required from the General Assembly, the Court
analogized this case to two similar situations in which the General
Assembly did enact "specific enabling legislation" for imposition of
fees. 33 However, the Court's analogy between LMIHA and the
Rhode Island Development Impact Fee Act ("RIDIFA") is a bit of a
stretch.34
In the RIDIFA, the General Assembly made specific
provisions for municipalities to impose fees against developers
when the development projects would require the municipality to
increase public facilities 35 in order to support the developments. 36
The Court noted that the General Assembly allowed imposition of
fees in these situations because it was "in the public interest."37
The statewide policy that the General Assembly sought to promote
with RIDIFA was to "promote orderly growth and development"
while still maintaining adequate public facilities.3 8
The Court found similarities in this need for funds to increase
public facilities necessitated by new development with the need
for funds to ease the strain placed on a town by construction of
non-affordable housing. 39  When a developer builds only non-
affordable housing, the town's total housing units will increase,
and therefore the percentage of affordable housing will decrease. 40
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 535.
34. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-22.4 (2009).
35. Public facilities included services such as water supply, waste
removal, public schools, and road maintenance. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 45-22.4-3
(2009).
36. N. End, 25 A.3d at 535 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-22.4-2(a) (2009)).
37. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAwS § 45-22.4-2(b) (2009)).
38. Id. at 537.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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The town will move even further away from compliance with
LMIHA, and it will have to expend additional resources in order to
meet this greater need. 41 The Court here reasoned that because
the General Assembly had provided specific provisions for fees in
the RIDIFA, it would also need to have made such specific
provisions in LMIHA in order to authorize East Greenwich to
impose its fees-in-lieu. 42
Although the two Acts are similar in that they both represent
situations where a municipality will face financial hardship as a
result of development, these similarities are not so striking as to
mandate a specific authorization of fee provisions under LMIHA.43
Two major differences exist between the two Acts. First, RIDIFA
allows municipalities to impose fees in order to support new public
facilities that will be required as a result of the development
projects. 44 In contrast, LMIHA requires municipalities to ensure
that housing is available to low and moderate income residents
with allowance for both public and private housing. 45  The
Generally Assembly may have included the specific fee provision
details in RIDIFA because municipalities would always have to
find funding for public facilities to meet the needs of new
developments. 46 However, municipalities have options in how to
address the issue of providing affordable housing. 47 In LMIHA,
the General Assembly left each municipality to develop its own
comprehensive plan on how it would come into compliance. 48
Therefore, the General Assembly may have preferred to leave the
decisions on methodology to each municipality rather than provide
specific provisions in the language of the Act.
Second, towns are required to submit their comprehensive
plan to the director of administration for approval under
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.4-2(a) (2009).
45. Id. at § 45-53-3(9).
46. See id. at § 45-22.4-2.
47. For example, a town could impose a fee-in-lieu similar to the one
imposed by East Greenwich and use the funds to develop affordable housing
on its own. Alternatively, a town could require all developers to build a
certain percentage of affordable housing as a requirement of permit approval
and developers would be left with the choice of building affordable housing or
not building housing at all.
48. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-53-4(c) (2009).
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LMIHA.49  The director must ensure that the plan meets the
guidelines of the state planning council.5 0  RIDIFA provides no
similar provision for any review and approval of a town's
responses to the Act.5 1 Therefore, the General Assembly likely
wanted to ensure it provided substantial detail to municipalities
on how to comply with RIDIFA because there would be no
individual approval process. 52 In contrast, the General Assembly
may not have seen as great a need for specific provisions in
LMIHA because the director of administration would have to give
approval to any plan before it could be enacted.53 Therefore, the
Court's reliance on RIDIFA's fee provisions to support the idea
that the General Assembly must always enact specific fee
provisions to authorize towns to impose fees was tenuous at
best. 54
CONCLUSION
Municipalities are not free to impose fees against developers
unless the Rhode Island General Assembly has given specific
statutory authorization of such fees.5 5  Here, East Greenwich
improperly enacted ordinances imposing fees-in-lieu of
development of affordable housing. 56 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded
the case back to that court with instructions to issue an injunction
to the town preventing it from imposing the fee-in-lieu provision of
its ordinances.5 7
Melissa R. Chalek
49. Id. at § 45-53-3(2).
50. Id.
51. See id. at § 45-22.4.
52. See id.
53. See id. at § 45-53-3(2).
54. See N. End Realty, L.L.C. v. Mattos, 25 A.3d 527, 537 (R.I. 2011).
55. Id. at 538.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Property Law. Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968 (R.I. 2011). A
party who knowingly violates a restrictive covenant is not entitled
to the benefit of the doctrine of balancing the equities when a trial
court justice evaluates whether or not to grant injunctive relief to
the party benefitted by the restrictive covenant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case is centered around two pieces of property: one
located on Beacon Hill Road in Newport, Rhode Island, and
another adjacent piece of property located on Hammersmith Road
(Hammersmith lot).' The first piece of property has been owned
by the plaintiff, Thomas D. Cullen, (Mr. Cullen) for 35 years.2
Prior to 2002, Mr. Cullen was the owner of both the lot on Beacon
Hill Road, on which his home was situated, and the Hammersmith
lot, which was unimproved.3
In 2002, Mr. Cullen executed a declaration placing certain
restrictive covenants upon the Hammersmith lot in favor of and
for the benefit of his lot located on Beacon Hill Road.4 This
declaration divided the Hammersmith lot into three areas, the
"Homesite Building Area", the 'View Easement Area", and the
"Open Space Maintenance Area", imposing restrictions on each
area.5 The Homesite Building Area was the only area where
construction was permitted, and any structure built within this
area was limited to a building footprint of 3,500 square feet, with
up to 1,000 additional square feet for other accessory structures,
and no portion of any building could exceed thirty feet in height.6
1. Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968, 971 (R.I. 2011). The Beacon Hill Road
property offers a direct view of the ocean to the south. The protection of this
view is the source of this litigation. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The purpose of this declaration was to preserve the ocean views
of the Beacon Hill Road property. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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According to the declaration construction was prohibited within
the Open Space Maintenance Area and the View Easement Area.7
Mr. Cullen sold the Hammersmith lot in or around 2003 to
the Olingers who in turn sold the property to the defendants,
Robert and Nellie Tarini (the Tarinis) in 2005.8 Prior to
purchasing the Hammersmith lot from the Olingers, the Tarinis
were notified of the restrictive covenants and sought clarifications
about the restrictions within the declaration from the attorney
who authored the declaration.9  After purchasing the
Hammersmith lot the Tarinis hired Paul St. Amand (Mr. Amand)
to design and build a home on the lot. 10
It is at this point, immediately after Mr. Amand was hired
that the record becomes less than clear." Mr. Tarini claimed that
Mr. Amand was given copies of the declaration while Mr. Amand
claimed the only information he received regarding restrictions to
the Hammersmith lot was a site plan depicting the boundaries of
the Homesite Building Area which Mr. Amand was told were
merely guidelines. 12 As early as February of 2007 the design
plans prepared by Mr. Amand contained a building footprint that
exceeded the allowable limits of the Homesite Building Area. 13
At some point in the late summer or early autumn of 2007,
Mr. Tarini attended a meeting at Mr. Cullen's home. 14 The
parties disputed exactly when the meeting took place and who
other than the plaintiff and Mr. Tarini were in attendance.' 5 Mr.
Cullen claimed that he told Mr. Tarini at this meeting that he had
denied a request by the Olingers to build a home that had a
footprint that did not conform to the limits of the declaration;
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 971-72. The most pertinent clarification sought by the Tarinis
was whether the 3,500 square foot building footprint could be combined with
the 1,000 square foot accessory structure footprint to allow a home with an
internal garage with a total footprint of 4,500 square feet. The attorney
replied in the affirmative. Id.
10. Id. at 972.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Id. At this time the design provided for a ground floor with 4,256
square feet and a garage of 1,101 square feet. The resulting combined
footprint was 5,357 square feet. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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however Mr. Tarini did not recall such a discussion taking place.16
At this meeting Mr. Tarini presented the building plans to Mr.
Cullen.17 Though Mr. Tarini was aware at the time he presented
the plans to Mr. Cullen that the building plans exceeded the
declarations limitations, Mr. Tarini did not inform Mr. Cullen of
this fact.' 8 Mr. Tarini claimed, however, that the building plans
he presented to Mr. Cullen were sufficiently scaled to make Mr.
Cullen aware that the size of the planned home was greater than
the declaration allowed.19 Mr. Cullen claimed that the plans were
not scaled in such a way as to make it apparent to him the size of
the planned home. 20 Mr. Cullen did not review the plans again
until December 1, 2008.21
Mr. Tarini encountered Mr. Cullen in Newport after the
meeting at Mr. Cullen's home, but did not inform him about the
proposed dimensions of the house. 22 Mr. Tarini did inform Mr.
Cullen that he was seeking a permit to develop the lot and invited
Mr. Cullen to attend any meetings where the permit may be
discussed.23 In December of 2007, Mr. Tarini contended that Mr.
Cullen was in attendance at a meeting where Mr. Tarini
presented Mr. Cullen a three-dimensional scale model of the
proposed home on the Hammersmith lot.24 Mr. Cullen did not
recall attending any meeting where Mr. Tarini presented a model
of the home. 25
Excavation began in May of 2008 on the Hammersmith lot
and construction began shortly thereafter. 26 In November of 2008
Mr. Cullen contacted Mr. Tarini and asked for a copy of the
building plans because he was concerned that the building may
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 972-73.
19. Id. at 973.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. Though the case does not indicate whether the Tarinis
obtained the necessary permit, the fact that the Newport Zoning Board of
Review later "stayed" the building permit necessarily implies that the permit
was in fact issued. Id. at 974.
24. Id. at 973.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 973-74. At this point the proposed footprint had grown to
5,336 square feet. Id.
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not be in compliance with the declaration. 27 After he did not
receive the building plans, Mr. Cullen again requested them in
early December, and also requested permission to conduct a land
survey of the Hammersmith lot.28 A survey completed at Mr.
Cullen's request led the plaintiff to believe that the building under
construction violated the terms of the declaration. 29
In late December 2008, Mr. Cullen successfully sought an
appeal of the issuance of the Tarinis' building permit. 30  On
February 11, 2009 Mr. Cullen filed a complaint in Superior Court
seeking preliminary and mandatory injunctions prohibiting the
Tarinis from continuing construction on their home, ordering
them to remove all construction from the Open Space
Maintenance Area and View Easement Area, and ordering them
to reconstruct the home in accordance with the declaration. 31 A
preliminary injunction was issued on March 4, 2009 which limited
the degree to which the Tarinis could continue construction and
informed them that any further construction was at their own
risk.3 2
On June 26, 2009 the trial justice issued a bench decision in
favor of Mr. Cullen permanently enjoining the Tarinis from any
further violations of the declaration and enjoined them to remove
all construction that was in violation of the declaration. 33 The
Tarinis asseverated Mr. Cullen was guilty of laches, that the
doctrine of estoppel barred the court from enforcing the restrictive
covenant, and that the plaintiffs conduct amounted to a waiver of
the restrictive covenant. 34  The Tarinis also asserted that the
court must apply a balancing of the equities when considering
whether to grant injunctive relief.35 Mr. Tarini, Mr. Cullen, and
others testified during the nonjury trial which began on May 11,
2009 and ended on May 28, 2009.36
27. Id. at 974.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The Tarinis had spent approximately $1.25 million on
construction at this point. Id.
33. See id. at 974-76.
34. Id. at 975.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 974. The parties did not dispute that the construction
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Mr. Cullen and his associate Mr. Pell both testified that the
meeting at Mr. Cullen's home took place in October. 37 Both men
also testified that Mr. Cullen did inform Mr. Tarini that in the
past Mr. Cullen had strictly enforced the declaration against the
Olingers. 38  Mr. Cullen testified that the building plans he
received at this meeting did not contain enough information to put
him on notice that the Tarinis intended to violate the restrictive
covenants. 39 Mr. Cullen also testified that he did not ever see the
three dimensional model of the proposed home on the
Hammersmith lot.40
Mr. Tarini and his associate Mr. Craig testified that the
meeting at Mr. Cullen's home took place in August.41 Mr. Tarini
testified that Mr. Cullen was present at a meeting at the home of
Mr. Pell where Mr. Tarini presented the three dimensional
model.42 Mr. Tarini also testified that he presented Mr. Amand
with copies of the declaration. 43 Mr. Amand testified that Mr.
Cullen did not in any way inform him of the declaration's
restrictions.44 Additionally, Mr. Tarini admitted at the trial that
he did not tell Mr. Cullen that the planned home violated the
restrictions of the declaration. 45
After hearing testimony, the trial justice reviewed and
weighed the evidence, considered the credibility of the witnesses,
and issued the following factual findings and conclusions. 46 The
trial justice concluded that Mr. Tarini was aware of the size of his
proposed home and that Mr. Cullen had enforced the declaration's
restrictions against the previous owners of the Hammersmith
lot.47 The trial justice determined that the drawings presented to
Mr. Cullen at the October meeting were not sufficient to provide
footprint exceeded the square footage restriction of the declaration and the
roof exceeded the height limitations of the declaration. Id.
37. Id. at 975.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 973.
40. Id. at 978.
41. Id. at 975.
42. Id. at 973.
43. Id. at 972.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 978.
46. Id. at 975.
47. Id.
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him notice that the home would violate the declaration.48 The
trial justice found Mr. Cullen acted "promptly" once he became
aware the building under construction may be in violation of the
declaration.49
The trial justice next determined that the language of the
declaration was clear; the Tarinis had notice of the declaration,
and willingly engaged in conduct in violation of the declaration.50
Based on the above findings the trial judge rejected each of the
affirmative defenses raised by the Tarinis.5 The trial justice then
concluded that he was not required to balance the equities in
determining whether to grant injunctive relief in this situation
because the Tarinis had acted with actual notice in violation of the
declaration and the only way the objective of the declaration could
be achieved would be through injunctive relief.52
The defendants filed a timely appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, contending the trial court erred (1) in granting
injunctive relief without balancing the equities or requiring a
showing of irreparable harm and (2) in misconstruing the factual
evidence. 53
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Trial justice's factual findings
Addressing the defendants' claim that the trial court erred by
misinterpreting certain material facts, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court stated that a trial justice's factual findings are afforded
great weight and will only be overturned if they are clearly wrong
or if the "'trial justice has overlooked or misconceived material
evidence."' 54 The Court then turned to each of the defendants' five
assertions regarding the trial justice's misinterpretations of
material evidence.
The Court first rejected the defendant's contention that the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 975-76.
53. Id. at 976-77 (The Supreme Court granted a stay of the permanent
injunction pending appeal).
54. Id. at 977 (quoting S. Cnty. Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of
Charlestown, 446 A.2d 1045, 1046 (R.I. 1982).
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trial justice erred by determining there was insufficient
information to put Mr. Cullen on notice that the planned design
was in violation of the declaration.5 5 The Court first accepted the
trial justice's reasoning that the building plans did not contain
enough information to put Mr. Cullen on notice. 56  The Court
noted that Mr. Tarini failed to inform Mr. Cullen that the planned
home violated the declaration even though Mr. Tarini had the
opportunity and "that Mr. Tarini was aware that plaintiff would
refuse any request to waive the restrictive covenants."5 7  The
Court also rejected the Tarinis' argument that even if the building
plans did not put Mr. Cullen on notice of the violation to the
declaration, the three dimensional model did.5 The Court
concluded that even though the trial justice made no specific
findings regarding the model, his other findings regarding the lack
of significant information in the drawings precluded a finding that
Mr. Cullen had actual notice of the violations. 59
The Tarinis' asseveration that the trial justice misconceived
the evidence concerning Mr. Cullen's timely notice vel non of his
intention to strictly enforce the restrictive covenants was also
rejected by the Court. 60 The Court stated that the trial justice
was entitled to determine that the plaintiff and his witnesses were
more credible, and to believe that Mr. Cullen had made clear to
the Tarinis that he had strictly enforced the covenants in the
past.61 The Court found that the evidence indicated Mr. Cullen
acted to enforce the covenant as soon as he became aware that the
terms of the declaration were being violated, bolstering the trial
justice's determinations. 62 For these reasons the Court concluded
the trial justice did not err in finding that Mr. Cullen did not delay
enforcing the restrictive covenants and was neither guilty of
laches, nor had he waived his right to enforce the restrictive
covenants. 63
The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 978.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 979.
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trial justice erred by concluding that the Tarinis had come to the
court with unclean hands. 64 Neither party disputed the fact that
the Tarinis had actual notice of the restrictions prior to
purchasing the property. 65 Additionally, the trial justice did not
err in finding that Mr. Tarini knew the planned building violated
the declarations and that Mr. Tarini failed to notify Mr. Cullen of
the size of the planned building.66  The Court analyzed the
undisputed facts as well as the trial justice's factual findings and
determined the trial justice did not err by concluding the Tarinis
acted in bad faith and came to the court with unclean hands
because the Tarinis knowingly violated the terms of the restrictive
covenant. 67
The Court also declined to accept the Tarinis' final assertion
that the trial justice failed to determine certain violations of the
declaration actually occurred, which would have constituted a
reversible error.6 8  The defendants alleged that certain factual
controversies regarding violations to the declaration in addition to
the 4,500 square footage restriction and height restriction were
not resolved by the trial justice. 69 The Court concluded that the
trial justice was not required to resolve these controversies
because the parties did not dispute that other restrictive
covenants had been violated.70
Irreparable Harm
While irreparable harm is necessary before a trial court may
grant injunctive relief, money damages are not necessary for a
showing of irreparable harm.7 1 The defendants argued that the
trial justice erred by granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff
because the plaintiff had not made a showing that he would suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted.72 The Court
noted that this issue and the remaining questions of law are
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 980.
72. Id. at 979.
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reviewed de novo.73  The Supreme Court recognized that
"'injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy so long as the purpose
for which the restrictive covenant was created continues to
exist."'74 The Court then held that the trial justice did not err
because the purpose of the restrictive covenant was to preserve
Mr. Cullen's unobstructed ocean view and that the only way to
continue to fulfill the purpose of the covenant would be to grant
injunctive relief.7 5
Balancing the Equities
The Court disagreed with the defendant's final contention,
that the trial justice erred by failing to balance the equities
between parties prior to granting injunctive relief.76  The
defendants asserted that the trial justice's reliance on Ridgewood
Homeowners Association v. Mignacca was inconsistent with the
Court's prior ruling in Belliveau v. O'Coin.n The Tarinis claimed
that the Supreme Court's holding in Belliveau required the trial
justice to balance the equities before granting injunctive relief.78
The Court, however, explained that this situation was similar to
two other cases, Martellini and Ridgewood, where the court did
not require a balancing of the equities prior to enforcing a
restrictive covenant. 79 The Court explained that in Belliveau it
held that although balancing the equities was appropriate in some
situations, it is not always necessary to do so.80 The Court made
73. See id. at 977 (citing R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Bowen
Court Assocs., 763 A.2d 1005, 1007 (R.I. 2001)).
74. Id. at 980 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §
8.3, cmt. b at 495-96 (2000)).
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Ridgewood Homeowners Ass'n v. Mignacca, 813 A.2d 965
(R.I. 2003); Belliveau v. O'Coin, 557 A.2d 75 (R.I. 1989).
78. Cullen, 15 A.3d at 980.
79. Id. at 981. In Martellini the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not
apply a balancing of the equities when requiring the operator of a home day-
care center who violated an unambiguous restrictive covenant to close the
business. In Ridgewood the Court also did not require a balancing of the
equities and held that "proof of a violation of a restrictive covenant was
sufficient of a court to grant injunctive relief. Cullen, 15 A.3d at 981 (citing
Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 845 (R.I. 2004) and
Ridgewood, 813 A.2d at 975).
80. See id.
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clear that balancing the equities was appropriate in Belliveau
because of the unique facts of the case, which were easily
distinguishable from those at hand.8 ' The Court then concluded
that the trial justice was not required to balance the equities in
this case.
Finally, even though the Court had determined the trial
justice was not required to balance the equities, the Court
evaluated whether the trial justice abused his discretion by failing
to do so. 8 2  The Tarinis asserted that injunctive relief was
inequitable in this situation because of the substantial amount of
money they had spent thus far in construction and because of the
relatively little harm Mr. Cullen would suffer.83  However the
Supreme Court determined the trial justice did not abuse his
discretion by deciding not to balance the equities. 84 Generally the
benefit of balancing the equities is reserved for innocent parties,
and this right does not extend to parties who knowingly and
deliberately violate a restrictive covenant. 85
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a party who
comes to court with unclean hands is not entitled to a balancing of
the equities prior to determining whether to grant injunctive
relief.86 The case is significant because the Court made clear that
a trial justice is not required to balance the equities in all
circumstances prior to granting injunctive relief. The trial
justice's decision not to balance the equities was appropriate
because the defendants came to the court with unclean hands.
81. Id. at 980-81. In Belliveau the plaintiffs owned a burdened parcel
upon which the defendants had the right of first refusal for any sale. The
plaintiffs attempted to transfer the parcel to a corporation wholly owned by
the plaintiffs and the defendants sought to enforce the right of first refusal,
forcing the plaintiffs to sell the parcel to the defendants. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held it was appropriate to balance the equities in declining
enforce the covenant because strictly enforcing the covenant would result in
an "'economic windfall"' to the benefit of the defendants. Id. (quoting
Belliveau, 557 A.2d at 76, 80).
82. Id. at 981.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 982.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 983.
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Were the trial justice required to balance the equities between
parties prior to granting injunctive relief, the result at the trial
level may have been different given the amount of money spent by
the defendants and the difficulty in quantifying the harm to the
plaintiff.
The Supreme Court's decision here should encourage parties
burdened by restrictive covenants to be honest and forthright
when seeking to deviate from the terms of a declaration. By
allowing a trial court to ignore the equities between parties when
determining whether to grant injunctive relief, burdened parties
are not encouraged to expend as much money as possible when
violating a restrictive covenant, thus tipping the balance of
equities in favor of their cause and allowing the burdened party to
defeat the purpose of the restrictive covenant. This decision
reinforces the principle that the enforcement of restrictive
covenants is an equitable issue and a party who does not come to
court with clean hands will not reap the benefits of equity.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision which granted Mr. Cullen all requested injunctive relief
and ordered the Tarinis to pay all of Mr. Cullen's fees and costs
incurred by enforcing the declaration. The Court determined that
the trial justice made reasonable factual findings which were free
from material misconceptions of the evidence. The Court also
determined that the trial justice did not err by declining to
balance the equities between the parties before granting
injunctive relief.
Andrew S. Tugan
Statutory Interpretation. Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d
68 (R.I. 2011). The Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered
whether a former government employee must be convicted of a
criminal offense related to his employment before the retirement
board can begin hearings to reduce or revoke that former
employee's pension benefits. The Honorable Service Ordinance
("HSO") allows the state to reduce or revoke a former employee's
pension benefits if that former employee acts contrary to what is
considered "honorable service." The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island held that the criminal conviction of a crime related to that
individual's public employment is necessary before the board can
begin hearings.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The appellant in this case was John J. Ryan, a retired captain
of the Providence Police Department, who asked the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island to vacate the judgment of the Superior
Court.' In a recent investigation, "Operation Plunder Dome," into
the corruption and scandal within the municipal government in
Providence, numerous city officials were convicted in federal
courts of "various acts of malfeasance." 2 Retired police Chief
Urbano Prignano, Jr. stated during the investigation that
"favored" applicants eligible for promotions within their police
departments were given source materials for their written
examinations. 3 The appellant was implicated in this scheme by
Mr. Prignano however was neither formally charged with criminal
charges or wrongdoings, nor did he ever admit his involvement;
the issue was put on the back burner but did not go away.4
Prior to the investigation which led to the case at bar, the
appellant had begun receiving his monthly pension benefits after
1. Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 68-69 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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his retirement from the force on June 11, 2002." On October 21,
2008 appellant was served with a notice that the board was
holding a hearing to determine whether to reduce or revoke his
pension benefits. 6 It was alleged that during his tenure appellant
(1) was given free or underpriced vehicles and low cost
maintenance from a city vendor in return for his supervising the
vendor's contract with the city, (2) assisted officers whom he
favored in obtaining source material prior to their promotional
examinations, and (3) he himself had received source materials
prior to his 1996 captain promotional examination.7 In response,
the appellant filed suit in Superior Court seeking a declaratory
judgment on November 18, 2008.8
In his suit, the appellant alleged that a conviction of a crime
related to his employment, plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo
contendere is a necessary prerequisite under the HSO9 before the
board can convene a "reduction or revocation hearing."l0 This
case was consolidated with the cases of four other individuals
because of common question of law to be decided." The board
hearings were stayed until three issues of first impression were
resolved: "(1) Is a criminal conviction a prerequisite to action by
the board in all cases?; (2) Does the Superior Court have
jurisdiction to hear an action brought by the board to enforce its
recommendations under the HSO?; (3) If that court does have
jurisdiction, should it apply a deferential or a de novo standard of
review when reviewing decisions made by the board?"' 2 The trial
judge held that a criminal conviction was not necessary and only a
showing that an employee failed to give "honorable service" was
5. Id.
6. Id. The notice did not specifically state that he was in violation of the
HSO but that was later made clear. Id. at 69 n.3.
7. Id. (The last two allegations were generally for participating in
corrupting the Providence Police Department's promotional process).
8. Id.
9. PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189.1 (1999).
10. Id. The appellant also asserted that the officer assigned to preside at
his hearing had a conflict of interest and that the six year period was
unreasonable, but neither issue was raised on appeal. Id. at 69 n.4
11. Id. at 70 (The four other individuals had already had their pensions
reduced or revoked. Those individuals are Anthony Annarino, Frank
Corrente, Kathleen Parsons, and Urbano Prignano).
12. Id.
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required to reduce or revoke a pension under the HSO.13
Additionally, the trial judge found that the Superior Court had
jurisdiction over any action brought under the HSO and that
deference would be given to the board's decisions. 14 The appellant
appealed this decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island is the final arbiter of
statutory construction. 16  Because the Court reviews cases of
statutory interpretation de novo, the Court determined that the
same rules shall apply when interpreting an ordinance." The
goal is to construe an ordinance to give full effect to the legislative
intent and enact the most consistent meaning.18 The ordinance's
language will provide the intent of the legislature and when the
ordinance is clear and unambiguous the Court will give the words
their plain and ordinary meanings.19 An ordinance is clear and
unambiguous when the Legislature has not qualified any words
and the true import of the words will be determined with regard to
the broader context of the ordinance. 20
A. Providence's Honorable Service Ordinance
The HS0 2 1 allows for pension benefits to be paid only to
employees who render honorable service. 22 The ordinance defines
four categories of crimes which are related to one's public
employment which would allow the board to reduce or revoke that
public employee's pension benefits. 23  Section 17-189.1(a)(4) 24
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id at 70-71.
19. Id. at 71.
20. Id. (Individual sections will be considered in the context of the entire
statutory scheme and not independently).
21. PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189.1 (1999).
22. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 71.
23. Id. at 71-72. Among these crimes are fraud, bribery, aiding or
abetting an embezzlement of public funds, aiding or abetting a felonious theft
by a public employee of his employer, and those who use their public position
to gain or realize a profit or advantage for himself or other person. See § 17-
6372012]1
638 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:635
provides that reduction or revocation of a former public employee's
pension benefits is authorized "'if such employee is convicted of or
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any crime related to his or her
public employment.""25 Pursuant to section 17-189.1(a)(5)2 6, as
soon as the conviction or plea occurs, the board may begin the
reduction or revocation hearing.27  If it is determined that a
former public employee's pension benefits need to be reduced or
revoked, the board shall file suit in Superior Court.28 The last
section of the ordinance, section 17-189.1(a)(6)29, specifically
states that the plea of guilty or nolo contendere must result in a
conviction. 30
B. Arguments of the Parties
The appellant argued that the ordinance's provisions are
unambiguous and that the provisions regarding the specific
criminal convictions are instructions about when the honorable
service requirement had not been met.31 He further contended
that because the provisions of the ordinance determine what
constitutes a failure to render honorable service, that condition is
limited to those convictions delineated in the ordinance. 32
Summarily, the "hearing process and subsequent civil action
provided for in the ordinance are permitted only when there is a
conviction." 33  The appellant also urged the Court to look at
relevant legislative history but the Court determined this was
unnecessary because the intent of the legislature is readily
apparent from the plain meaning of the words. 34
The City attempted to make an argument which would break
189.1(a)(2).
24. § 17-189.1(a)(4).
25. § 17-189.1(a)(4); Ryan, 11 A.3d at 72.
26. § 17-189.1(a)(5).
27. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 76.
28. Id. at 72. The procedure here was determined pursuant to § 17.-
189.1(a)(5). PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189.1(a)(5) (1999).
29. § 17-189.1(a)(6).
30. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 72.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 72-73. (The legislative history the appellant wishes the Court
to consider is the record of the adoption of the HSO, prior common law,
comparable state legislation, and debate preceding the HSO's adoption).
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the ordinance down into pieces. The City argued that the
ordinance should be read disjunctively so that action could be
taken by the board if the retiree either failed to provide honorable
service by engaging in conduct which is inappropriate and does
not result in a conviction or is convicted of a crime related to his
employment. Drawing on the Rhode Island State Constitution36,
the city believed that the public employees must be held to the
highest standards of ethical conduct and not use their public
positions for private gain or advantage. 37 By using the Rhode
Island Constitution, the Court concluded that this would force the
Court to "engage in mental gymnastics" and be in conflict with
principles of statutory interpretation. 38
In a prior Rhode Island Supreme Court case, 39 the Court held
that there was a common law requirement of honorable service
before drawing a pension. 40 The adoption of the honorable service
requirement in the HSO is merely a codification of this long-held
common law principle. Thus, when the Legislature adopted the
HSO, it specifically intended to spell out the circumstances under
which a former public employee would be in violation of the
honorable service requirement and when the board would be
required to initiate the reduction or revocation hearings.41  A
hearing will only be pursued when there has been a criminal
conviction related to the retiree's employment. 42
C. Interpreting Providence's Honorable Service Ordinance
While the Court only considered the plain and natural
meaning of the words in interpreting the ordinance, the words
were not looked at in isolation.43 Rather, the Court considered the
words in the context of the enactment as a whole. 44 Additionally,
provisions were not interpreted independently; rather, they will be
35. Id. at 73.
36. R.I. Const. art. III, § 7.
37. Id.
38. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 73.
39. See In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1377 (R.I. 1992).
40. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 73 (citing Almeida, 611 A.2d at 1377).
41. Id at 74.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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interpreted with regard to the entire ordinance.4 5
The phrase "'honorable service"' is only found twice in the
ordinance. 46 The Court realized that if they were to accept the
government's argument they would then have to separate both
provisions where "honorable service" is mentioned and then
disregard the rest as "surplusage."47  The Court found that it
would be absurd to recognize that "honorable service" is not linked
to the other provisions of the ordinance and is somehow
independent of the other conduct which constitutes an HSO
violation. 48 The Court determined that the criminal convictions
mentioned in the ordinance failed to meet the definition of
"honorable service."49  The ordinance must be construed as
containing an exhaustive list of conduct which is considered a
violation of one's "honorable service."50 The Court reasons that
the Legislature would not have gone through the trouble of
delineating an exhaustive list if the ordinance was to be
interpreted to include other conduct.5 1  Additionally, the
Legislature expressly excluded pleas of guilty and nolo contendere
which did not result in a conviction, meaning that only a
conviction will trigger the hearing laid out in the ordinance.5 2 The
board only has the authority to act when there has been a
conviction. 53 Including only that which is specifically excluded in
the ordinance would be absurd and illogical; such an
interpretation is impermissible. 54 Furthermore, other state laws5 5
specifically provide that those who enter a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere and are sentenced to probation will not be considered
as having been convicted upon completion of probation.56
45. Id.
46. Id. (Specifically, the term is only found in the title and in § 17-
189.1(a)(1)).
47. Id. at 74-75.
48. Id. at 75.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (The Court states that they will be holding to the old maxim of
interpretation "expresio unius est exclusion alterius" meaning "the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-10-12 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-18-3 (1956).
56. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 76 (R.I. 2011).
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The Court held that the HSO is clear and unambiguous.5 7
Because of the clarity and unambiguity, the words in the
ordinance are given their plain and ordinary meaning.58
Furthermore, a conviction of a crime related to one's public
employment is a necessary prerequisite to the board taking
action. 59 Thus, mere allegations, a plea of guilty not resulting in a
conviction, or a plea of nolo contendere not resulting in a
conviction are insufficient under the HSO for the board to begin
pension benefit reduction/revocation hearings. 60
COMMENTARY
The intent of the Legislature in enacting the HSO is clear: no
more benefits for those who are corrupt. Seth Yurdin, the
Majority Leader of the Providence City Council, stated in an
interview that "the intent of the Honorable Service ordinance, has
been to hold accountable individuals who commit a crime related
to their public employment."6' Corruption has long been a
problem in Providence. 62  In the past, some Providence civil
servants have realized extra-legal benefits and the city is tired of
the poor image this portrays.
To fight this image, the Legislature took action in 1999. The
initial enactment in 1999 of what is now the HSO got the ball
rolling but it was all bark and no bite. Providence Finance
Committee Chairman John J. Igliozzi recognized the failings of
the 1999 ordinance as loopholes which allowed those who had
acted dishonorably to escape without consequences.63 While the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island in this case 64 makes clear that a
criminal conviction is a requirement for the board to initiate
reduction or revocation hearings, the statute in its entirety has
57. Id at 76.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Council Passes New Honorable Service Ordinance, Official Website of
the Providence City Council (Mar. 18, 2011), http://council.providenceri.com/
council-passes-new-honorable-service-ordinance.
62. The vast majority of public servants in Providence are engaging in
"honorable service" but there are a few documented cases of individuals
which give the rest of the Providence public servants a bad reputation.
63. Id.
64. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 76.
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considerably broader reach. Not only is a conviction not
necessary, but other sections of the ordinance have a much more
lenient standard. Section 17-189.1(b)(2)(E) 65 , not mentioned in
the opinion, allows the board to weigh a plethora of factors in
determining when one has acted "dishonorably" and not only when
one has failed to perform within the "honorable service"
standard.66 Additionally, the ordinance permits the hearings to
begin if the weighing of the Section 17-189.1(b)(2)(E) 67 factors are
sufficient to support a finding by the board using a preponderance
of the evidence standard that the employee has engaged in
"dishonorable conduct." It was clearly the intent of the legislature
to reach more conduct than merely convictions related to
employment, guilty pleas, and pleas of nolo contendere.
Using the Court's own analysis, this section must be read
together with all of the other sections. Each section is construed
in light of the entire enactment and section 17-189.1(b)(2)(E) 68
suggests that a criminal conviction is not the only conduct which
will satisfy the ordinance. In fact, the ordinance gives broad
discretion to the board to determine what "dishonorable conduct"
may include. The "dishonorable conduct" section nowhere states
that a criminal -conviction is required for a violation of the
ordinance. 69 According to the text, it is clear that not only does a
criminal conviction satisfy the ordinance, but there could be other
conduct which would be sufficient. The legislature would not have
gone through the trouble of putting in sections 17-189.1(b)(2)(E) 70
and 17-189.1(d)n if it did not intend to include more conduct than
criminal convictions relating to a former employee's public service.
Therefore, a criminal conviction and any other conduct which the
board deems "dishonorable" may result in the board taking action
to reduce or revoke pension benefits.
While a criminal conviction may be necessary under a few
65. PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189.1(b)(2)(E) (1999).
66. Id. (The factors to be weighed include the nature of the misconduct
or crime and the quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt and
culpability. This particular section of the ordinance is not one which the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island addresses.).
67. § 17-189.1(d).
68. § 17-189.1(b)(2)(E).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. § 17-189.1(d)
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sections of the ordinance, the entire ordinance read as a whole
explicitly allows for a hearing by the board if the conduct is only
determined to be "dishonorable." Section 17-189.1(b)(2)(E) 72 does
not state a conviction requirement and is an expressed departure
from that requirement. In a town which has been riddled with
corruption it is highly doubtful that the Legislature intended to
crack down in only a strict sense on very specific conduct. To close
all the loopholes and really give this piece of legislation some
teeth, the HSO should have been interpreted to include more
conduct. Bringing more conduct within the reach of the HSO
would allow the board to initiate more hearings to reduce or
revoke pension benefits. The result would be to ensure that civil
servants would engage in "honorable service." Any corruption
within Providence would come to a grinding halt. Sections 17-
189.1(b)(2)(E)" and 17-189.1(d) 74 crackdown on corruption by
bringing more conduct within reach of the board and these
sections need to be applied for the full force of the HSO to be felt.
CONCLUSION
In interpreting the HSO, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
applied principles of statutory interpretation and held that the
ordinance was clear and unambiguous on its face.7 5 Furthermore,
the Court held that there must be a criminal conviction of a crime
related to a retiree's public employment for the board to take
action to reduce or revoke that individual's pension benefits. 76
Collin A. Weiss
72. § 17-189.1(b)(2)(E).
73. Id.
74. § 17-189.1(d)
75. Ryan, 11 A.3d at 76.
76. Id.
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Tort Law. DaPonte v. Ocean State Job Lot, Inc., 21 A.3d 248 (R.I.
2011). A plaintiff employee of a retail store does not establish a
violation under Rhode Island General Law Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1)
of her right to privacy through an unreasonable intrusion on her
physical solitude or seclusion when a defendant member of high-
level management demonstrates his displeasure by taking a
misplaced price tag and putting it on the plaintiffs shoulder
without warning.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arose from an incident on October 25, 2001 at the
North Kingstown Ocean State Job Lot (Ocean State) between
defendant Mark Perlman, the corporation's president and CEO,
and plaintiff Irene DaPonte, a former assistant manager of the
store.1 Prior to the store's opening that morning, it was Ms.
DaPonte's duty to "walk the store" with Mr. Perlman. "Walk the
store" refers to a customary practice wherein a visiting member of
high-level management (Perlman) inspects, critiques, and
evaluates the store with the store's senior on-duty employee
(DaPonte). During the inspection, Mr. Perlman became upset by
the misplacement of a price tag on a rug.3 While the details of Mr.
Perlman's subsequent actions were a matter of dispute between
the parties, the parties did agree that Mr. Perlman took the
misplaced price tag and put it on Ms. DaPonte's shoulder without
warning.4 Subsequently, Ms. DaPonte filed a complaint alleging a
1. DaPonte v. Ocean State Job Lot, Inc., 21 A.3d 248, 249 (R.I. 2011).
Ocean State Job Lot is a retail store with several locations throughout Rhode
Island. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. The misplaced price tag concerned Mr. Perlman because it could
easily be switched with a lower-priced tag in a process known in the retail
industry as "tag-switching," wherein a customer switches the price tag of a
higher-priced item with a lower-priced item prior to checkout. Id. at 249-50.
4. Id. at 250. Ms. DaPonte claimed Mr. Perlman "slammed" the price
tag on her shoulder, while Mr. Perlman described his conduct as an
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violation of her right to privacy under Rhode Island General Law
Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1), and sought to extend liability from Mr.
Perlman to Ocean State based on the legal theory of respondeat
superior.6
In March 2008, the case was tried in the Superior Court
without a jury, and final judgment was entered in March 2009,
dismissing Ms. DaPonte's claim with prejudice.7  The Superior
Court found that, "'[n]otwithstanding the glaring
inappropriateness of the Defendant's actions, which amount to
criminal assault and battery, the [c]ourt finds that Perlman's
conduct is not actionable under [Rhode Island General Law
Section 9-1-28.1].8 This unfortunate incident is simply not an
occurrence which falls under the language of [Rhode Island
General Law Section 9-1-28.1], nor is it an occurrence which the
right to privacy statute was intended to address."'9 Ms. DaPonte
timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.10
"inconsequential touching." Id.
5. Id. This statute provides an individual with '[t]he right to be secure
from unreasonable intrusion upon one's physical solitude or seclusion.' Id.
(quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1997)). In its entirety, § 9-1-28.1(a)(1)
provides:
(a) Right to privacy created. It is the policy of this state that every
person in this state shall have a right to privacy which shall be
defined to include any of the following rights individual:
(1) The right to be secure from unreasonable intrusion upon
one's physical solitude or seclusion;
(i) In order to recover for violation of this right, it must be
established that:
(A) It was an invasion of something that is entitled to
be private or would be expected to be private;
(B) The invasion was or is offensive or objectionable to a
reasonable man; although,
(ii) The person who discloses the information need not
benefit from the disclosure.
R.I. GEN LAws § 9-1-28.1(a).
6. DaPonte, 21 A.3d at 250. In addition, Ms. DaPonte filed a claim for
negligent hiring and supervision, which was dismissed on the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which was dismissed by joint stipulation of the parties.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island began its discussion by
setting forth its standard of review, which is to give great
deference to the trial justice's findings of fact, disturbing them
only if they are clearly wrong, and to review questions of statutory
interpretation de novo. 11 The Court then commenced its de novo
review of Rhode Island General Law Section 9-1-28.1, which gives
an individual the "right to be secure from unreasonable intrusion
upon one's physical solitude or seclusion."' 2 In its analysis, the
Court relied heavily on Swerdlick v. Koch, wherein it held that a
defendant had not violated this statute despite photographing and
documenting his neighbor's activities over a period of several
months. 13  The Court emphasized the fact that that the
defendant's surveillance was "not invading shielded activities" in
reasoning that Section 9-1-28.1 'only protects against an invasion
of one's physical solitude or seclusion, neither of which is present
when one ventures outside his or her house into public view."' 14
The Court responded to the plaintiffs contention that
Swerdlick should not be read to foreclose a cause of action under
Section 9-1-28.1 for all incidents that occur in a public setting,
with a further review of the statute.15 The Court observed that
Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1)(i)(A) requires the plaintiff to establish that
'[the alleged violation] was an invasion of something that is
entitled to be private or would be expected to be private."' 6 The
Court further relied on Swerdlick for the proposition that "once
the person leaves the seclusion of the home and enters the public
domain, the burden is upon the party alleging an unreasonable
intrusion upon his or her physical solitude or seclusion to
11. Id.
12. Id. at 251. The Court noted that while other sections of the Rhode
Island General Laws provide for additional rights to privacy, there were no
such claims in this case. Id.
13. See id.; Swerdlick v. Koch, 721 A.2d 849, 856, 864 (R.I. 1998). In
Swerdlick, the defendant's activities were part of an effort to show that his
neighbor was operating a business in violation of a local ordinance. DaPonte,
21 A.3d at 251 (citing Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 853-56).
14. See DaPonte, 21 A.3d at 251-52 (quoting Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 857-
58).
15. Id. at 252.
16. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-1-28.1(a)(1)(i) (1997)).
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establish that 'thrown about his [or her] person or affairs' is an
affirmative seclusion sufficient to merit an objective expectation of
privacy."17 After first declaring that a work area of a business is
not inherently a place of seclusion, the Court concluded that,
according to the record, Ms. DaPonte had not established that "she
threw about her person a seclusion that would merit an
expectation of privacy actionable under Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1)."18
Next, the Court dealt with the plaintiffs contention that the
United States District Court had interpreted Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1)
to extend to an invasion of the body in Liu v. Striuli.19 However,
the Court found the facts in Liu easily distinguishable because it
involved the brutal rape of a college student by her professor in
the privacy of her own apartment. 20 Unlike Liu, the Court noted
that, "here the contact was in a public place of business, it was
nonsexual in nature, fleeting, and the only touching was of an
outer garment."21
Before affirming the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
claim, the Court fulfilled its duty to consider the intent of the
statute with respect to the underlying facts of the case. The Court
shared the trial justice's concern that characterizing the Ocean
State Job Lot incident as a valid right-to-privacy action would
"transform every non-permitted touching into a parallel right-to-
privacy action under Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1)." 22  In addition, the
Court highlighted the trial justice's observation that a holding in
the plaintiffs favor, "would render meaningless the statutory
requirements of 'physical solitude and seclusion' and an intrusion
of 'something that is entitled to be private or would be expected to
be private."' 23 In closing, the Court declined to disrupt any factual
17. See DaPonte at 252 (citing Swerdlick, 721 A.2d at 857 n.11 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977))). The Court included
an example of a "private seclusion thrown about a person in a public place"
from the Restatement: "[e]ven in a public place, there may be some matters
about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited
to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is
intrusion upon these matters." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B cmt. c (1977) (alteration in original).
18. Id. at 252-53.
19. See id. at 253; Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452, 479 (D.R.I. 1999).
20. DaPonte, 21 A.3d at 253 (citing Liu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 458-60).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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or evidentiary findings, holding that the trial justice was not
clearly wrong in her decision. 24
COMMENTARY
In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs action, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court's decision was less than shocking, as the
stipulated incident was not of the variety that courts are eager to
entertain. While the Court made a concerted effort to condemn
Mr. Perlman's actions, 25 Justice Flaherty's opinion was void of any
indication that this was a difficult decision. Although the Court
does not expressly foreclose the possibility of a cause of action
under Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1) arising in a public setting, it suggests
that such an occurrence would require a specific set of facts, such
as the exposure of the plaintiffs underwear. 26 Nonetheless, the
Court implies that if the touching is sexual in nature, it could
interpret Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1) to extend to an invasion of the
body, as the United States District Court did in Liu.27 Therefore,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has clarified what is required to
prevail in a right to privacy cause of action under Section 9-1-
28.1(a)(1) when the incident occurs in a public place.
CONCLUSION
To prevail in a cause of action under Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1), a
plaintiff must establish "an invasion of something that is entitled
to be private or would be expected to be private."28  Since an
individual's expectation for privacy is logically reduced in a public
setting, such a plaintiff faces the increased burden of establishing
that he threw about his [or her] person a seclusion that warranted
24. Id.
25. The Court referred to Mr. Perlman's actions as "offensive,"
"inappropriate," and "boorish." Id.
26. The Court provided only one example of a situation where an
incident in public would satisfy § 9-1-28.1(a)(1), which was borrowed from the
Restatement: "A, a young woman, attends a 'Fun House,' a public place of
amusement where various tricks are played upon visitors. While she is there
a concealed jet of compressed air blows her skirts over her head, and reveals
her underwear. B takes a photograph of her in that position. B has invaded
A's privacy." Id. at 252 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B
cmt. c (1977)).
27. Id. at 253 (citing Liu, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 479).
28. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 9-1-28.1(a)(1)(i)(A) (1997).
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an expectation of privacy. Here, the Court denied Ms. DaPonte's
claim under Section 9-1-28.1(a)(1) because it did not consider Mr.
Perlman's non-permitted touching to be an unreasonable intrusion
upon her solitude or an invasion of something that is expected to
be private.
William Yost
Tort Law. Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110 (R.I. 2011). In
Rhode Island, in order to survive summary judgment on an
attractive nuisance claim, the plaintiff is only required to show
that the landowner knew or had reason to know that children are
likely to trespass on the property, and that the defendant
landowner knew or had reason to know of a potentially dangerous
condition on the land.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In October 2006, twelve-year-old Austin Hill was playing
touch football with some friends on a grassy vacant lot owned by
National Grid in a residential neighborhood of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island.' During the game Austin tripped over a metal pole
sticking out of the ground.2 When Austin fell he cut his leg on a
second metal pole.3 Bleeding profusely, Austin rode his bike home
and his mother brought him to the emergency room of a local
hospital.4 Although Austin's leg wound eventually healed, his leg
is permanently scarred.
Austin's parents filed suit in Superior Court alleging that
National Grid negligently maintained its property, causing
Austin's injuries. 6 National Grid argued that it did not owe a duty
to Austin because he had trespassed on the utility's lot.7 Plaintiffs
argued that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty under the
attractive nuisance doctrine.8  The Superior Court granted
summary judgment for the defendant because it determined that
plaintiffs had failed to show that the defendant knew or had
1. Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110, 112 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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reason to know that children were trespassing.9  Plaintiffs
appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court reviews the granting of motions for summary
judgment on a de novo basis and adheres to the same rules and
criteria as the hearing justice." Before proceeding to the merits,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that since plaintiffs were
appealing a grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the Court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.12 It is the burden of the nonmoving party to prove a
disputed issue of material fact by competent evidence." The
nonmoving party cannot rest on allegations or denials in the
pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions to meet its burden.'4
The Rhode Island Supreme Court explained that property
owners owe trespassers no duty except a duty "to refrain from
wanton or willful conduct," and this duty only applies when a
property owner discovers a trespasser in a position of danger.' 5
An exception to this general rule is the attractive nuisance
doctrine, which imposes in certain circumstances "a duty of care
on landowners to trespassing children."16 The rationale of the
attractive nuisance doctrine is that society's interest in protecting
the life and limb of its young substantially outweighs the property
owner's interest in "the unrestricted right to use his land."17
The Court applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts' version
of the attractive nuisance doctrine, which it adopted in Haddad v.
First National Stores, Inc.'8 Rhode Island's attractive nuisance
doctrine does not require that a possessor of land "know or have
reason to know that children are trespassing on the property, but
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 113 (citing Classic Entm't & Sports, Inc. v. Pemberton, 988
A.2d 847, 849 (R.I. 2010).
14. Id. (quoting Classic Entm't & Sports, Inc., 988 A.2d at 849).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Haddad v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 280 A.2d 93, 96 (R.I.
1971).
18. 280 A.2d at 95; Hill, 11 A.3d at 113-15.
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rather that children are likely to trespass on the premises." 19 In
determining whether the facts were sufficient to survive summary
judgment, the Court found that defendant's employee looked "at
the property five or six times a year," the lot was in a residential
neighborhood, and the defendant had a trespasser policy in place
directing employees to call police if children were playing on the
lot.20 The Court concluded that together these facts created a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether National Grid
knew or had reason to know that children were likely to trespass
on its property. 21
From the activities of National Grid agents on the vacant lot,
the Court concluded that a jury could find that the defendant
knew or had reason to know of the metal poles on the lot, which
plaintiff asserted was a dangerous condition on National Grid's
land.22 Such activities included one agent that looked "at the
property five or six times over two years" and "monthly
maintenance by a grounds-keeping crew that mowed the grass
and removed debris."23 In determining that the plaintiffs "raised
19. Id. at 115 (emphasis added). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
339 (1965) states:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to
children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon
the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to
know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children,
and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the
risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children.
Id. at 113-14.
20. Id. at 115.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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sufficient facts from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
[the] defendant knew or had reason to know trespass was likely,"
and that "defendant knew or had reason to know" of the metal
poles in the ground, the Court held that the Superior Court's entry
of summary judgment for the defendant was erroneous.2 4  The
Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
to Superior Court. 25
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reaffirmed that in
attractive nuisance cases, it follows Section 339 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which requires that the defendant
knew or had reason to know that children are likely to trespass on
the property and that a dangerous condition exists on the
property.26 All but seven or eight jurisdictions have adopted this
section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 27  An early
Minnesota case, Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co., decided in
1875, first advanced the theory that the child had been lured onto
the premises by a condition on the defendant's land. 28 The rule
then became known as "attractive nuisance," which is somewhat
of a misnomer. 29 Under that rule, a child does not have to be
attracted or lured onto the defendant's land by a "nuisance" or
dangerous condition. 30 The aim of the attractive nuisance
doctrine is to shift liability from the trespassing child who lacked
the capacity to appreciate the risk onto the landowner who has a
dangerous condition on his land and whose burden of eliminating
the danger is slight compared with the risk to children.31
Allocating potential liability to National Grid, a conscientious
landowner by the Court's own account, and away from the twelve-
year-old plaintiff who likely understood that he was trespassing is
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 113-15.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. b (1965) (explaining that
in the few jurisdictions which have not adopted the Restatement (Second) of
Torts' formulation of the attractive nuisance doctrine, landowners may be
liable to child trespassers under other doctrines); Haddad, 280 A.2d at 95.
28. 18 Am. Rep. 393 (1875) (cited in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
339 cmt. b).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 cmt. b.
30. Id. at cmt. e.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 generally and cmt. i.
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inconsistent with the policy behind the attractive nuisance
doctrine. In its cursory description of the facts, the Court explains
that the plaintiff "suddenly tripped over an unseen metal pole."32
If the metal poles were so hidden from view that a group of
adolescent boys trampling over the grassy vacant lot did not
become aware of the metal pole until the plaintiff tripped over it, a
reasonable landowner might not realize that the poles were
present or that they posed an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm to children, as required under Rhode Island's
attractive nuisance doctrine. 33  If the boys were aware of the
metal poles the defendant should not be liable under the
attractive nuisance doctrine because the boys concluded that their
desire to trespass on the lot to play football outweighed any
danger presented by the metal poles.
In this case, the Court cited National Grid's child trespasser
policy as one of three facts from which a jury could determine that
National Grid knew or had reason to know that children were
likely to trespass. 34 Such a finding may encourage landowners to
abandon current policy or refrain from creating a new policy
regarding child trespassers. The same facts that the Court relied
on to reach its holding in favor of the plaintiff demonstrate that
the defendant was making efforts to maintain the lot in a safe
condition. For example, the court found that the defendant's
regular monthly maintenance, which included mowing the grass
and removing debris from the lot, was a factor in favor of imposing
liability on the defendant. 35  The Court's holding incentivizes
property owners to be less attentive and dutiful in the
maintenance and care of their land, which is undesirable for
landowners and trespassing children. However, had National
Grid neglected the lot, and its negligence caused a person to be
injured, National Grid could be liable under a negligence or land
occupier liability theory. Under the Court's application of the
attractive nuisance doctrine, landowners are left with a Hobson's
choice of incurring liability by acting as diligent caretakers who
were not careful enough and who should have known of a
dangerous condition through their attentiveness, or as careless
32. Hill, 11 A.3d at 112.
33. Id. at 113-14.
34. Id. at 115.
35. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
possessors whose lack of attentiveness and care resulted in the
plaintiffs injuries.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clarified the level of
knowledge a defendant landowner must have in order for the
defendant to acquire a duty to trespassing children under the
attractive nuisance doctrine. 36 Based on various activities of
National Grid's agents, the fact that the defendant had a
trespassing policy specifically addressing children, and the lot's
location in a residential neighborhood, the Court concluded that
the plaintiffs had presented facts sufficient to survive summary
judgment on the claims that National Grid knew or should have
known that children were likely to trespass, and that the
defendant knew or should have known of the presence of the metal
stakes. 37
Marjorie Whalen
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Workers' Compensation. Duffy v. Powell, 18 A.3d 487 (R.I.
2011). An employee that received a lump sum workers'
compensation award is subsequently barred from receiving
temporary disability insurance benefits for the same period of
time pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws Section 28-41-6.1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 12, 2001, Susan Duffy (Duffy) hurt her right ankle in
a workplace accident. 2 Duffy received approximately $14,000 in
her workers' compensation claim on October 27, 2006. During
the following year, it became apparent that Duffy required
additional surgery to remedy the injuries that she had sustained
in the accident.4  Consequently, on October 17, 2007, Duffy
applied for temporary disability insurance (TDI) benefits to cover
the period of time estimated for her recovery due to her inability
to work.
The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT)
denied this request, concluding that pursuant to Rhode Island
General Laws Section 28-41-6, Duffy's receipt of the lump sum
workers' compensation settlement disqualified her from seeking
TDI benefits for same period of time. 6 Section 28-41-6 states that
[i]n the event that workers' compensation benefits are
subsequently awarded to an individual, whether on a
weekly basis or as a lump sum .. . with respect to which
that individual has received ... benefits ... for the
temporary disability insurance fund, shall be subrogated
1. Duffy v. Powell, 18 A.3d 487, 488 (R.I. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-41-
6 (1956 & Supp. 2003). Powell is the director of the Rhode Island Department
of Labor and Training.
2. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 488.
3. Id. $14,000 is the amount Duffy recovered after paying her
attorney's fees.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 488-89.
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to that individual's rights in that award to the extent of
the amount of benefits . .. paid to him or her under those
chapters. 7
Duffy appealed the DLT decision and was granted a hearing
on January 29, 2008 before a referee of the DLT.8 However, the
referee was not persuaded by Duffy's arguments, noting that she
received a low workers' compensation award since she was not
working full time and consequently echoed the denial of the TDI
benefits she sought, reasoning that Section 28-41-6 applied pro
rata and covered the same period of time she had received
workers' compensation benefits for. 9 The Board of Review denied
Duffy's subsequent appeal.10
Duffy sought relief in the Sixth Division District Court." At
a hearing on April 23, 2008, the court ordered the Board of Review
to calculate Duffy's TDI benefits considering the amount she was
awarded in her workers' compensation settlement. 12  On
September 11, 2008, the Board of Review considered Duffy's
request on remand from the District Court and again issued a
denial of her application for TDI benefits.1 3  Therefore, Duffy
returned to the District Court, which ruled in her favor on March
6, 2009.14 The court held that '[t]he interests of justice require"'
Duffy's application for TDI benefits to be granted from October 16,
2007 until April 20, 2008 since her surgery prevented her from
working.' 5 The court reasoned that $139.17 should be deducted
from her TDI benefits, "which represents future workers'
compensation benefits she would have been entitled to [receive]
when considering her October 27, 2006 lump sum workers'
compensation settlement of $14,000." 16
7. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-41-6.
8. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 489.
9. Id.; § 28-41-6.
10. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 489.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was petitioned by the DLT,
which sought a determination of whether Section 28-41-6 prevents
an applicant's eligibility to obtain TDI benefits if one received a
lump sum workers' compensation award. 17 The Court began by
insisting that "legally competent evidence" must exist to affirm
the District Court's ruling in Duffy's favor, and found none."8 The
Court acknowledged deference is typically given to administrative
agencies when interpreting a statute the agency is responsible for
executing, absent a clearly erroneous interpretation.19
Furthermore, per Rhode Island General Laws Section 28-33-
25(a)(1), parties are able to ask the workers' compensation court to
approve a settlement of future liability for a payment that is a
lump sum or structured payment.20 Consequently, the Supreme
Court concluded that Duffy's workers' compensation award
applied from October 27, 2006 through October 6, 2008, and
therefore disqualified Duffy from receiving TDI benefits per Rhode
Island General Laws, Section 28-41-6(a). 21 The Court found "it is
abundantly clear that the General Assembly intended receipt of
workers' compensation benefits to be a complete bar to receipt of
TDI benefits."22 Therefore, the Court quashed the District Court's
decision and remanded the case to the District Court. 23
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected Duffy's fairness
argument as justification for her eligibility to receive workers'
compensation funds and TDI benefits for the same period of time,
and instead insisted in affirming the District Court's decision only
if there was a solid legal standard to uphold it on.24  This
17. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-41-6.
18. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 490.
19. Id. (quoting State v. Swindell, 895 A.2d 100, 104 (R.I. 2006)).
20. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-25(a)(1) (1956 & Supp. 2003).
21. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 490; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-6 (stating "[n]o
individual shall be entitled to receive waiting period credit benefits or
dependents' allowances with respect to which benefits are paid or payable to
that individual under any workers' compensation law of this state").
22. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 490; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-6(d).
23. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 490.
24. Id.
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conclusion reflects the Court's desire to make decisions not solely
upon policy rationales, instead requiring solid legal standards to
exist for such a decision. Since a number of state statutes seemed
to expressly bar Duffy from receiving funds from both a lump sum
workers' compensation award and TDI, the Supreme Court found
that they must deny her relief.25
The Court also engaged in a statutory analysis of multiple
statutes26 to draw the conclusion that the Legislature wished to
make it "abundantly clear"27 that an individual is not able to
receive compensation from both TDI and workers' compensation
for the same period of time. The Court reasoned that the
Legislature's mention of the prohibition in multiple sources
reflected a strong desire to prevent this opportunity.28 Again, the
Court was strictly adhering to a statutory interpretation to arrive
at the determination in this case, whereas the District Court was
compelled by policy concerns to justify Duffy's recovery. 29
The Supreme Court also exhibited a deferential standard to
the DLT, noting that since the agency is charged with enforcing
and interpreting these statutes in question, their judgment ought
to be deferred to, unless evidence existed that their
determinations were clearly erroneous. 30  This exhibits a
recognition by the Court that the agency may be better equipped
to make these decisions since it involves matters in which they
primarily work in on a daily basis.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that pursuant to
Rhode Island General Laws, one who has received a lump sum
workers' compensation award is subsequently barred from seeking
TDI benefits for the same period of coverage. 31
Erica S. Pistorino
25. Id.
26. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-41-6, 28-33-25(a)(1), 28-41-6(d).
27. Duffy, 18 A.3d at 490.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Zoning Law. Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 15 A.3d 1015
(R.I. 2011). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an appeal
was moot because plaintiffs urged that the Tiverton Yacht Club's
proposed rebuilding plans were an unlawful expansion of its
status as a legal nonconforming use, yet subsequent amendments
to Tiverton zoning laws now allowed for the Club's usage on the
lot. A marina across the street, operating on an appropriately
zoned lot, was not prohibited from continuing such operations,
regardless of affiliations with the Club. Plaintiffs in this action
could not recover attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act' because the issuance of the permit they were opposing was
not an adjudicatory proceeding under the act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Tiverton Yacht Club (TYC) has been in operation at 58
Riverside Drive in Tiverton, R.I. since 1956.2 When Tiverton
adopted zoning in 1964, the clubhouse, located in a residential
area, became a legal nonconforming use.3 By the late 1980's, the
same owners also ran a marina on a lot across the street, located
in a waterfront zoning district.4 In June 2003, a fire destroyed the
main building of the clubhouse, and the owners (defendants)
revised their draft of proposed building plans several times, until
they received a permit to rebuild from the Town of Tiverton in
2006.5 This permit sparked five subsequent years of litigation.6
Plaintiffs in this action, neighbors of the TYC, immediately
appealed this permit to the Tiverton Zoning Board (TZB).
However, while the appeal was pending before the TZB, plaintiffs
1. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-92-2 (1956).
2. Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning Bd., 15 A.3d 1015, 1018 (R.I. 2011).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1019.
6. Id. at 1017.
7. Id. at 1017, 1019.
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also filed an action in Newport County Superior Court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief 8  On April 13, 2007, plaintiffs
requested the Superior Court justice to determine to what extent
the new building plans indicated the "expansion and
intensification of a non-conforming use in a residential zone."9
The plaintiffs also sought an injunction.10
The matter was heard at a bench trial in May of 2007." In
November of the same year, the trial justice entered an order
declaring that the plans on the building permit indicated that the
rebuilding would produce an unlawful expansion of nonconforming
use. 12 This order specifically named "the conversion of the
clubhouse from seasonal to consistent daily, year- round use," and
any additional interior or exterior space created by the new plans
as unlawful expansions of the TYC's nonconforming use status. 13
The justice ordered a further hearing to explore the plaintiffs'
allegations of "the addition of a marina." 14
In May 2009, following the hearing, the justice entered an
order.' 5 Because the evidence demonstrated the marina had not
existed when the TYC became a nonconforming use in 1964 and
because the marina and the TYC operated "in tandem," the justice
determined that the marina "must be prohibited" as an "unlawful
expansion of a nonconforming use."1 6 The trial justice also denied
the plaintiffs' motion to recover "reasonable litigation expenses"
under the Equal Access to Justice Act.1 7
The defendants (Tiverton Zoning Board, trustees of the TYC,
the TYC, and the Tiverton Building Official) appealed the first two
orders declaring the rebuilding of the TYC and the operation of
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1017. Among other things, plaintiffs cited "the addition of a
marina, the addition of a swimming pool, the addition of interior space, an
enlarged kitchen, an increased function capacity, an enlarged parking area
and an intention to go from seasonal use to year-round use" as changes
indicative of unlawful expansion. Id. at 1019.
10. Id. Plaintiffs wanted the Court to enjoin defendants from rebuilding
according to the new plans.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1019-20.
14. Id. at 1020.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-2.
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the marina unlawful.18 The plaintiffs also appealed the denial of
their motion to recover litigation expenses.19 While these appeals
were pending, the Tiverton Town Council amended its zoning
ordinance and map.20  These amendments, which "created a
'floating zone' designated Waterfront-Related to be placed on the
TYC clubhouse lot," and became effective on October 26, 2010.21
As a result of the amendments, the TYC was no longer a
nonconforming use. 22 Plaintiffs moved to stay the appeal pending
in Rhode Island Supreme Court so they could file an action
opposing the amendments, but the motion was denied and the
appeals were heard as scheduled.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Though the defendants raised five issues on appeal, the Court
only addressed two of them as well as the plaintiffs' appeal
pertaining to litigation expenses. 24 The Court quickly dismissed
the defendants' first appeal because the issue was rendered moot
by changes in the Town's zoning. 25 The amendments to Tiverton's
zoning laws "extinguished the TYC's status as a legal,
nonconforming use in a residential district," thereby extinguishing
the underlying controversy of the case, which was the "nature and
extent of the TYC's nonconforming use."26 The Court dismissed
the issue because "as a general rule, [it] will 'only consider cases
involving issues in dispute; [it] shall not address moot ...
18. Campbell, 15 A.3d at 1017 n.1, 1020.
19. Id. at 1020.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1018.
23. Id. at 1020.
24. Id. at 1020-21. Defendants argued first that plaintiffs lacked
standing; secondly, even if plaintiffs had standing, they were not eligible to
seek relief in Superior Court because they had not exhausted their
administrative remedy options; third, that the trial justice erred when she
relied on the current version of the Tiverton zoning ordinance as opposed to
the ordinance from 1964; fourth, even if the justice correctly relied on the
current ordinance, it was error to find that the proposed building plans
indicated an unlawful expansion of a nonconforming use; and lastly that the
justice erred when she prohibited the marina from further operations,
because the marina is located on waterfront property "zoned to permit such
use as a matter of right." Id.
25. Id. at 1021.
26. Id.
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questions."27
The Court did address the prohibition of the marina
operations, as this issue was not rendered moot by the Town's
subsequent zoning amendments. 28  Reviewing the issue "with
great deference" to the trial justice's decision, the Court
nonetheless held that the trial justice abused her discretion in
finding the marina was an unlawful expansion of a nonconforming
use and exceeded the court's authority by prohibiting its continued
operation. 29 Despite the trial justice's finding that the marina and
the TYC operated "in tandem" because they share ownership and
use of the marina is reserved exclusively for TYC members, the
Court ruled that they were, in fact, "physically separate and
exist[ed] independently" of one another. 30 The trial justice erred
by merging the two "wholly distinct" operations into "essentially
one lot, despite the presence of Riverside Drive between them,"31
since the marina operated on a lot appropriately zoned for such
operations. 32 Demonstrating great regard for the "sacred" right to
possession of private property, the Court reasoned that the
defendant owners of the TYC and the marina could sell the
marina, and that the new owner, completely unaffiliated with the
TYC, could then operate a marina its present lot without
restriction. 33 The Court reasoned that zoning law attaches to the
lot, not the property owner; if any other individual may legally
operate a marina on that lot, then defendants have that same
legal right, regardless of other enterprises they may own on the
same street.34 Therefore, the Court vacated the decision below,
holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in holding the
two operations out as one, and exceeded her authority when she
"prohibited the TYC's operation of the marina on a lot where it
27. Id. at 1022 (citing H.V. Collins Co. v. Williams, 990 A.2d 845, 847
(R.I. 2010)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1021, 1023 (citing Fravala v. City of Cranston ex rel. Baron,
996 A.2d 696, 704 (R.I. 2010)).
30. Id. at 1023.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1022.
33. Id. at 1023; (citing Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v.
Putnam County, 301 S.W.3d 196, 212 (Tenn. 2009)).
34. See id.
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was legally permitted."35
Lastly, the Court affirmed the trial justice's denial of the
plaintiffs' motion for litigation expenses, holding that "the
building official's issuance of the building permit simply was not
an adjudicatory proceeding under the act."36 The plaintiffs argued
that they are due "reasonable litigation expenses" pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act. 37 Despite many attempts on the part
of the plaintiffs to bring their cause under this act, the Court held
that the building official did not conduct any adjudicatory
proceedings when he granted the TYC the rebuilding permit.38
Generally, an adjudicatory hearing is one "in which the rights and
duties of a particular person are decided after notice and an
opportunity to be heard."39 In this case, because the building
official simply reviewed an application to rebuild, he did not hold
any proceeding "wherein the parties ... were given an opportunity
to be heard," and this process did not constitute an "adjudicatory
proceeding." 40
COMMENTARY
The Court clearly disagreed with the lower court's decision
that the TYC and the marina were operating "in tandem" and that
the marina, operating lawfully on its own physically distinct lot,
could qualify as an unlawful extension of the nonconforming use of
the lot across the street.41 The Court claimed to review decisions
granting declaratory relief with "great deference," yet, comes
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1025.
37. Id. at 1023. The act is codified in R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-92-1(a) (1956);
the act's goal is to "mitigate the burden placed upon individuals . . . by the
arbitrary and capricious decisions of administrative agencies during
adjudicatory proceedings." Campbell, 15 A.3d at 1024.
38. Id. at 1024-25. Plaintiffs also argued the building official who
granted the permit constituted an "agency" under the act, that plaintiffs were
"prevailing parties" because they won at trial, and that court proceedings
below should serve as the requisite "adjudicatory proceedings." Because the
Court held that plaintiffs did not establish that adjudicatory proceedings
necessary under the act were held, it did not address the other contentions.
Id. at 1025 n.7.
39. Id. at 1025 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 725 (7th ed. 1999)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1023.
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arguably close to mocking the very same. 42 While this is not an
argument against the Court's decision that the trial justice
exceeded her authority by prohibiting further operations of the
marina upon a lot which is quite appropriately zoned for such
operations, one may still ponder why there was an abuse of
discretion when the trial judge held that the marina and the TYC
were operating "in tandem." Without questioning whether the
Rhode Island Supreme Court was correct in holding that the
operation of a marina on a lot zoned for waterfront and water
related activities should not be prohibited simply because the
marina is affiliated with a nonconforming use across the street, it
seems a stretch to rebuff the idea that the two were working "in
tandem." Finding that two enterprises are situated on two
physically distinct lots is a very different from a finding that they
are working "in tandem."
Arguably, the two entities did work in tandem. The two
buildings shared ownership and enjoyed the same patrons. 43
Members of one were free to walk the across the street to enjoy
the benefits of the other, while non-members were denied this
privilege. It is fair to assume that financial and professional
success of one correlates directly with success of the other. The
error was not the finding that the two were working in tandem, an
error occurred because two operations, working in tandem, were
analyzed under the same zoning laws, even though they existed on
physically distinct lots, each subject to their own allowances and
limitations. In sum, while there is an argument in support of the
trial justice's finding that the two worked "in tandem," her error
was assuming that tandem entities must necessarily share and
affect the other's zoning restrictions.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the extent to
which plans to rebuild the Tiverton Yacht Club constituted an
unlawful extension of a nonconforming use was rendered moot by
subsequent changes in Tiverton zoning laws that extinguished the
42. Id. at 1021, 1023. "The trial justice incorrectly treated the marina
and clubhouse lots as essentially one lot, despite the presence of Riverside
Drive between them . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 1023.
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Yacht Club's status as a nonconforming use. The Court further
determined that the marina across the street, in an appropriately
zoned area, did not operate "in tandem" with the Yacht Club,
despite sharing owners and patrons, and could continue its
operation as a marina on its own lot, where such operations were
legally permitted. Lastly, the Court held that a building official
who approved the permit to rebuild did not conduct an
adjudicatory proceeding under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
and therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover litigation
expenses under the Act.
Carolyn M. Rankin
Zoning. Generation Realty, LLC v. Catanzaro, 21 A.3d 253 (R.I.
2011). In this case of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court contemplated the meaning of the words 'general' and
'specific' as used in Rhode Island General Laws section 45-23-53,
which governs the notice requirements for amendments to zoning
ordinances. The Court, rejecting the requirement of a universal
and uniform effect, held that general changes are those which
affect a majority of districts and properties, and determined that,
under the statute, general public notice sufficed for such general
changes.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1998, North Providence adopted a comprehensive plan, and
later enacted Ordinance 99-127Z in 1999, in compliance with the
Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation
Act1 and the Zoning Enabling Act. 2 Ordinance 99-127Z's
amendments (the 1999 amendments) proposed several changes 3 to
many North Providence districts, including the district in which a
property owned by Capital City was located.4 As a result, the
1. The purpose of the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use
Regulation Act was to "'totally rewrite the major land use enabling legislation
in Rhode Island"' and "'provide[] for each municipality to enact a real
comprehensive plan, with state government review of such plan, and carrot-
and-stick incentives to make the municipalities comply."' Generation Realty,
LLC v. Catanzaro, 21 A.3d 253, 256 (R.I. 2011) (citation omitted).
2. Id.
3. The 1999 amendments
eliminated one commercial zoning district and created seven new
zoning districts; set new dimensional regulations for all of the new
zoning districts; deleted the existing table of use codes and
substituted a new table in its stead; changed zoning maps to reflect
the locations of the new zoning districts; and ultimately placed about
[fifty] percent of the land area of the town into a different zoning
district.
Id.
4. The property was "designated as Assessor's Plat No. 22, lot No. 852."
Id.
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amendments rezoned this property from residential single family
use to open space. 5
Seven years after the adoption of the 1999 amendments,
Capital City and Generation Realty entered into an agreement 6 by
which the latter would purchase the property from Capital City.7
A condition precedent to the agreement made the transaction
expressly contingent upon Generation Realty's success in
obtaining permits to build residential dwellings on the property.8
In April 2007, the plaintiffs submitted an application to
amend the zoning ordinance and zoning map and requested to
change the designation of the property from open space to
residential general or residential multi-household. 9 The North
Providence Planning Board (the Board) held a public hearing
regarding the plaintiffs' application on August 14, 2007.10 The
hearing was then continued until September 11, 2007.11 At the
September hearing, the plaintiffs reiterated their argument that
the town had failed to follow the statutory requirements and
procedures when it rezoned Capital City's land in 1999.12 The
Board rejected this argument and voted to recommend that the
North Providence Town Council deny the application.13 Although
the town council scheduled a public hearing for September 27,
2007, it did not take place because the plaintiffs filed a verified
complaint in Superior Court prior to the hearing.14
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the 1999
rezoning was null and void, injunctive relief barring the
5. Id.
6. The Court noted that the Superior Court record did not include a
copy of the agreement; however the appendix plaintiffs submitted to the
Supreme Court contained an "Amended and Restated Purchase and Sale
Agreement" from 2008. The Court reminded plaintiffs' counsel that "only
documents that are part of the record are appropriately included in an
appendix," pursuant to Article I, Rule 17 of the Supreme Court Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id. at 256 n.5.
7. Id. at 256.
8. Id. at 257.
9. The plaintiffs claimed that during this process they discovered that
the town had not followed the proper procedures when it enacted Ordinance
99-127Z. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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defendants from proceeding with the hearing and from prohibiting
plaintiffs from continuing with their development proposal, a writ
of mandamus ordering the defendants to act upon the plaintiffs'
proposal, and further relief under the court's discretion." The
defendants denied the plaintiffs' asseverations and asserted
several affirmative defenses in their answer. 16 The owners of the
property adjacent to the property in question, DePasquale
Brothers, Inc., were added to the suit as an intervenor in support
of the defendants.' 7
On October 15, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary
judgment, and the hearing justice held a hearing on the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on February 24, 2009.18 They
argued that rezoning the property to open space was a "'specific
change in a zoning district map,"' which, according to Rhode
Island General Laws section 45-24-53(c),19 required individual
written notice. 20  The plaintiffs also claimed that the 1999
amendments were void because the defendants failed to include in
their public notice a zoning map and the effective date of the
enactment. 21 At the hearing, the intervenor spoke on behalf of the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 257-58.
19. Section 45-24-53(c) provides as follows:
where a proposed amendment to an existing ordinance includes a
specific change in a zoning district map, but does not affect districts
generally, public notice shall be given as required by subsection (a)
of this section, with the additional requirements that: (1) Notice
shall include a map showing the existing and proposed boundaries,
zoning district boundaries, and existing streets and roads and their
names, and city and town boundaries where appropriate; and (2)
Written notice of the date, and place of the public hearing and the
nature and purpose of the hearing shall be sent to all owners of real
property whose property is located in or within not less than two
hundred feet . . . of the perimeter of the area proposed for change,
whether within the city or town or within an adjacent city or town.
The notice shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the last
known address of the owners, as shown on the current real estate
tax assessment records of the city or town in which the property is
located.
Id. at 261 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-24-53(c) (2009)).
20. Id. at 257.
21. Id. at 258.
2012] 669
670 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:667
defendants generally. 22 The intervenor argued under the Zoning
Enabling Act 23 not only that Ordinance 99-127Z included general
changes because its provisions were so comprehensive, but also
that defects in notice would not 'render the ordinance or
amendment invalid."'24
At the hearing, the justice explained that although Ordinance
99-127Z "had elements of a general amendment," 25 the changes
had not "'universally and uniformly affected all districts and
properties of the same genre."'26 She held that "' [als a matter of
law,' the rezoning of plaintiffs' property to open space was a
specific, not general, change."27  The hearing justice further
explained that "specific changes don't become general changes
because they're surrounded by many other specific changes, and
'widespread' is not the same as 'universal."'2 8 She held that the
plaintiffs had been entitled to "additional notice," which the
defendants did not provide, and thus the plaintiffs' property
remained zoned as residential. 29 Accordingly, on April 6, 2009 an
order granting the motion and a judgment on the order were
entered.30
Following this decision, the defendants and intervenor
submitted a timely appeal. 3 1 The defendants filed a motion to
stay the judgment pending appeal, and this was granted on April
15, 2009.32
22. Id.
23. Section 45-24-53(b) provides that "'[w]here a proposed general
amendment to an existing zoning ordinance includes changes in an existing
zoning map, public notice shall be given as required by subsection (a) of this
section." Furthermore, section 45-24-53(f) states that '[n]o defect in the form
of any notice under this section shall render any ordinance or amendment
invalid, unless the defect is found to be intentional or misleading."' Id. at 261
(quoting R.I. GEN. LAWs § 45-24-53(b),(f)).
24. Id.
25. These elements included the fact that the ordinance had "established
open space districts, 'created new residential districts, two commercial
districts, an institutional zone and a historic overlay zone,' eliminated one
commercial district, and adopted new dimensional requirements for various
zoning districts." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. (brackets in original).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In its de novo review of the granting of the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
considered whether the hearing justice erred in ruling that the
1999 amendments were "specific" under section 45-24-53 of the
Zoning Enabling Act.33 The Court stated that such a question is
one of statutory construction, 34 which also receives a de novo
review.35
On appeal, the defendants argued that the lower court had
erred because the 1999 amendments did not 'target a specific
parcel for change, leaving districts generally unaffected,"' but
rather they were general and 'effected a sea of change in the
zoning scheme for the community at large,' with an impact not
only on plaintiffs' property, but also on 'all North Providence
parcels."'36 The defendants further argued that the lower court
did not consider the 1999 amendments in their proper context by
focusing only on the parts related to the open space changes. 37
They also asserted that the lower court's ruling had reinstated a
notice requirement that had been abolished when the General
Assembly repealed section 45-24-438 and replaced it with section
45-24-53.39 Finally, the defendants argued that the lower court's
statutory interpretation produced an absurd result, such that a
hypothetical amendment that affected all but one property would
33. Id. at 260.
34. When construing a statute, courts have the "ultimate goal" of giving
effect to the purpose of the act "'as intended."' Id. at 259 (citation omitted).
Courts also determine and effectuate the "'legislative intent"' of the
enactment and attribute to the enactment "'the most consistent meaning"' of
the language used. Id. (citation omitted). As such, courts give the words of
the enactment 'their plain and ordinary meaning when the statute's
language is 'clear and unambiguous,"' without resorting to "'myopic
literalism,"' and they consider the statute as a whole and consider individual
sections 'in context of the entire statutory scheme."' Id. (citation omitted).
Courts do not, however, "'construe a statute to reach an absurd result." Id. at
259 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 258.
36. Id. at 259.
37. Id.
38. Section 45-24-4 required individual written notice even for general
ordinances when they included amendments that made changes to zoning
maps. Id. at 259 n.6 (quoting Quigley v. Town of Glocester, 520 A.2d 975,
977, 979 (R.I. 1987)).
39. Id. at 259 & n.6.
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be considered specific. 40
In response, the plaintiffs argue that the 1999 amendments
were "specific" because they "'affected some lots' on the map, but
'did not affect the [residential single family] district generally."'4 1
In their opinion, an amendment is general only when all
properties in a zoning district are affected "'in the same way."' 42
Accordingly, plaintiffs reassert that the defendants did not give
proper notice and that the rezoning of the property in question is
null and void.43
In evaluating these arguments, the Court first looked to the
statute in question. The Court looked to the dictionary definition
of the word "general," which is used in subsections (b) and (c) of
section 45-24-53.44 Additionally, the Court relied on the Black's
Law Dictionary definition of "specific."45  In applying these
definitions to the statute, the Court stated that it uses the same
guidelines when interpreting ordinances and statutes such that
the ordinance should be considered in its entirety.46 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that the 1999 amendments were
general because they were extensive, affecting a wide range of
properties in a variety of ways, and because they did not
"contemplate[] a relatively narrow proposed change," and thus
were not specific. 47
Next, the Court looked to the General Assembly's intent. The
Court concluded that "the General Assembly, by replacing section
45-24-4 with section 45-24-53, intended to confine the requirement
of individual notice to specific amendments that do not affect
districts generally, and to allow public notice to suffice in cases of
general amendments, even when such amendments 'include
changes in an existing zoning map."'48 Therefore, the Court held
that "although Ordinance 99-127Z made changes to North
Providence's zoning maps, those changes were part of a general
40. Id. at 259-60.
41. Id. at 260 (brackets in original).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 261-62.
45. Id. at 261; BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
46. Generation Realty, 21 A.3d at 262.
47. Id. at 262-63.
48. Id. at 263.
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overhaul and thus required only public notice." 49
Lastly, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' arguments that the
rezoning is void because North Providence failed to include a
proposed zoning map-and failed to depict the changes to the map
within ninety days of the authorized changes as required by
section 45-24-55.50 The Court stated that the plain language of
section 45-24-53(a) does not require an included map, which is
only required if there is a specific change under subsection (c).5 1
Additionally, the Court asserted that a defect in notice would not
have rendered the 1999 amendments null and void because
subsection (f) states that "[n]o defect in the form of any notice
under this section shall render any ordinance or amendment
invalid, unless the defect is found to be intentional or
misleading."52 Here there was no evidence that any defect was
either intentional or misleading.
As a result, the Court vacated and reversed the lower court's
judgment. The record was remanded to the Superior Court for
further proceedings.
COMMENTARY
Generation Realty sought to change the zoning of the land in
question to facilitate its plan to build eighty-six condominiums on
the fifteen-acre site on the Lincoln-North Providence line.53 The
land is located on the site of Camp Meehan, a summer camp,
which has operated for over forty years. 54  Each summer, the
camp provides swimming, canoeing, and games for eighty to one
hundred children from Lincoln, Providence, and North
Providence.55 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, neither
mentioned these details in its opinion, nor the significant reaction
that this case, and Generation Realty's development proposal,
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 264.
53. Daniel Barbarisi, Developer Suing Town Over Zone Change - The
Town Council Postpones the Hearing on the Camp Meehan Site Plan, THE
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Sept. 28, 2007, at D1.
54. Richard C. Dujardin, Developer Sets Sights on Land Being Used by
Camp Meehan, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, July 18, 2007, at Dl.
55. Id.
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drew from the North Providence Community. 56
Town officials and residents resisted the development project,
citing a lack of open space, which is at a premium in a Rhode
Island, and various financial burdens as concerns." At the
September 11, 2007 hearing, "of the 200 people at the hearing at
North Providence High School, the only individuals who spoke in
favor of the proposal were the lawyer, real estate expert and civil
engineer who were hired by Generation Reality's owner, John
Petrarca."58 Concerned citizens were also angered by what was
perceived as Generation Realty's attempts to stall the Town
Council's meetings.5 9 By deciding this case based on principles of
statutory interpretation, however, the Court avoided much of the
heated debate that occurred beyond the judicial system. The
Court's decision also allowed the town of North Providence a
cheaper method of controlling land use, as opposed to the
expensive alternative of acquisition through the exercise of
eminent domain.
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court wisely did not
become directly involved with the surrounding controversy, the
Court did not provide adequate guidance for the future by limiting
the decision to the very specific legal issue of statutory
interpretation. Readers conjure an entirely different
interpretation of the decision upon reading the entire background
facts, thus potentially leading readers to attribute different
possible motives to the Court's decision. If the Court mentioned
some of the policy concerns, or explained its hesitancy to address
such issues, this decision could have been more instructive or
useful not only for the legal community, but also Rhode Island
citizens, such as those who were concerned about Generation
Realty's development project.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that an amendment to a zoning ordinance was
a general amendment because, when considered in its totality, the
56. Richard C. Dujardin, Planners Will Tell Council to Reject Camp
Meehan Plan, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Sept. 12, 2007, at Dl.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Barbarisi, supra note 53.
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ordinance completely revamped the town's zoning landscape
rather than single out and change a specific property. Therefore,
the Court determined it was not a specific change, which would
require personal notice to affected property owners, and so the
town only needed to provide public notice.
Juliana McKittrick
Zoning Law. West v. McDonald, 18 A.3d 526 (R.I. 2011). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a subdivision
proposal was required to comply with both the area requirements
of East Providence's zoning ordinance and the density limitations
of its comprehensive plan. The Court held that the state and city
land use statutes specifically require a subdivision proposal to
comply with both the city's zoning ordinance and comprehensive
plan. Furthermore, a petitioner's reliance on the city's zoning
ordinance was an insufficient basis on which to state a claim
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiff Michael West purchased two family homes in a
residential neighborhood located between Lynn and Vineland
Avenues in East Providence.' West had purchased the properties
with the intent to construct three duplexes to create a total of six
residential units.2  Consistent with section 19-98 of East
Providence's Zoning Ordinances, 3 West's lots were located in a
zoning district designated as "residential-4" (R-4) that "permits
construction of two unit dwellings, provided that they are built on
lots containing at least 8,750 square feet."4 Additionally, the lots
were sited in an area designated as "Low Density Residential" in
East Providence's Comprehensive Land Use Plan (comprehensive
plan).5
In order to comply with the zoning ordinance, West needed to
adjust the lot lines of his parcels of land "to achieve three lots of
1. West v. McDonald, 18 A.3d 526, 528 (R.I. 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 537.
4. Id. at 528-29.
5. Id. at 530. "In November 2001, the city council amended East
Providence's comprehensive plan to decrease the residential density of the
Low Density Residential category from 8 dwelling units per acre to 5.8
dwelling units per acre." Id.
676
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the minimum permissible size."6 In February 2006, West
petitioned East Providence's city planner for approval of an
administrative subdivision of his three parcels of land.7 Upon
review, the city planner determined that West's petition for an
administrative subdivision should be reviewed as a minor
subdivision, which required the approval of the city's planning
board.8 In March 2006, West resubmitted his application seeking
a minor subdivision.9 In April 2006, the city's zoning officer
issued a certificate of completeness of the application and
approved West's application for a minor subdivision with respect
to relevant zoning provisions.10  On May 3, 2006, the city's
planning department made a recommendation to the planning
board to grant conditional approval for the subdivision.II
However, during the planning board's meeting on May 8,
2006, several neighbors objected to West's proposed duplexes
because the neighborhood was already "densely populated" and
"would not be able to absorb the burden" of the additional units. 12
In response to the density concerns of the neighborhood, the
planning board continued its investigation of West's development
proposal.13  On July 17, 2006, the city planning department
recommended that the planning board reject West's application for
a minor subdivision because it failed to comply with the density
requirements of the comprehensive plan.14  The planning
department based its decision on the November 2001 amendment
to the comprehensive plan, which effectively limited "the number
of units that could be constructed on West's combined properties
to a maximum of 3.72 dwellings."15
6. Id. at 529.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The planning department determined that West's proposal
complied with both the city's comprehensive land use plan and its zoning
ordinance.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 529-30. Reversing its prior recommendation, the planning
department concluded that West's proposal was "contrary to many of the
goals, policies, objectives, maps, and policy statements," of the comprehensive
plan. Id.
15. Id. at 530.
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On July 20, 2006, the planning board unanimously rejected
West's proposal and an equitable estoppel claim that he had
raised. 16 West then appealed the board's decision to the East
Providence Zoning Board of Review (board of appeals), which in
turn, denied his appeal.17  Pursuant to section 45-23-71 of the
Rhode Island General Laws, West appealed the decision of the
board of appeals to the Superior Court.18 On September 10, 2008,
the trial justice of the Superior Court for Providence County
affirmed the decision of the board of appeals and entered
judgment in favor of the City of East Providence.' 9
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Superior
Court's decision with deference to determine "whether the trial
justice exceeded his or her authority under § 45-23-[71]."20
However, the Court reviews "issues of statutory interpretation de
novo."21 When the language of a statute is "clear and
unambiguous," the Court will interpret the language literally.22
But when the language of a statute is "unclear and subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation," the interpretation of an
agency or board is entitled to deference, unless that interpretation
is "clearly erroneous or unauthorized."2 3
On appeal, West argued that the Superior Court erred by
holding that: (1) "a municipality is not mandated to conform its
zoning ordinance to the comprehensive plan within eighteen
16. Id.
17. Id. The Board of Review briefly concluded that the planning board
properly interpreted and applied the comprehensive plan and subdivision
regulations.
18. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-23-71 (2006); West, 18 A.3d at 530-31.
19. West, 18 A.3d at 531.
20. Id. at 532. The Court "shall reverse a lower court judgment on
appeal from a planning board of review if the trial justice 'misapplied the law,
misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or made findings that were
clearly wrong."' (quoting Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich, 733 A.2d 703,
705 (R.I. 1995)).
21. Id. Determinations of law are "not binding on the reviewing court;
they may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to
the facts." Id. (citing Pawtucket Transfer Operations v. City of Pawtucket,
944 A.2d 855, 859 (R.I. 2008)).
22. Id. at 532.
23. Id.
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months of adopting the comprehensive plan;" (2) a development
proposal must comply with both the municipality's zoning
ordinance and comprehensive plan; and (3) the doctrine of
equitable estoppel did not bar the city from denying West's
proposed subdivision.24
First, the Court determined whether the time provisions
contained in both the Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and
Land Use Regulation Act 25 (CPLURA) and the Zoning Enabling
Act,26 requiring municipalities to bring their zoning ordinances
into conformance with their comprehensive plans within eighteen
months, are directory or mandatory in nature. 27  The Court
examined three factors to determine whether to construe the time
provisions in the statutes as directory or mandatory. 28 First the
court found that absence of sanctions within CPLURA and the
Zoning Enabling Act, for failing to conform the zoning ordinances
to the comprehensive plans within eighteen months, "bespeaks
that the provisions are directory" and not mandatory. 29
Furthermore, the Court determined that the time-frame
provisions were directory because they related to a matter of
procedure as opposed to the essence of either CPLURA or the
Zoning Enabling Act.30  Finally, the Court found that the time
provisions within the land use planning statutes are directed at
public officials rather than private individuals and therefore
directory.3 ' In conclusion, the Court held that the city's failure to
amend its zoning code within eighteen months did "not eviscerate
24. Id.
25. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-22.2-5(a)(3) (2006) ("Rhode Island's cities
and towns . . . shall . . . [c]onform its zoning ordinance and map with its
comprehensive plan within eighteen (18) months of plan adoption and
approval[.]")
26. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-24-34(b) (2010) ("The city or town shall bring
the zoning ordinance or amendment into conformance with its comprehensive
plan as approved ... not more than eighteen (18) months after approval is
given.")
27. West, 18 A.3d at 534.
28. Id. The three factors a court looks to when analyzing whether time
provision are directory or mandatory, include: "(1) the presence or absence of
a sanction, (2) whether the provision is the essence of the statute, and (3)
whether the provision is aimed at public officers." (See New England Dev.,
LLC v. Berg, 913 A.2d 363, 372 (R.I. 2007)).
29. Id. at 534.
30. Id. at 534-35.
31. Id. at 535.
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the goals, requirements, and mandates of a municipality's
comprehensive plan."32
The Court then determined whether a municipality could
deny a development proposal that complied with the area
requirements of the zoning ordinance but failed to comply with
density requirements of the comprehensive plan.33  The Court
first found that East Providence's zoning ordinance and
comprehensive plan "do not clearly contradict one another"
because the two statutes further different purposes and the
comprehensive plan sets forth area requirements while the zoning
ordinance sets forth density limitations.34  Subsequently, the
Court held that a "subdivision proposal must comply with both the
comprehensive plan and the zoning code" 35 under the Rhode
Island Land Development and Subdivision Review Enabling Act 36
and East Providence's Development and Subdivision Review
Regulations.37  Furthermore, the Court found that "East
32. Id.
33. Id. at 536-37.
34. Id at 536 & n.13.
35. Id. at 537.
36. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-23-60 (2010). The statute states in pertinent
part:
(a) All local regulations shall require that for all administrative,
minor, and major development applications the approving
authorities responsible
for land development and subdivision review and approval shall
address each of the general purposes stated in § 45-23-30 and make
positive findings on the following standard provisions, as part of the
proposed project's record prior to approval:
(1) The proposed development is consistent with the
comprehensive community plan...
(2) The proposed development is in compliance with the
standards and provisions of the municipality's zoning
ordinance[.]
Id. & n.14 (emphasis removed).
37. "Article 5, sec. 5-4 of the Land Development and Subdivision Review
Regulations of East Providence states in relevant part: [T]he Administrative
Officer or Planning Board . . . shall make positive findings on all of the
applicable standards listed below[:]
(a) Subdivision and land development project proposals shall be
consistent with the East Providence Comprehensive Plan .. .;
(b) All lots in a subdivision and all land development projects shall
conform to the standards and provisions of [Chapter 19, Zoning] . . .
West, 18 A.3d at 537.
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Providence zoning code specifically addresses the issues that arise
when two requirements are not wholly inconsistent with each
other."38  Under sections 19-839 and 19-340 of the City of East
Providence Revised Ordinances, "it was West's burden" to comply
with the city's heightened density limitations of the
comprehensive plan in addition to the area restrictions of the
zoning ordinance. 1
Finally, the Court determined whether the doctrine of
equitable estoppel barred the city of East Providence from denying
West's subdivision proposal. 2 West argued that "his reliance on
the permissible uses outlined in the zoning ordinances was both
substantial and detrimental to him" and the city's "failure to
amend the zoning ordinance to comport with the comprehensive
plan renders any limitation on zoning uses unenforceable under
equitable principles."43 The Court first found that "the city made
no representations upon which West reasonably could rely" by
merely enacting a zoning ordinance that set forth permissible
uses. 44 Statutes and ordinances "do not constitute a continuing
representation by the municipality upon which citizens can
38. Id. at 538.
39. Id. at 538-39. "Subsection (a) of § 19-8 provides: ... 'Wherever the
provisions of any other statute, ordinance or regulation . . . impose other
higher standards than are required in this chapter, the provisions of such
statute, ordinance or regulation shall govern."' Id. (emphasis removed).
40. Id. at 539. "§ 19-3 of the city's zoning code says: '[i]n instances of
uncertainty in the construction or application of any section of this chapter,
the ordinance shall be construed in a manner that will further the
implementation of and not be contrary, to the goals and policies and
applicable elements of such comprehensive plan."' Id.
41. Id. at 539-40.
42. Id. at 540. "There are four elements to equitable estoppel: (1) good
faith reliance; (2) on an act or omission of a municipality; (3) which induces a
party to incur substantial obligations; (4) making it highly inequitable to
enforce the zoning [or planning] ordinance." Id. (citing 4 Edward H. Ziegler,
Jr. et al., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING, § 65:29 (4th ed. West
2010))
43. Id. The trial justice rejected West's argument because he should
have known that compliance with both the zoning ordinance and the
comprehensive plan was required when his proposal was reclassified from an
administrative to minor subdivision, the planning board had taken no action
that he could reasonably rely upon, and that he failed to incur any
substantial obligations that would require a remedy under equitable
principles.
44.. Id. at 541.
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indefinitely rely" because they are constantly subject to change. 45
In addition, the Court rejected West's second reliance
argument that "he relied on the fact that the zoning ordinances
are required to conform to a municipality's comprehensive plan."46
The Court reiterated their prior findings that there was no
mandatory requirement that the comprehensive plan and the
zoning ordinance be identical.47 Furthermore, the Rhode Island
Land Development and Subdivision Review Enabling Act and
East Providence's Development and Subdivision Review
Regulations require a development proposal to comply with both
the zoning ordinance and the comprehensive plan.48  In
conclusion, West's equitable estoppel claim was insufficient
because he "should have been aware that his proposal could be
denied" if it failed to comply with both the ordinances and the
comprehensive plan.49
COMMENTARY
It is important to emphasize that the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island unequivocally asserted that the "central issue" in the case
involved "the subdivision of land and not zoning enforcement."50
The comprehensive plan and its purpose "to encourage cities and
towns to plan for orderly growth and development" thus became
relevant in the Court's analysis. 51 Therefore, the Court had a
duty to address the city's comprehensive plan "in concert" with the
zoning ordinance. 52
Another interesting aspect of the case was the participation of
the East Providence neighborhood during the subdivision's
approval process. This case highlights the valuable oversight
power that members of the public wield during administrative
land use proceedings. The density limitations mandated by the
comprehensive plan might never have been brought to the
45. Id. (citing Ocean Road Partners v. State, 612 A.2d 1107, 1111 (R.I.
1992)).
46. West, 18 A.3d at 541.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 535.
51. Id. at 536.
52. Id.
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attention of the planning board without the participation of the
community. The Court even acknowledged that West's proposal
"seemed to be moving seamlessly through the approval process"
before the planning board meeting.53  During West's approval
process, two of the city's regulatory land use bodies failed to
adequately consider the comprehensive plan in their
assessments. 54 First, East Providence's zoning officer consulted
only "the relevant zoning provisions" before approving West's
subdivision proposal. 55
More significantly, the city's own planning department,
responsible for consulting the comprehensive plan, granted
conditional approval for the subdivision after specifically
addressing the density requirements of the comprehensive plan.56
The planning board would not have continued its investigation
into West's proposal had it not been for "the concerns of the
neighbors."57 From this case, one takes the indelible impression
that the planning board would have rubber stamped West's
proposal without the active participation by the neighborhood.
However, it is regrettable that the Court did not specify the
neighborhood's density issues that would have been aggravated by
West's duplexes.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of
the Superior Court in favor of the City of East Providence. After
reviewing de novo the applicable state and municipal land use
statutes, the Court held that a minor subdivision proposal must
comply with the municipality's area requirements of its zoning
53. Id.
54. Id. at 529.
55. Id. While I do not wish to imply that the specific provisions of the
city's comprehensive plan are within the specific province of the zoning
officer, a responsible civil servant should have at least a basic understanding
or working knowledge of relevant density limitations such as the one adopted
by the city council in 2001.
56. Id. The planning department asserted that "the proposed changes in
the boundary lines and the construction of three two-family dwellings were in
accordance with the comprehensive plan, including density requirements."
Id.
57. Id.
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ordinance and the density limitations of its comprehensive land
use plan. The Court further held that a developer's reliance upon
existing zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations is "a
patently insufficient basis on which to invoke the doctrine of
equitable estoppel" because the statutes, by their mutable nature,
do not represent "a continuing representation by the
municipality." 58
William J. Giacofci
58. Id. at 541.
2011 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 043, 130. An Act Relating to Criminal
Procedure - Arrest. Provides for the formation of a task force
designed to investigate and develop polices for electronically
recording custodial interrogations in their entirety. The task force
is to be made up of a variety of people employed in both the legal
and law enforcement professions, with the attorney general and
public defender serving as co-chairpersons of the task force. The
recommendations of this task force shall be submitted in a report
to the governor, the chief justice of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the president
of the Senate, and the chairpersons of the judiciary committees of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 067, 079. An Act Relating to
Corporations, Associations, and Partnerships - Low Profit Limited
Liability Companies. Creates a new business designation under
Rhode Island law for companies which are formed for charitable or
educational purposes. The Act, referring to language found in 26
U.S.C. §170(c)(2)(B), defines a charitable or educational purpose
as "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involves the provision of athletic facilities or equipment),
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." Finally,
the Act also provides that any business originally organized as a
low profit limited liability company will automatically revert to an
ordinary limited liability company if their purpose ceases to
satisfy the aforementioned requirement, as long as the company
still satisfies all other requirements of an LLC.
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2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 068, 108. An Act Relating to State
Affairs and Government - Corrections. "The Healthy Pregnancies
for Incarcerated Women Act" is based on the assertion that
restraining a pregnant woman can create unnecessary health
risks to the woman or unborn child. If the department of
corrections has "actual or constructive knowledge" that a prisoner
or detainee is in her second or third trimester of pregnancy, the
Act requires that the use of restraints be medically necessary and
administered in the least restrictive manner possible. When
restraints are used upon a pregnant prisoner or detainee the
correctional officer must submit, within five days, a written
explanation for using the restraints to the department of
corrections. Any woman who has been restrained in violation of
this law may pursue a civil action for damages.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 073, 097. An Act Relating To Criminal
Procedure - Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Expands upon the
"Domestic Violence Prevention Act" by including the crimes of
"cyberstalking" and "cyberharassment" to conduct prohibited
under the Act. Section 11-52-4.2 of the Rhode Island General
Laws defines the conduct of cyberstalking and cyberharassment to
encompass transmitting communication "by computer or other
electronic device to any person or caus[ing] any person to be
contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his or
her family." The course of harassing conduct prohibited must be
of a kind that would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress or be in fear of bodily injury.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 078, 083. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Jails and Prisons. Prohibits prisoners from possessing
any portable electronic communication device that is capable of
transmitting or intercepting cellular or radio signals between
providers and users of telecommunication and data services. The
term prisoner includes all persons incarcerated at the adult
correctional facility, in the custody of an officer outside the
custodial unit, or in the custody of the state director of behavioral
services, developmental disabilities, and hospitals.
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2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 080, 085. An Act Relating to Court and
Civil Procedure - Courts - District Court. Amends the distribution
of court business by consolidating Rhode Island's six divisions into
four. The Act eliminates the first division and fifth division. The
second division includes the city of Newport and towns of
Jamestown, Little Compton, Middletown, Portsmouth and
Tiverton. Appeals and transfers for this division shall be
transmitted by the clerk of the Second Division District Court to
the clerk of Newport County Superior Court. The third division
includes city of Warwick and the towns of Coventry, East
Greenwich, Foster, Glocester, Johnston, Lincoln, North
Kingstown, North Providence, North Smithfield, Scituate,
Smithfield, West Greenwich and West Warwick. Appeals and
transfers for this division shall be transmitted by the clerk of the
Third Division District Court to the clerk of Kent County Superior
Court. The fourth division consists of the towns of Charlestown,
Exeter, Hopkinton, Narragansett, New Shoreham, Richmond,
South Kingstown and Westerly. Appeals and transfers shall be
transmitted by the clerk of the Fourth Division District Court to
the clerk of Washington County Superior Court. The sixth
division consists of the cities of Central Falls, East Providence,
Pawtucket, Woonsocket and the towns of Barrington, Bristol,
Burrillville, Cumberland and Warren. Appeals and transfers
shall be transmitted by the clerk of the Sixth Division District
Court to the clerk of Providence County Superior Court.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 159, 175. An Act Relating to Insurance
- Autism Spectrum Disorders. Requires every group health
insurance contract or every group hospital or medical expense
insurance policy issued or renewed after January 1, 2012 to
provide coverage for autism spectrum disorders. Benefits include
coverage for applied behavioral analysis, physical therapy, speech
therapy and occupational therapy services. Coverage only applies
to services delivered within the state of Rhode Island, and
continues only until the covered individual reaches age of fifteen.
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2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 162, 178. An Act Relating to Education
- Safe Schools. The "Safe School Act" prohibits "any form or
degree" of bullying in a school setting or where such behavior
creates disruption of the education process or orderly operation of
the school. The Act mandates that all Rhode Island schools adopt
a statewide and unified anti-bullying policy promulgated by the
Rhode Island Department of Education. The Act provides that all
school districts, charter schools, career and technical schools,
approved private day or residential schools and collaborative
schools adhere to the Act and adopt the statewide anti-bullying
policy by June 30, 2012.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 176, 300. An Act Relating to Criminals
- Correctional Institutions - Medical Parole. Amends the
availability of medical parole to include persons deemed "severely
ill," where it would alleviate exorbitant medical expenses
associated with inmates whose chronic and incurable illnesses
render their incarceration non-punitive and non-rehabilitative.
"Severely ill" is defined as suffering from a significant permanent
or chronic physical and/or mental condition that requires
extensive medical and/or psychiatric treatment with little or no
possibility of recovery and precludes significant rehabilitation.
Inmates will be considered for such release when the office of
financial resources of the department of corrections determines
the treatment causes the state to incur exorbitant expenses as a
result of continued and frequent medical treatment during
incarceration. An inmate granted medical parole shall be required
by the parole board to undergo electronic monitoring, unless the
health care plan mandates placement in a medical facility that
cannot accommodate electronic monitoring.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 185, 186. An Act Relating to Motor and
Other Vehicles - Safety Belt Use. Amends Rhode Island law by
providing that reasonable suspicion of a safety belt violation is
required to stop, inspect, or detain a motor vehicle to determine
whether the vehicle's occupants are in violation of current safety
belt law. The Act also prohibits any law enforcement officer from
performing a search of a motor vehicle, its contents, the driver, or
any passengers based solely on a violation of safety belt law.
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2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 196, 223. An Act Relating to Public
Utilities and Carriers - Internet Service Providers - Duty to
Disclose Information. Requires internet service providers, upon
proper service of a search warrant or an administrative subpoena,
to disclose subscriber account information consisting of the name,
address, IP address, and telephone numbers associated with the
account to the attorney general or the superintendent of the
Rhode Island State police. Only the above information may be
disclosed, and this information may only be disclosed when
necessary for a criminal investigation or prosecution of offenses
specifically delineated in the Act, such as child pornography and
cyberstalking.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 194, 207. An Act Relating to Animals
and Animal Husbandry - Animal Abuse Offenders. The Act
grants a sentencing judge the discretion to prohibit a person who
enters a plea of nolo contendere or is convicted of any
misdemeanor animal cruelty violation from possessing or residing
with any animal for a period of up to five years. The Act also gives
a sentencing judge the discretion to prohibit a person who enters a
plea of nolo contendere or is convicted of a felony animal cruelty
violation from possessing or residing with any animal for up to
fifteen years. A violation of this Act is punishable by a fine up to
$1000, imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, and
forfeiture of the animal(s).
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 198. An Act Relating to Domestic
Relations - Civil Unions. Provides for civil unions between two
individuals of the same sex. To be eligible to enter into a civil
union, both parties must be at least eighteen years old, of the
same sex, competent, not a party to another civil union or
marriage, and not in a family relationship as stated in sections 15-
1-1 and 15-1-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws. In order to
establish a valid civil union, the parties must obtain a license from
the town or city where one of the parties resides or, in the case of
nonresidents, in the town or city where the proposed civil union is
to be performed. Within three months of obtaining the civil union
license, the parties must have the civil union certified by a
qualified official and the certification must be held in the presence
of two witnesses in addition to the qualified official. A party to a
2012] 689
690 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 17:685
lawful civil union is entitled to the same benefits, protections, and
responsibilities as a party to a lawful marriage under section 15-3
of the Rhode Island General Laws, and a party to a civil union is
included in the definition or use of any term that denotes the
spousal relationship under Rhode Island law. The law provides
that Rhode Island will recognize a civil union or registered
domestic partnership lawfully entered into in another state, as
long as the relationship meets the eligibility requirements of this
Act; however the state will not recognize a civil union or registered
domestic partnership that has the status of marriage. The Rhode
Island Family Court has jurisdiction over the dissolution of civil
unions and will follow the same procedures as those for the
dissolution of marriage. Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, no religious or denominational organization,
organization operated for a charitable or educational purpose in
connection with a religious organization, or individual will be
subject to fines or penalties for refusing to provide, solemnize,
certify, or treat as valid any civil union if doing such would cause
the organization or individual to violate their sincerely held
religious beliefs.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 199, 201. An Act Relating to Elections -
Voter Identification. Requires any person claiming to be a
registered voter and wishing to vote in a primary, special, or
general election to provide valid proof of identification. Valid
types of proof of identification include documentation showing a
photograph of the person, such as a Rhode Island driver's license
or U.S. passport. Proof of identification not showing a photograph
of the person, such as a birth certificate or social security card, is
also allowed. If a person claiming to be a registered and eligible
voter is unable to provide proof of identity, they will be allowed to
vote by provisional ballot which the local board will later
determine the validity of.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 265. An Act Relating to Education -
School Committees and Superintendents. The Act amends the
general powers and duties granted to local school committees
under Rhode Island law. The Act vests the chief executive officer
of the respective city or town with the power and duty to enter
into collective bargaining agreements with teachers and school
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employees, rather than with the local school committee. The Act
applies to all cities and towns where the school committee is
appointed rather than elected, although it does not apply to any
municipality in receivership. The Act does not otherwise affect
the form of government of any city or town.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 269, 277. An Act Relating to Towns and
Cities - Indebtedness of Towns and Cities. Amends current law by
prohibiting any Rhode Island city or town from selling a long-term
bond to fund pension obligations or post-employment benefits
without prior approval by the state auditor general and director of
the state department of revenue.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 270, 295. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Children. Prohibits children under the age of eighteen
from engaging in "sexting"- electronically transmitting a sexually
indecent visual depiction of him or herself to another person. A
violation of this law constitutes a status offense and shall be
referred to the Family Court. A violation of this law does not
subject the minor to sex offender registry requirements under
applicable law.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 271, 318. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses - Children. Clarifies the distinction between the injury
requirement for a first degree child abuse conviction, carrying a
ten year mandatory prison sentence, and a second degree child
abuse conviction, carrying a five year mandatory prison sentence.
Prior to amendment, a first degree child abuse conviction required
a showing that the defendant caused "serious bodily injury," while
a second degree child abuse conviction required a showing of
"other serious physical injury." The amendment eliminates the
word "serious" from the elements of second degree child abuse, so
that a second degree child abuse conviction now requires the state
to prove that the defendant caused a physical injury other than
what qualifies as "serious bodily injury" under the first degree
child abuse.
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2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 338, 376. An Act Relating to Education
- Compulsory Attendance. The Act increases the age of mandatory
school attendance from sixteen (16) years old to eighteen (18)
years old. Allows a school superintendent to waive this
compulsory attendance requirement only upon proof that the pupil
is sixteen (16) years of age or older and has been accepted into a
postsecondary education program or has "an alternative learning
plan" for obtaining either a high school diploma or its equivalent.
The Act specifies that alternative learning plans must be of "age-
appropriate academic rigor and [have] the flexibility to
incorporate the pupil's interests and manner of learning" and
includes examples such as internships, online courses, and
independent study. Waiver requests that are denied by the
superintendent may be appealed to the school committee pursuant
to Rhode Island General Law section 16-39-1.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 339, 370. An Act Relating to Insurance
- Life Insurance Beneficiaries' Bill of Rights. The Act requires
complete and proper disclosure, transparency, and accountability
relating to the payment method of life insurance death benefits,
and requires that beneficiaries be fully informed in bold type and
in layman's terms. Requires that a beneficiary be informed of his
or her right to receive a lump-sum payment of life insurance
proceeds, and prohibits an insurer from using a retained asset
account unless the insurer discloses the beneficiary's options to
the beneficiary or the beneficiary's legal representative. If a
beneficiary does not receive a lump-sum payment of life insurance
proceeds, then the insurer must provide a clear explanation of all
life insurance proceeds payment options available to the
beneficiary. Also, if an insurer uses a retained asset account, then
the insurer must provide the beneficiary with a description and
explanation of the items listed in this section. The law applies to
death benefit claims under any life insurance policy submitted on
or after September 1, 2011.
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2011 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 408, 409. An Act Relating to Public
Officers and Employees - Retirement System - Contribution and
Benefits. Amends section 36-1-8 of the Rhode Island General
Laws by making significant changes to the state pension system to
ensure stability and long terms sustainability. The Act alters the
structure of the current state pension system by creating a defined
benefit plan in which retirement savings are accumulated in
individual member accounts. The Act also alters the current
pension system by altering eligibility requirements, raising the
retirement age, and temporarily suspending cost of living
adjustments. The Act also establishes a commission to review
municipal pension plans and make recommendations to improve
the security and sustainability of those plans.

